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Mediocre mediators: How various countries use “peacekeeping” initiatives in Ukraine for their own purposes
On August 5, Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Kyiv plans to lay the foundation for ending Russia’s war this year. What exactly he meant by this remains unclear. Multiple “peace plan” proposals have emerged since the early months of the war, often involving third-party mediation — with China, India, Turkey, and Hungary playing notable roles. While these initiatives have not led to real progress, the potential brokers continue to actively leverage their “mediator” status for geopolitical gain — with some success.
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Turkey: controlling the straits and gas transit
China: demonstrating global influence
India: getting Russian oil and avoiding quarrels with the West
Hungary: strengthening influence in the EU and Ukraine
Turkey: controlling the straits and gas transit
After the first peace talks between Russia and Ukraine broke down in the early weeks of the full-scale war, the focus of efforts to find a diplomatic solution shifted from Belarus to Turkey. Unlike Belarus, which had served as the staging ground for Russia’s attack towards Kyiv, Turkey enjoyed a more balanced position with regards to the conflict. This helped make both sides more open to compromise. For Russia, this was because the war's outcome had become uncertain, as by mid-March 2022, Moscow had been forced to acknowledge the failure of its initial blitzkrieg strategy. From the Ukrainian side, its representatives no longer felt isolated, meaning that concessions from Kyiv would not necessarily be seen as a defeat.
But what were Turkey's interests in offering its territory as a platform for negotiations — beyond the obvious goal of boosting Ankara’s international prestige?
Turkey's stance was initially quite clear. Ankara condemned the war and supported Ukraine's territorial integrity. Since 2014, Turkey's relationship with Ukraine had been growing stronger, partly due to its opposition to the annexation of Crimea, a region with which Turkey has deep historical ties. Turkey's approach did not just align with international law; it was driven by obvious geopolitical and historical factors.
If Russia had won the war quickly and easily, it would have enhanced Moscow’s presence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, posing a direct challenge to Turkish dominance in the region. This is particularly significant given the ongoing conflicts of interest between Moscow and Ankara in Syria and the South Caucasus. Russia's military operation in Syria not only heightened tensions with Turkey but also made the issue of passage through the Bosphorus Straits a critical security concern. The possibility of Russia advancing by land to the Straits area near Izmail revived old geopolitical fears.
However, Turkey's formally pro-Ukrainian stance was counterbalanced by a few factors. For one, Putin and Erdogan enjoyed a fairly normal personal relationship. Perhaps even more importantly, Russia and Turkey shared significant mutual trade and economic interests. As Western sanctions increasingly isolated Russia, Turkey became a crucial bridge to global commodity and technology flows, often serving as Russia's only viable partner. Even though the Nord Stream pipelines were still operational in the spring of 2022, Europe's energy dependence on Russia made the Turkish route for Russian-European gas transit essential, potentially giving Turkey a controlling stake in the future of Russian energy transit to Europe.
As sanctions increasingly isolated Russia, Turkey became a crucial bridge to global commodity and technology flows
The Istanbul talks also proposed putting the question of Crimea’s territorial status on hold, with the possibility of revisiting it in ten years. Erdogan may have envisioned some form of condominium for the peninsula — shared sovereignty between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea, potentially under international oversight during a transitional period. In this scenario, Turkey, with its long-standing cultural and political ties to Crimea and its traditional role as a Black Sea power, could naturally position itself as a mediator acceptable to all parties, backed by an international mandate. The “grain deal” included in the Istanbul plan — a measure that was ultimately adopted in July 2022 — also allowed Ankara to play a key role in guaranteeing global food security.
So far, the Turkish mediation project is the only one that has moved into even the initial stages of implementation. When negotiations were paused in April of 2022, the parties had not only begun discussing specific details of a potential final peace agreement but had also taken some de-escalatory steps to move toward it, such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from around Kyiv (even if debate remains about whether that Russian withdrawal was the result of a trust building initiative, or if Moscow’s troops had simply been driven out by counterattacking Ukrainian forces). In other words, the negotiation process was progressing steadily, and from this perspective, the Turkish mediation mission can be considered relatively successful.
Negotiations of Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Istanbul, March 2022
TASS
Moreover, even if the talks proved incapable of ending the war, one key element of the larger plan — the grain corridor — was institutionalized and continued to function successfully even after the negotiations fell apart. As for the mediator, Turkey managed to increase its global influence, enhance its international standing, and maintain trust with both sides of the conflict.
This trust, however, came at least in part because both Kyiv and Moscow lacked any better alternative. As mentioned above, Russia relies on Turkey both geopolitically and economically, while Ukraine depends on Turkey for geopolitical reasons and, to some extent, for military-technical support.
Such ties were sufficient to start talks, but not to continue them. In late October 2023, Ankara made another attempt to revive its mediation efforts, but by that time, both sides were focused on gaining the strategic upper hand and were far from ready for any compromises.
Recently, Turkey facilitated a prisoner exchange between Russia and the West but has not been heavily involved in other mediation efforts. Ankara’s diplomatic efforts now prioritize the Middle East, where it seems willing to mediate without taking on too many commitments related to Ukraine.
And yet, Turkey still remains a valuable partner for other potential mediators. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, for instance, has spoken positively about Turkey's role in Budapest’s mediation efforts.
China: demonstrating global influence
China's official vision for a peaceful settlement of the Russia-Ukraine conflict was most clearly articulated on February 24, 2023. The timing suggests that the plan was intended to coincide with the opening of the latest session of the UN General Assembly, although it was not formally presented there.
This settlement plan marked China's first major international initiative in the post-COVID era and was likely intended to underscore Beijing’s role as a global player willing to take on some responsibility for maintaining stability worldwide. In this context, the mere act of proposing the plan was perhaps more significant than its actual feasibility.
The settlement plan was likely intended to underscore China's role as a global player willing to take on some responsibility for maintaining stability worldwide
The plan itself was carefully balanced: it called for respecting territorial integrity and preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction, while also opposing the expansion of military alliances. Additionally, it paired the promise of post-war reconstruction for Ukraine with a call to avoid imposing unilateral sanctions.
China's envoy held negotiations on Ukraine in Russia
“Vedomosti”
China also put forward initiatives that highlighted its responsibility as a member of the world community. These included ensuring grain supplies to the world market, preventing disruptions in global trade and technological chains, and protecting nuclear energy facilities.
Experts suggest that if China's plan were successful, Beijing could certainly gain recognition as a global mediator. However, this wouldn't necessarily translate into significantly increased influence over the parties involved in the conflict. Even if Beijing’s proposals were adopted, Ukraine would likely remain under the guidance of the “Western” participants in any settlement, and the influence China gained over Russia during the war is so substantial that it would be difficult for post-conflict influence to offer greater benefits.
The influence China gained over Russia during the war is so substantial that it would be difficult for post-conflict influence to offer greater benefits
Indeed, over the course of the war, Moscow has been compelled to shift its energy exports and much of its trade and technological partnerships to China, while also increasing the use of the Chinese yuan in international transactions. Russia’s lack of alternatives has allowed China to secure highly favorable terms in the two countries’ economic relationship, effectively turning the Russian market into an extension of the Chinese market. These advantages are seen as China's gains from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and could significantly diminish — or even vanish — if a peaceful settlement were reached.
Furthermore, Beijing views Russia, which initiated the war, as both a disruptor of the current world order and as a means to test the limits of U.S. power, particularly concerning the Taiwan issue, which is of paramount importance to China.
Therefore, experts largely interpret China's peace initiatives as more of a symbolic demonstration of its global ambitions and a projection of its influence, rather than a genuine effort aimed at resolving the conflict.
The Chinese plan emerged as the most structured “non-Western” proposal for settling the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, it's hard to determine whether it could have served as a viable negotiating platform, as it was met with extreme caution and distrust both by Western stakeholders and Ukraine. By the second year of the war, China's role in bolstering Russia's economic and technological resilience in the face of sanctions was evident to all observers. Russia's formal support for theChinese plan likely only deepened the wider world’s skepticism toward the Chinese initiative.
On May 23, 2024, the world saw the release of a second version of the Chinese plan. This time, it was co-authored with Brazil and presented by China as the position of a segment of the global South, reinforcing the idea that China is using the Russia-Ukraine settlement issue to advance its model of global order.
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war appears to benefit China, a view echoed by the West — most notably by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who called China the “main enabler” of Russian aggression against Ukraine.
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war appears to benefit China
Given the dual nature of China's approach and the clear reluctance of the West to allow Beijing to shape a potential settlement, the Chinese mediation effort appears doomed. Moreover, China itself no longer seems interested in playing the role of peacemaker. On July 19, the Chinese Foreign Ministry officially stated its support for direct dialogue between Moscow and Kyiv.
India: getting Russian oil and avoiding quarrels with the West
The role of India in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its mediation efforts remains unclear. In the early weeks of the war, India advocated for a resolution based on diplomatic principles of territorial integrity and respect for sovereignty. Indian officials condemned the civilian deaths in Bucha and, during a meeting with Vladimir Putin in Samarkand in autumn 2022, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi condemned the use of war as a tool of international relations. However, India has not directly condemned Russian aggression and seems to be carefully balancing its position, striving to keep its options open regarding Russia and the conflict.
India seems to be carefully balancing its position, striving to keep its options open regarding Russia and the conflict
India's shaky stance is understandable. On one side, there are the long-standing traditions of Russian-Indian political and, crucially, military-technical cooperation. On the other, there is India's desire to maintain its reputation as a global advocate for peace, to avoid jeopardizing its deep integration into the global economy, and to avoid losing ground in its strategic rivalry with China, which has become Russia's main partner since 2022.
With Russia's clear shift towards China, India is finding it challenging to balance its traditional policy of maintaining relations with both China’s adversaries in Southeast Asia and Russia’s opponents on the global stage. Meanwhile, the longstanding military and technical ties between Moscow and New Delhi continue to influence India's approach.
As a result, India's strategy appears to be intentionally ambiguous. In February 2024, Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar indicated that India might consider mediating. However, by July 2024, both Prime Minister Modi and Austrian Chancellor Nehammer stated that they would not offer their countries’ diplomats as mediators — nor their soldiers as peacekeepers — but were open to supporting initiatives from other nations. During Modi's visit to Moscow in July, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed that India was not positioning itself as a mediator.
The Kremlin reported “new ideas” on peace in Ukraine after Modi's visit
There are still reasons why India might change course and pursue a role as a mediator. One key motivation is to boost its own global and regional influence, especially since China, its main rival, is also vying to be a major player in peace efforts.
Other motivations are less apparent.
Like China, India has benefitted from the Russia-Ukraine war, though its gains have been primarily economic rather than geopolitical. Delhi has largely capitalized on favorable trading opportunities, such as the influx of heavily discounted Russian oil sold in exchange for less liquid Indian rupees.
Like China, India has benefitted from the Russia-Ukraine war
At the same time, the war has posed challenges for New Delhi. For instance, in 2023, a contract for supplying Russian S-400 air defense systems to India faced potential disruptions, and as secondary sanctions from the U.S. come into effect, any economic ties with Russia risk becoming problematic.
However, India has a strong interest in containing China's ambitions in Southeast Asia and would benefit from increased Western focus on this region, as Western nations are also working to counter Beijing's influence.
Given this reality, India is likely keen on seeing a swift resolution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as the ongoing war in Europe continues to shift Western strategic resources away from Southeast Asia. Additionally, India would prefer that the ultimate settlement does not reward Russia in the form of territorial gains, as such an outcome could set a precedent for potential Chinese actions around Taiwan, an area of crucial concern for Asians.
Hence the duality of the Indian position regarding mediation: India's initiative may look like a marker that a player puts on the table to demonstrate their geopolitical ambitions, but it can also be considered as an indicator of real interest in achieving a settlement as soon as possible. So far, however, experts consider the first option more likely.
Hungary: strengthening influence in the EU and Ukraine
Hungary stands out in the list of mediators — and not in a way that makes success more likely. For a mediation effort to succeed, the mediator typically needs either significant influence over one of the parties to the conflict or considerable international authority. However, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has limited authority both within the EU and in Ukraine, which undermines his effectiveness as a mediator. This is why Brussels and many other European capitals responded so negatively to his initiatives, even resorting to a boycott against Hungary's mediation attempt.
Orban has limited authority both within the EU and in Ukraine, which undermines his effectiveness as a mediator
The specifics of the Hungarian settlement plan remain unclear. The only element that is known is that Viktor Orban reported to the EU Council that, in his view, the parties were not ready for any compromise. This suggests that some form of compromise might have been part of Orban’s plan, but it is uncertain whether a detailed plan actually existed. It is possible that the main focus of Orban’s shuttle diplomacy — traveling to Moscow, Kyiv, Beijing, and even to Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate — was more about the show than the substance.
Orban seemed to be positioning himself as a negotiator acceptable to both warring parties, and also to major global stakeholders — including China’s leader and the potential once-and-future U.S. president. In his report, Orban highlighted Turkey as the only mediator to have achieved any success in the Russia-Ukraine conflict so far. It seems Orban views himself as a bridge between the “Western” and “non-Western” groups of external stakeholders in the conflict, especially given that Trump’s position is considered to fall outside the traditional Western perspective.
If Orban's mission were to succeed in reaching a legitimate peace plan, Hungary’s international prestige and its prime minister’s personal standing would undoubtedly rise. Additionally, Hungary’s influence in Ukraine, which Orban has long pursued with some success, would likely increase. However, the strong rejection of Orban's mediation efforts in Brussels and Kyiv — evidenced by the suspension of Russian oil transit to Hungary via Ukraine shortly after his visit — undermines Budapest's plan and casts doubt on its viability.
So far, all potential mediators of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated, at best, mediocrity.