Moscow’s minions

A new pro-Kremlin bloc is taking shape in the European Parliament

In late September, British politician and former MEP Nathan Gill pleaded guilty to accepting bribes from a Russian intermediary, Oleg Voloshyn. Between 2018 and 2019, Voloshyn instructed Gill on at least eight occasions to deliver anti-Ukrainian speeches in the European Parliament, spread disinformation, bring together European politicians for pro-Russian events, and carry out other activities in Moscow’s interests.

Gill is a former MEP for the Reform UK party — the current leader in the opinion polls. When British MEPs left the European Parliament following Brexit in 2020, the body’s pro-Russia camp lost part of its strength, yet it remained a visible force in the chamber.

Throughout the ninth European Parliament, which ran from 2019 to 2024 — both before and after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — a group of MEPs consistently voted against resolutions condemning Moscow or supporting Kyiv.

The most prominent among them, Tatjana Ždanoka of the Russian Union of Latvia, has been under investigation since February 2024 for her alleged links to the FSB, and the probe has effectively ended her two-decade career in the European Parliament.

Another frequent opponent of pro-Ukraine resolutions was Maximilian Krah from Germany’s far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). In March, he moved from the European Parliament to the Bundestag, which later lifted his parliamentary immunity amid an investigation into alleged espionage and corruption — reportedly in China’s, rather than Russia’s, interests.

The new European Parliament, elected in June 2024, has shifted further to the right, with conservative and nationalist parties gaining ground and forming two new groupings — Patriots for Europe (PfE) and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN).

Since taking office, the new parliament has voted on at least 14 resolutions concerning Russia and Ukraine — an early test of how its fresh line-up approaches foreign policy.

Drawing on these voting records, EUobserver and Novaya Gazeta Europe have formulated an updated ranking of the most pro-Kremlin parties and MEPs.

Extremes unite on Russia

During the ninth European Parliament, roughly 40 MEPs on average opposed resolutions condemning Russia, while another 43 chose to abstain.

In the new assembly, however, that number has almost doubled. Around 84 deputies now routinely vote against such motions, with a further 62 either abstaining or missing votes. Though the pro-Russia bloc remains too small to overturn a resolution, the distance between the mainstream and the radicals has clearly narrowed.

Pro-Kremlin sentiment in the chamber is mostly found at its political fringes. On one end sit members of The Left, the far-left group, and on the other, the newly formed far-right alliances — PfE and ESN.

Outside the formal party blocs, the trend is similar. Among the unaffiliated MEPs — a loose mix of members from small or radical parties shunned by mainstream groups — only one in 14 Russia-critical resolutions has received support.

The list includes deputies from Germany’s hard-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), whose rhetoric on the war often mirrors that of their far-right counterparts in the AfD.

BSW is also one of the leaders among all other national delegations in their support of Kremlin positions. In the 14 resolutions analysed, almost every vote cast by its six MEPs was either a vote against or an abstention. One MEP left BSW in February, reducing its delegation to five.

Yet the bulk of pro-Kremlin votes comes from larger and more influential forces — the French Rassemblement National (RN), Germany’s AfD, Hungary’s ruling party Fidesz and Italy’s Five Star Movement.

With sizeable delegations and disciplined voting patterns, these parties shape most of the resistance to resolutions condemning Moscow or backing Kyiv.

Voting patterns on Russia-related resolutions tend to follow party leadership — and the mood of their core voters — a trend clearly visible in the case of RN under Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella.

Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, RN MEPs unanimously opposed every resolution criticising Moscow. Between March 2022 and the end of the previous term in 2024, however, their stance softened: the share of pro-Kremlin votes dropped from 100% to 57%, reflecting Le Pen’s effort to distance herself from the Kremlin after repeated accusations of financial and political ties.

That shift now appears to be reversing. In the new parliament, RN’s share of votes against and abstentions on 14 Russia-critical resolutions has climbed back to 67%.

The party supported most symbolic texts — such as those condemning Russia’s falsification of history, or the deportation of Ukrainian children — yet withheld backing for resolutions on increased EU aid to Kyiv.

The renewed hard line may stem both from the Kremlin’s attempts to sway French public opinion and from Le Pen’s recent criminal conviction, which has effectively ended her political career.

The AfD has shown similar swings. After February 2022, its MEPs became less predictable — sometimes abstaining and, in one of the final resolutions of the previous term, even joining the mainstream to denounce the illegitimacy of Russia’s presidential elections.

In the new parliament, however, the AfD’s pro-Kremlin vote share has climbed back to nearly 90%. The only resolution most of its MEPs chose to abstain on concerned the return of Ukrainian children deported to Russia.

Hungary’s Fidesz has also moved closer to Moscow since the 2024 European elections. During the parliament’s ninth convocation, the party opposed just two of 30 Russia-critical resolutions, and in most cases simply chose not to vote at all.

It has now voted against seven of 14 resolutions condemning Moscow and abstained on three more — reflecting both Viktor Orbán’s tougher rhetoric on Ukraine and the party’s new alliance within the PfE grouping, after years of sitting unaffiliated.

Slovakia’s SMER-SD (Direction-Social Democracy), led by Prime Minister Robert Fico, has taken a similar course in the European Parliament. Having expanded its delegation from two to five MEPs, the party now rejects almost every Russia-critical resolution — 12 out of 14 to date — in line with Bratislava’s broader push for what it calls a “balanced” relationship with Moscow.

Old names fade, new allies emerge

To refine the individual ranking of the most pro-Kremlin MEPs, the analysis of 14 Russia-critical and pro-Ukraine resolutions was supplemented by three additional votes concerning the European Parliament’s position on Belarus.

The final list includes 21 MEPs who consistently vote in line with Moscow’s interests — only four of whom appeared in our previous rankings. The reshuffle reflects both the major turnover in the new parliament’s composition and the fact that several former frontrunners are now facing criminal charges.

Among those who reappear in the new ranking, Slovakia’s Milan Uhrík — leader of the far-right Republic Movement and now vice-chair of the ESN group — ranks the highest.

In comments to Novaya Gazeta Europe, Uhrík defended his voting record on Russia and Ukraine and accused the EU of having double standards. He also said that those condemning Moscow “remain blind to more brutal acts committed by Western countries or their allies”.

This summer, Uhrík made his first visit to Belarus, praising the country on state TV channels as “cleaner than Brussels” and urging Europe to “normalise relations” with Minsk and Moscow. Unsurprisingly, he voted against all three resolutions condemning the Belarusian regime.

Another Slovak MEP from Republic, Milan Mazurek, also appears near the top of the list. A newly-elected lawmaker, Mazurek became an MEP after losing his seat in the Slovak parliament over racist remarks he made about the country’s Roma community. He also refused to wear a mask during the pandemic, and has even praised Hitler on social media.

Czech MEP Ivan David, a psychiatrist and former health minister, also retains his spot in the new ranking. Once a mainstream politician, he later joined Czechia’s far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and became known for spreading disinformation — first about Covid-19 and then about the war in Ukraine.

Two other long-time figures in the ranking — Greece’s Kostas Papadakis and Czechia’s Kateřina Konečná — represent small communist parties in their countries. Both have repeatedly voiced pro-Kremlin positions that have been eagerly amplified by Russian state media.

The strongest showing, however, comes from Germany’s Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW). All its current MEPs appear in the ranking, with three topping it. Support for Russia and criticism of Ukraine have become part of BSW’s political brand as it competes with AfD for voters in eastern Germany.

Wagenknecht herself condemns the Russian invasion of Ukraine but portrays it as a reaction to NATO expansion and opposes Ukraine’s membership of the alliance. She regularly denounces Berlin as a vassal of the United States, calling instead for Germany to play a role mediating between Moscow, Eastern Europe and Washington.

The ranking also includes three new names from Slovakia’s ruling SMER-SD party.

Among them, Ľuboš Blaha stands out as the most consistent Kremlin sympathiser. A longtime advocate of closer ties with Moscow, he justified the annexation of Crimea back in 2014 and, since becoming an MEP in 2024, has visited Russia twice, where he is known to have met with Russian foreign intelligence chief Sergey Naryshkin.

The new ranking of pro-Kremlin MEPs reveals a more mixed landscape, split almost evenly between far-right nationalists and hard-left radicals — a reflection of Europe’s broader political shift.

While mainstream parties still control most national governments and maintain support for Kyiv, radicals from both ends of the political spectrum are gaining ground.

Though the European Parliament remains largely impervious to their influence, their growing numbers nevertheless increases the Kremlin’s scope for cultivating sympathetic allies — as past scandals involving former MEPs Nathan Gill and Tatjana Ždanoka have shown.

This story was published in partnership with euobserver.