Opinion: The risks of Ramzan Kadyrov

Why Chechnya's ruler has returned to Russian airwaves with new hostility

Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of Russia's Chechen Republic, has dominated national headlines in recent weeks, proclaiming the country's liberal opposition to be “enemies of the people” and “traitors.” He's even threatened to throw protest leaders, whom he accuses of working for Western intelligence agencies, in insane asylums. In an opinion piece for the newspaper Vedomosti, editors Nikolai Epple and Andrei Sinitsyn break down the trending theories about Kadyrov's new media offensive, arguing that it raises the risks of further political violence, like the assassination of Boris Nemtsov last February. Meduza translates that text here.

Last week, the head of Chechnya launched a new media campaign to defend Russia from “enemies of the people” and “traitors.” In this group, he included the leaders of Russia's protest movement, who he says “are trying to cash in on a difficult economic situation.” Ramzan Kadyrov's remarks have provoked a strong reaction in the public, generating criticism not only from the protest leaders themselves, but also from officials like human rights commissioner Ella Pamfilova. Meanwhile, Magomed Daudov, the speaker of the Chechen parliament, State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov, and Senator Suleiman Geremeyev have all supported Kadyrov, creatively developing his ideas even further. On Instagram, Daudov went so far as to name names when identifying the “puppets” and “crooked cultural figures, politicians, and journalists” whose actions, he says, must be stopped.

On the one hand, Russians have gotten used to the fact that, from time to time, Kadyrov makes outlandish statements. He proposed sending Chechen troops to Karelia in 2006, when race riots hit Kondopoga; he promised collective responsibility for the relatives of suspected militants (and he later burned down their homes); and he ordered Chechen security forces to open fire on any police found in Chechnya deployed from other regions in Russia. He not infrequently has harsh words for the Russian opposition, but he doesn't stop there. Last year, “devils” and “traitors” is what he called the judge and prosecutor in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, after a court ruled that a book with excerpts from the Koran was extremist. The ruling was then reversed, and the Duma later passed a law introduced by President Putin exempting the sacred texts of Russia's four established religions from being branded as incitements to extremism.

On the other hand, in the past, there has always been something that triggered each of Kadyrov's outbursts. This time, the reason isn't obvious, but the campaign is massive, and he has the support of his subordinates. Why now?

There are many theories, but we can fold them all into two opposing views. One view claims that Kadryov has grown stronger recently: he withstood the pressure from Russia's federal security agencies in the investigation of Boris Nemtsov's murder, he protects the religious sentiments of Muslims, and he provides the Kremlin with various services in eastern Ukraine and in Syria. The Kremlin doesn't interfere, and this unties Kadyrov's hands. As state revenues fall, he needs to assert himself more loudly in the fight for his share of the country's rents, and to ensure his control over the Chechen Republic.

Conversely, other theories about Kadyrov's new offensive says Putin's demand for “footsoldiers” has declined: in both Syria and eastern Ukraine, Russia is trying to move toward a settlement, and the activity of Chechen security forces is no longer needed. Now they must find new roles in Russia at the national level, to avoid being localized to Chechnya. The moment he outgrows his position as head of the republic, Kadyrov risks being replaced. He needs to establish himself in a new role soon, too, before he's promoted who knows where, and his influence in Chechnya is lost.

Political analyst Alexei Makarkin believes that the Kremlin has no need of Kadyrov's recent comments, just months before elections in the State Duma, where Moscow wants to conduct a respectable campaign. But the Kremlin won't respond to Kadyrov in any official capacity—it will merely try quietly to apply the brakes.

Whatever the reasons for Kadyrov's new media blitz, it's easy to see what dangers it risks. He is cultivating in Chechnya the concept of loyalty to the leader, and his subordinates support him, eager to please the head of their republic. And you can never be too sure there won't be other “true patriots and deeply religious, brave warriors” (words Kadyrov used to describe the men accused of murdering Boris Nemtsov) who decide that calling people “traitors” isn't just politics, but target assignment.