The Real Russia. Today.

Resurrecting Rutube

Wednesday, February 9, 2022

• Domestic policy: (opinion) Maxim Trudolyubov on citizenship under authoritarians, iStories and Agentstvo investigate Russia’s YouTube plans, and (opinion) Andrey Pertsev says the power vertical is sawing off its own feet
• Foreign policy: Russia skips the 2022 Munich Conference, (opinion) Thomas Graham and Alexander Dynkin offer a peace plan in Europe, (opinion) Vladislav Inozemtsev warns that the Kremlin doesn’t care about sanctions anymore, and (opinion) Almut Rochowanski says peace in the Donbas won’t come without ‘centering people’

Domestic policy

👁️ (Opinion) Maxim Trudolyubov on how authoritarian states use citizenship to create loyal subjects and control the masses (9-min read)

Every year, the Russian authorities “create” hundreds of thousands of new citizens — 720,000 Russian passports have already been issued to residents of Ukraine’s Donbas alone. In a sense, however, the Kremlin’s actions are not so different from other governments that offer citizenship to foreign nationals in order to (1) expand their sphere of influence abroad and (2) acquire new, loyal electorates. Meanwhile, Russia has deprived nine million of its own citizens of a key civil right — the right to stand for election — and pro-government politicians periodically float the idea of depriving opposition-minded Russians of their citizenship. Meduza “Ideas” editor Maxim Trudolyubov breaks down how citizenship has evolved from a privilege to an instrument of control and manipulation.

📺 The Russian authorities have been investing in domestic ‘alternatives’ to YouTube, investigative journalists report (3-min read)

The Russian authorities have been sinking money into domestic alternatives to YouTube for over a year, says a new investigation from iStories and Agentstvo. Allegedly, these Russian video platforms are meant to serve as substitutes in the event that Russia’s censorship agency bans YouTube altogether. However, sources say blocking YouTube would be a last resort — apparently, the authorities in the Kremlin hope that its parent company, Google, can be “forced into submission” through fines and threats to throttle YouTube’s traffic.

🗳️ (Opinion) Russia’s power vertical is now eating its own children

In an article for the Carnegie Moscow Center, expert Andrey Pertsev says proposed reforms to local government in Russia (designed to facilitate the state centralization baked into recent constitutional reforms) will eliminate the “ground floor” of the nation’s political elite, resulting in a less responsive bureaucracy, fewer resources for small- and medium-sized towns, less opportunity and recognition for local leaders, and less motivation for local officials to facilitate the Kremlin’s desired election results. The reforms are meant to enhance the central government’s power, explains Pertsev, but the Kremlin could end up paying for it with the very roots of its own support.

Foreign policy

🕊️ For the first time in more than 20 years, Russia will not send an official delegation to the Munich Security Conference (President Vladimir Putin has attended the forum only once, in 2007. There, he delivered his so-called “Munich speech,” criticizing “unipolarity,” as well as the United States and NATO.)

(Opinion) Four steps to détente in Europe

In an article published in Kommersant, former U.S. National Security Council senior director for Russia Thomas Graham and Institute of World Economy and International Relations Alexander Dynkin (the same Alexander Dynkin who reportedly would have joined Russia’s delegation at this year’s Munich Conference) outline four broad steps to resolve the current security crisis in Europe and integrate Russia on mutually acceptable terms. The text expands on recommendations Graham made to Kommersant a few weeks earlier: (1) limitations on military operations near the borders of both Russia and NATO members, (2) a 30ish-year moratorium on NATO’s eastward expansion, (3) the resolution of the frozen conflicts in the former USSR and in the Balkans, and (4) an updated Helsinki Accords to negotiate agreeable interpretations of the principles that could foster a new détente.

Graham and Dynkin argue that “periodic crises” in Europe are “inevitable” without major adjustments to the security arrangements upheld primarily by Washington for the past 30 years. The two experts acknowledge that the U.S. is extremely reluctant to change a system that has served its interests well, but they stress that Russia’s revisionism is typical for great powers that have recovered enough strength to contest a postwar settlement from which they were excluded.

Graham and Dynkin say Moscow and the West should pursue all four recommendations simultaneously, given Russia’s insistence on resolving NATO expansion before addressing other issues. They say a moratorium could allow both sides to walk away claiming not to have lost, hence the time period of several decades: long enough for Russia to say its minimum demands were met, but short enough for Washington to maintain that the alliance’s doors aren’t really shut. If this proves impossible, Graham and Dynkin say the West should at least find a way to signal that it won’t offer membership to Ukraine in the near future. As for limits on military operations, there’s already precedent for NATO limiting its weapons deployments in 1997.

The two experts say local democracy is the best way to resolve the region’s frozen conflicts. Election officials and international monitors would need to adapt the exact form of voting to the specific circumstances in each territory, and the voting itself needn’t be a referendum on secession (it might be enough if voters merely endorse candidates who support secession). The important thing here would be to grant agency to those most affected by these conflicts. At the same time, Graham and Dynkin say they expect these votes would ultimately confirm the “truth” already apparent to most impartial observers (that Kosovo is independent, that Crimea will never return to Ukraine, and so on).

💰 (Opinion) The Kremlin gladly risks stagnation in its pursuit of Western concessions

In an op-ed for The Insider, political expert Vladislav Inozemtsev argues that Russia’s ultimatum to NATO was not “an invitation to war” but the Kremlin’s last attempt to “win concessions from the West by peaceful means.” The effort failed, he says, further isolating the Russian economy and prolonging the nation’s stagnation, but the high price of energy and the federal government’s enormous gold reserves insulate the Kremlin from these threats. In fact, the state’s interests are often at odds with the interests of individuals and businesses, says Inozemtsev, who dismisses the likelihood of truly crippling sanctions against Russia because they would ultimately be too disruptive to business globally. In other words, the main result of this winter’s tensions between Russia and the West is the “reinforcement of the new reality” wherein the West pulls its punches with sanctions, and Russia accepts the absence of real economic prospects.

🕊️ (Opinion) The Donbas needs a ‘people-centered’ peace process

In an article for openDemocracy, researcher and civil society organizer Almut Rochowanski welcomes what she calls the ascension of “realist-restraint” thinking about European security issues and Ukraine, but she argues that resolving the conflict in the Donbas will require more. Rochowanski says Minsk II should be the starting point for a peace agreement, but “we must not stop there.”

On the one hand, Minsk II “follows the inescapable logic of any peace deal” by forcing both sides to “cede a degree of sovereignty,” but a lasting resolution also needs to secure “broad, representative public participation” by addressing “grievances, human rights, and human security,” as well as reconciliation, healing, returning displaced persons, and demobilizing armed groups. Collectively, Rochowanski calls this a “people-centered peace process.” Additionally, she stresses the need to “center women” in this work. Taking this approach is necessary for “dismantling the dogma” that Ukraine has chosen “cultural-linguistic homogenization” and jettisoned any “intersectional diversity.”

Yours, Meduza