Resistance network coverage: Iranian protesters have shown the world how to combat internet shutdowns

A study on the topic commissioned by Chinese intelligence agencies explored the feasibility of jamming Starlink over Taiwan. Modeling showed that such an operation would require about a thousand drones — or balloons equipped with special gear — hovering constantly in the air several kilometers apart. These would need to be plugged into a source of continuous power supply, and there is currently no evidence that anything like this has been successfully attempted.

Why is it so difficult to jam the internet provided by Elon Musk’s company? In short, there is a fundamental difference between Starlink and traditional satellite communications. In older systems, satellites are positioned far away in geostationary orbit. As a result, the signal is weak and easily catches interference, sometimes even from clouds. Communication requires a parabolic dish aimed directly at the satellite.

By contrast, Starlink satellites are in constant motion. The terminal’s antenna is phased-array — essentially a set of small antennas on a single substrate, allowing one terminal to communicate with multiple satellites simultaneously. If interference occurs, Starlink simply switches to another satellite.

This is why blocking Starlink is so difficult: instead of jamming the signal toward a single satellite, would-be censors have to “cover” the entire sky with interference (which is why, in the case of Taiwan, the model estimated the need for around a thousand jammers).

Mikhail Klimaryov of the Internet Protection Society is also adamant that efforts to block Starlink are unlikely to succeed, as proven by similar attempts during the war in Ukraine: “Combat experience shows that jamming the terminal’s receiving function is very difficult and energy‑intensive. Instead, the Russians use spoofing — that is, GPS signal substitution. The dish has to be aimed very precisely at the satellite, and it uses GPS for precision. At the frontline, spoofing is countered by placing the terminal in a Faraday cage — a simple device that can be made from chain‑link mesh.”

According to an online manual attributed to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the most effective ways to shield Starlink terminals from enemy electronic warfare (EW) interference involves either placing them at the bottom of a pit, or surrounding them with a makeshift Faraday cage made of steel mesh with a cell size of 2 to 6 centimeters. The structure should be about 120 centimeters high and 110–120 centimeters in circumference, with the mesh wrapped in three to four layers. Crucially, the authors warn against covering the terminals from above.