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On June 4-5, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) launched their long-awaited offensive, though details on its exact shape and direction are not yet clear.
Not all of Ukraine’s forces who were trained for the summer campaign have been deployed for the first stage of the offensive. Ukraine has decided to spread out its forces — contrary to expectations. In the Zaporizhzhia region and in the western Donetsk region, the AFU have attempted to advance on three fronts. The offensive’s westernmost position, located near the Dnipro River, is 115 kilometers (71 miles) from the easternmost, which is not far from Vuhledar. If you count Ukraine’s two offensive flanks on the Bakhmut front, which have been ongoing since May, there are a total of five offensives underway.
It’s possible that spreading out its forces could have led to tactical issues for Ukraine:
In order for the offensive to be successful, the AFU will have to address their tactical issues, such as the inability to pass through areas in front of the Russian military’s positions without suffering heavy losses. The AFU will also have to address operational issues, such as choosing weak spots in Russia’s defenses to carry out concentrated strikes.
During combat in 2022, Russian troops created a “wedge” that reached the outskirts of Velyka Novosilka, a city located in the Donetsk region on the border with the Zaporizhzhia region. Russian troops were unable to capture the city, and afterwards engaged in trench warfare.
The AFU has now decided to cut off the “wedge” by carrying out strikes from both the west (on Storozhevoy) and from the east (on Novodonetske). At least two new AFU brigades are participating in the offensive. If the AFU succeeds, this could allow for an offensive on Mariupol, and then on the route that supplies all Russian forces from Taganrog in Russia’s Rostov region. However, Ukrainian units have encountered difficulties here:
Ukrainian brigades armed with Leopard and Bradley tanks participated in the offensive. According to the Pentagon documents leaked in April, these were the newly formed 33rd and 47th mechanized brigades. However, the distribution of equipment may have changed in the last couple of months.
The first attacks seemed to have ended in major failure. Troops began to suffer losses in the gray zone (the area between the two sides) before they even reached Russian positions. The equipment losses were mostly due to landmines, anti-tank missiles launched from the ground, and attack helicopters.
Dozens of armored vehicles, including Leopard and Bradley tanks, were lost in the battle. There were virtually no advances into Russian defenses (or at least none that were confirmed on video).
The AFU’s units carried out a strike on the village of Lobkove, located approximately 10 kilometers (6 miles) east of the left bank of the Dnipro River and 35 kilometers (22 miles) south of Zaporizhzhia. An attack moving south along the Dnipro could potentially prove to be the most important part of the whole operation — its goal could be the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and, later, the Crimean isthmuses.
The AFU’s advancing forces would be at an advantage if the Dnipro always protected their right flank, with Ukrainian artillery positioned behind the river. In fact, the AFU could attack along the Dnipro front, pushing Russian forces away from the riverbank. However, it’s precisely here where there are relatively few forces stationed.
The Ukrainian military entered Lobkove, which video footage corroborates, though they lost several units of equipment and were unable to reach the front due to Russian artillery fire. Russian sources claim that the Russian army was able to recapture the village, but this remains unconfirmed.
It’s too early to say how the AFU’s tactical issues will affect the entire operation. It’s likely that the Ukrainian army will have to focus on suppressing Russian artillery, which has been inflicting the most damage and has prevented Ukrainian troops from advancing through minefields. In order to do so, the AFU will have to direct more of its own artillery fire into the locations of its intended breaches.
Thus far, there have been no fundamental changes to the balance of power. The AFU still has many reserves yet to engage in combat — most new brigades haven’t entered the battlefield. Additionally, occupying troops have suffered heavy losses, which even Russian sources have acknowledged.
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