Misuse of Anti-Extremism in March 2022

The following is our review of the primary and most representative events in the misuse of Russia's anti-extremist legislation inMarch2022.

The military operation in Ukraine launched on February 24 caused a wave of protests in Russia, and, in March, the authorities took active measures to influence the public, prevent mass dissent, both offline and online, and establish tighter control over the information space.

Lawmaking in the Light of the Events in Ukraine

On March 4, the State Duma of Russia adopted laws amending the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO) and the Criminal Code (CC) under emergency procedure (not in the form of separate bills, but by amending other bills that had already been adopted in the first reading). These laws dealt with calling for sanctions against Russia, spreading fake news about the Russian armed forces, discrediting them, and calling for “obstruction to their use.” The laws were approved by the Federation Council on the same day and signed by the president in the evening. The amendments of March 25, which provided legal protection against spreading fakes and discrediting the work of Russian government agencies abroad, were added to the norms adopted on March 4.

Under the law adopted on March 4, a new article 20.3.3 was introduced in the CAO establishing liability for “public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for protection of the interests of the country and its citizens or for keeping international peace and security, including calls to prevent the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the indicated purposes.” In accordance with the amendments to the CC, in case of repeated violation within a year, citizens are liable under a new Article 280.3 CC, the maximum sanction for which is imprisonment for up to five years.

The same amendments of early March added Article 20.3.4 to the CAO. It stipulates punishment for calls for imposing or extending political or economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, citizens of the Russian Federation, or Russian legal entities. Penalty for the first such violation within a year takes the form of a fine, and criminal liability follows for a repeated violation under the new Article 284.2 СС, which provides for imprisonment of up to three years.

Finally, new Article 207.3 СС establishes responsibility for “public dissemination under the guise of reliable reports of deliberately false information containing data on the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for protection of the interests of the country and its citizens or for keeping international peace and security.” The article has three parts, and the punishment for it, depending on the aggravating circumstances, varies from a fine of 700 thousand rubles to 15 years in prison if the act led to grave consequences. According to the Agora International Human Rights Group, 21 such cases have already been initiated as of the beginning of April. For some defendants the cases included a hate motive, moving them into the sphere of anti-extremist law enforcement. However, since SOVA Center has no expert knowledge needed to verify the accuracy of information about the activities of the Russian armed forces abroad, we do not include sanctions under this article in our monitoring.

On March 14, the President signed the law on remote electronic voting; the corresponding bill was submitted to the State Duma in December 2021 and adopted in the first reading in late January, but by its second reading on March 10 it already was significantly amended. Among other norms, the law extends the loss of passive suffrage to everyone convicted of extremist crimes for a five-year period from the day the conviction is removed or extinguished. Meanwhile, the norm on depriving individuals involved in the activities of extremist or terrorist organizations of passive suffrage for a period of three or five years after the organization’s ban depending on their status in the organization now also applies to presidential elections. The legal norms adopted in April 2021, which require candidates to inform the voters about their “foreign agent” status or their affiliation with a person or entity performing the functions of a foreign agent” in various forms, were extended to the presidential elections as well. The changes were also made to the Law “On Measures to Influence Persons Involved in Violations of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, Rights and Freedoms of Citizens of the Russian Federation” – the Ministry of Justice was instructed to create and maintain a unified registry of information about individuals performing the functions a foreign agent, or affiliated with persons performing the functions of a foreign agent. The list will include individuals recognized as foreign agents, current or former founders, employees and members of the media, NGOs or public associations recognized as foreign agents, as well as persons engaged in political activities who received any funds from foreign agents.

Law Enforcement in the Light of the Events in Ukraine

Law enforcement agencies utilized the new Article 20.3.3 CAO immediately, and the scope of its application in the first weeks of its enforcement turned out to be unusually large. According to the counts provided by the human rights media project OVD-Info, at least 401 law enforcement reports based on this article were filed by March 31. SOVA Center monitors its application, sorting the cases into several categories if the available information allows: cases related to the display of posters, text on clothes or the snow, etc., or statements made during protest actions; cases based on public statements unrelated to protests; cases related to the distribution of printed campaign materials, graffiti, etc.; and, finally, cases based on statements made online. The majority of the reports were compiled under Part 1 of Article 20.3.3 rather than under Part 2, which punishes for the same actions if accompanied by calls for holding unapproved public events or creating various threats to society. We recorded approximately ten cases under Part 2, mostly as punishment for those who were inciting others to participate in a protest. Those punished under Part 1 were most frequently fined in the amount of 30–40 thousand rubles, and those under Part 2 faced fines of 50–100 thousand rubles. We know of more than 200 such court decisions in March. Of course, we are unable to describe every single one of these numerous court decisions. We can only say that, in almost all cases known to us, the incriminating statements and actions clearly did not violate the constitutional restrictions on freedom of expression. Frequently, they contained no opinion on actual military actions whatsoever.

A series of cases based on public statements related to the events in Ukraine is also worth pointing out.

In early March, the Korolyov City Court fined activist Roman Ivanov, editor-in-chief of the “Chestnoye Korolyovskoye!” YouTube channel, 10 thousand rubles under Article 20.3.1 CAO (inciting hatred or enmity). According to Ivanov, the case was based on his live broadcast and video “RUSSIA DO NOT BE SILENT!!!” published on February 24. In the video, Ivanov condemned the start of a “special military operation” on the Ukrainian territory, called Russian president Vladimir Putin a “new fascist dictator,” characterized him and his entourage as enemies, and the United Russia party as criminal. In the video’s finale, he called on the Russians to “resist” in order to “stop what is happening” and suggested that Russian soldiers disobey criminal orders. The activist laid flowers at the Eternal Flame on the territory of the Glory Memorial in Korolyov pointing out that the inhabitants of Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine fought together against Nazism during the Great Patriotic War.

At the same time, a case under Article 20.3.1 CAO was opened against environmental activist Alexei Dmitriev from Khimki. The case was based on Dmitriev’s Instagram post. He published a meme, which called Adolf Hitler responsible for bombing Kyiv in 1941, and Vladimir Putin – for doing the same in 2022. According to the conclusion by the Center for Forensic Expertise, the publication contained linguistic signs of inciting hatred, hostility, and humiliation of Putin's human dignity “on the basis of his belonging to a social group – a group of persons holding public office in the Russian Federation.” In early April, the Khimki City Court placed the activist under arrest for 10 days.

From our point of view, both Ivanov and Dmitriev were punished inappropriately. First, their publications contained no calls for violence or other illegal actions. Next, we believe that civil servants, including the president, do not form a social group in need of protection from incitement to hatred. Finally, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation pointed out in 2011 that media criticism against officials should not, in and of itself, be viewed as an insult to their dignity, since the limits of permissible criticism are wider for officials than for private individuals. In our opinion, this argument applies not only to mass media. In addition, SOVA Center advocates excluding the vague concept of “social group” from anti-extremist legislation altogether. In early April, the Moscow Regional Court overturned the decision in Ivanov’s case and returned it to the court of the first instance for a new trial.

In early March, the Central District Court of Kemerovo fined Yevgeny Maryenkov 30 thousand rubles under Article 20.1 Part 3 CAO for disrespect for the state and society (we regard the very existence of this legal norm as an unjustified restriction of freedom of expression). He was punished for selling on the Internet the buttons with statements against the president of Russia and the special operation in Ukraine.

In early March, a criminal case under Article 213 Part 2 CC (hooliganism motivated by political and ideological hatred, committed by a group of persons) was opened in St. Petersburg against local activists Igor Maltsev and Sofya Semyonova. They are suspected of holding a performance, in which unknown people burned a dummy in camouflage with a bag on its head and the sign “TAKE AWAY,” apparently in protest against the special operation in Ukraine. A video of the performance appeared on social networks on March 6. We consider the prosecution of Maltsev and Semyonova inappropriate. In our opinion, although the activists were guided by political motives, their actions have been qualified under Article 213 CC incorrectly. As far as we can judge, the actions of the video’s creators did not violate citizens' work or leisure conditions, work of any institutions, etc., that is, did not result in a gross violation of the public order. The performance should not be regarded as an expression of their disrespect for society – on the contrary, the purpose of the action was to draw public attention to a socio-political issue Maltsev and Semyonova viewed as important. It is also worth noting that the manifestation of political hostility, in and of itself, is not criminalized, and in our opinion, this motive should be used only when manifestations of political hostility are associated with violence or xenophobia.

In March, a whole series of criminal cases on vandalism Article 214 CC was initiated for various anti-war inscriptions in public places. Please note that we include in our monitoring only the cases, in which law enforcement agencies charge the defendants with vandalism motivated by ideological or political hatred (Article 214 Part 2 CC). At the same time, it should be noted that the presence or absence of a hate motive in such cases obviously depends solely on the discretion of particular law enforcement officers, and not on the specific circumstances of any given incident.

It is worth reminding that we doubt the overall validity of prosecuting people for politically motivated vandalism. In our opinion, these actions represent a form of political propaganda. The manifestation of political hostility, in and of itself, is not criminalized, and if such vandalism is not associated with advocating violence and xenophobia, the degree of its social danger is not so great as to always require criminal prosecution. In our opinion, unless the property damage is significant, cases under Article 214 CC should be terminated for insignificance. If a case cannot be dismissed but the damage is still relatively minor, we suggest introducing an article similar to Article 7.17 CAO that penalizes destruction or damage of other people's property or amending Article 7.17 to include vandalism that did not cause major damage.

Criminal cases against 11 people reported in the past month are listed below.

• In late February, a criminal case under Article 214 Part 2 CC was initiated against Vasily D., a resident of Belgorod, who wrote several anti-war slogans at the Vodostroy public transport stop.
• In early March, we were informed about a similar case that opened in Vladimir when anti-war graffiti appeared in several city districts. Denis Savenko, Ivan Sinyukhin, and Anton Ganyushkin were detained on suspicion of involvement in the crime.
• A criminal case was initiated in Feodosia based on “offensive inscriptions against conducting the special operation made with black paint on the city infrastructure walls”; a suspect was reportedly arrested.
• In St. Petersburg, Nikolai Vorotnev was detained and then arrested; he is suspected of having painted the shield covers of two howitzers from the Great Patriotic War era, located near the Artillery Museum in Alexandrovsky Park, in the colors of the Ukrainian flag. The incident took place at night in early March. Vorotnev posted a photo of the painted howitzer on his Instagram page with the caption “this gun was facing west for too long.”
• In late March, a criminal case was opened in Vladikavkaz based on the fact of defacement of a banner displayed in support of the Russian armed forces. A banner on Kosta Prospect in Vladikavkaz was doused with paint. Employees of the criminal investigation department detained a local resident on suspicion of vandalism. She confessed to the deed and was released under the obligation to appear when summoned for inquiry.

A series of such criminal cases were initiated in Tula and the Tula Region.

• In Novomoskovsk, a criminal case was initiated against a 28-year-old local resident suspected of painting graffiti to protest the participation of the Russian Armed Forces in the special operation on the Ukrainian territory.
• Dmitry Kozyrev, age 27, who placed an anti-war inscription on the foundation of the Spasskaya Tower of Tula Kremlin, was placed under house arrest.
• Two 28-year-old local paramedics were sent to pre-trial detention in late March. They are suspected of making anti-war inscriptions “aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” in the lobbies of four residential buildings in Tula.

In addition, in mid-March, the Leninsky District Court of Krasnodar placed a local resident under for 15 days under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO (propaganda or public display of Nazi symbols) for painting a swastika on a banner emblazoned with the letter “Z.” The Krasnodar resident added a swastika on a banner with the letter “Z” on the territory of the Eternal Flame memorial complex. He stated in court that he had no intention to promote fascism, but wanted to express his disagreement with the actions of Russia’s Armed Forces on the territory of Ukraine. We believe that sanctions under Article 20.3 CAO are appropriate if Nazi symbols are displayed to promote the relevant ideology, but not if they are used for other political purposes.

In the course of March, the efforts of the authorities brought dramatic changes to the information sphere in Russia. Starting in late February, the media (including those previously recognized as “foreign agents”), as well as civic and political online resources, faced a barrage of claims from state agencies. Roskomnadzor started blocking them at the request of the Prosecutor General's Office in accordance with Article 15.3 of the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection,” which provides for restricting access to materials containing, in particular, “inaccurate socially significant information distributed under the guise of reliable messages,” as well as calls for public actions without permits, calls for extremism, and support for or justification of extremist activity. Based on the decision of the Prosecutor General's Office dated February 24, hundreds of websites were blocked in the following weeks, including Ukrainian resources, websites of BBC, Deutsche Welle, Bilt, BBC Russian Service, Voice of America, all Radio Liberty websites as well as Meduza, Bellingcat, Mediazona, Novye Izvestiya, Bumaga, Echo of the Caucasus, Caucasian Knot, Snob, 7X7, TJournal, The Village, Republic and many others. The Euronews TV channel was taken off the air.

Upon request from Roskomnadzor, several media outlets were forced to remove or edit materials about the events in Ukraine. During March, under pressure from the authorities, many media outlets had to stop their operations in one way or another, among them Novaya Gazeta, the Echo of Moscow radio station (which was taken off the air and then liquidated by the decision of its board of directors, including its website and social media accounts), and TV Rain. Znak.com, whose site has been completely shut down, and Colta also reported that their work had been suspended. The BBC Russian Service has announced that its editorial office will continue its work outside the country. American TV channels CBS News and ABC News, CNN and Bloomberg news agencies, Canadian CBC, and German ARD and ZDF channels also announced that they were terminating their work in Russia.

Censorship has affected social networks as well. On March 4, Facebook and Twitter were blocked under the law on “sanctions” for unreasonably restricting the distribution of Russian media materials. Roskomnadzor explained that the ruling following Facebook’s decision to block the pages of RIA Novosti, Zvezda, Sputnik, RT, Lenta.ru and Gazeta.ru and Twitter’s dissemination of “inaccurate socially significant information on the subject of a special military operation in Ukraine.” Roskomnadzor also demanded that the TikTok administration explain the removal of RIA Novosti stories from its platform, but TikTok proactively limited its operations in Russia on March 6 in response to the law on fakes. Then, on March 14, Instagram was blocked in Russia for publishing calls for violent actions against the Russian military.

On March 11, the Prosecutor General's Office filed a claim with the Supreme Court to recognize Meta Platforms Inc., the owner of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, as an extremist company. Apparently, the court was initially supposed to recognize all the activities of the company as extremist, but then the demands were reduced to recognizing just Facebook and Instagram as extremist. On the same day, the Investigative Committee opened a criminal case against unnamed employees of the corporation under Article 280 CC (calls for extremism) and Article 205.1 CC (contributing to terrorist activity). The case was based on the statement made on that day by the Meta leadership – the corporation announced its decision not to delete posts that called for violent actions against the Russian troops located on the Ukrainian territory, indicating, however, that the ban on calls to violence against other citizens of Russia still stands. Meta later changed its position and declared Russophobia and calls for violence against citizens of the Russian Federation unacceptable, but this change did not affect the court's decision.

The Prosecutor General's Office argued in its claim that the company “has for a long time allowed violations of Russian legislation in the field of countering extremist activities. Meta's corporate policy is directed against the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, creates a threat to public safety, life and health of citizens of the Russian Federation, and state security.” Obviously, the claim was drawn up in a matter of days, and the department did not try to carefully select the incriminating materials and substantiate the request to recognize Meta's activities as extremist. It is also quite clear that the intention of the authorities, in this case, was not to counter any specific offenses but to restrict the general activities of the already blocked Facebook and Instagram (both the claims and the court decision did not affect WhatsApp). Characteristically, the prosecutor's office in this case cited the extremely general Civil Code provisions – Paragraph 1 of Article 10 (“civil rights cannot be exercised solely with the express purpose of inflicting damage to another person or to circumvent the law for an illicit purpose”) and Article 12 (“one of the ways to protect civil rights is to suppress the actions that violate a right or create a threat of its violation”).

This reasoning satisfied the court, which decided to ban Meta's activities related to the “distribution of its products, Facebook and Instagram, on the territory of the Russian Federation on the grounds of their extremist activities.” The decision against Meta is unique in the history of Russian legal proceedings in extremism-related cases, since in this case, it was the organization’s activities that were recognized as extremist, but not the organization itself, its websites or its individual materials. Since the current Russian legislation does not provide for such a ban, its legal consequences are unclear. Obviously, since Meta has not been banned as an extremist organization, the sanctions under Article 20.3 of CAO for displaying its symbols as symbols of extremist organizations cannot be imposed (however, Roskomnadzor stated on March 21 that the media should not display Meta symbols and must mention the ban on its activities). Criminal liability under Article 282.2 CC for organizing the activities of an organization banned as extremist or participating in such an organization is also not applicable. It is not clear how financial relations with the company will be treated, since in such cases liability under Article 282.3 CC will follow if such funding can be proved to have contributed to preparation or commission of extremist crimes. In any case, the recognition of Meta's activities as extremist created a situation of legal uncertainty. Although the court decision explicitly stated that the measures of judicial protection stipulated in it “do not limit the use of Meta's software products by individuals and legal entities not participating in activities prohibited by law,” Russian users of Facebook and Instagram nevertheless become potential offenders. This situation creates uncertainty and fear – probably exactly the effect the authorities have been counting on, since their efforts are intended to force citizens to switch to Russian platforms controlled by law enforcement agencies.

Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights

On March 1, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) issued another ruling that was important for the enforcement of Russia's anti-extremist legislation. The ruling was based on a complaint from Russian citizen Ivan Moseev. The court decided that Russia had violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects freedom of expression, and must compensate the applicant for non-pecuniary damage and material damage. Moseev, the leader of the Pomors Association of the Arkhangelsk Region was sentenced by the Oktyabrsky District Court of Arkhangelsk on March 1, 2013 under Article 282 Part 1 CC (inciting hatred or enmity, as well as humiliating human dignity) to a fine of 100 thousand rubles. On May 24 of the same year, the Arkhangelsk Regional Court upheld this decision. The charges against Moseev were based on a comment he made under the username “Pomors” (Pomory) in a discussion under an article on the Ekho Severa news agency website, which allegedly insulted ethnic Russians. In our opinion, Moseev's statement could be categorized as hate speech, but it posed no public danger and did not merit criminal prosecution. The ECHR pointed out that the Russian courts failed to include Moseev’s statement in their decisions, and the expert opinion was only sparingly quoted. When considering the case, the Russian courts did not take into account the fact that Moseev's emotional remark was made in the context of a discussion and could be addressed not to all Russians, but personally to his opponent and his supporters. The European Court also ruled that Moseev's statement should not be seen as offensive or – given that the statement was made on a local website and Moseev was not a well-known public figure – as a dangerous incitement to hatred that could lead to actual violence against millions of Russians.

On March 23, the ECHR ruled that the Russian Federation would cease to be a High Contracting Party to the Convention on Human Rights on September 16, 2022. The Court will continue to consider complaints against the Russian Federation regarding its actions or failure to act, but only for events that have occurred or will occur before September 16, 2022. The ECHR decision was based on the fact that on March 16, in response to the actions of the Russian authorities in Ukraine, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution on the cessation of membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe effective the same day. The Committee ruled that Russia had violated the organization's statute, which stipulates that “every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively” in order to achieve “a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles, which are their common heritage, and facilitating their economic and social progress.” In fact, the expulsion procedure started on February 25, when Russia's membership in the Council of Europe was suspended. On March 15, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe unanimously adopted the Opinion that Russia could no longer remain a member of the organization. Russia has been a member of the Council of Europe for 26 years, since February 28, 1996.

Sanctions for Oppositional Speech

In early March, Daniel Kholodny, the former technical director of the Navalny LIVE YouTube channel, was arrested in Moscow as a defendant in the joint criminal case of Alexei Navalny and his supporters under Article 282.1 Part 2 СС (participation in an extremist community). Activist Olga Shkolina from Arkhangelsk became a suspect in the same case later in the month and was placed under travel restrictions. This case on the creation of an extremist community under Article 282.1 CC was opened in October 2021, and at least 17 people in total have been facing criminal prosecution. We believe that this case was opened inappropriately, since the activities of Navalny's banned organizations, their founders and participants were not extremist.

In mid-March, the Tsentralny District Court of Kemerovo sentenced local activist Alexander Balashov to 10 days of arrest under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO (public display of symbols of a banned organization) for displaying symbols of a banned Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK). In late March, the same court also placed Maxim Murashka under arrest for 10 days for a similar act. Meanwhile, a resident of Tula was placed under arrest for 15 days under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO for displaying symbols associated with Navalny. In addition, both Murashka and the unnamed Tula resident were fined under Article 20.3.3 CAO for discrediting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

At the end of March, the Vologda City Court fined National Bolshevik Alexei Smirnov one thousand rubles under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO. Smirnov was charged with publishing the symbols of this unregistered party on the public VKontakte page of the Other Russia of E. V. Limonov. According to an expert involved in the case, the symbol – a hand grenade crossed by a lightning bolt – was identical to the symbols of the banned National Bolshevik Party (NBP). We view the decision to ban the NBP as an extremist organization made in 2007 as inappropriate. Accordingly, in our opinion, sanctions for displaying the symbols of this party are inappropriate as well. In addition, the symbols of the Other Russia of E. V. Limonov differ from the well-known NBP symbols, and the law does not punish for displaying “symbols resembling the symbols of an extremist organization.”

In early March, the Tsentralny District Court of Novokuznetsk placed local activist Igor Gorlanov under arrest for five days under Article 20.3.1 CAO (inciting hatred or enmity). In mid-March, he was arrested again, this time for 15 days. In both cases, Gorlanov was punished for his Telegram posts. According to the linguist, who analyzed the publications, they contained statements with negative assessments of a group of people on the basis of them being the police. Gorlanov’s first punishment was imposed for his posts published on February 28 that described his experience interacting with police officers who tried to send him to a psychiatric hospital. He was punished the second time for his comments made after the judge had announced the order for his first arrest. We consider sanctions against Gorlanov inappropriate – his comments contained no calls for violence but only the harsh statements against the law enforcement officers who, in his opinion, had violated the law. We believe that law enforcement officers should not be considered a vulnerable social group protected by anti-extremist legislation. On the contrary, they must be exceptionally tolerant of criticism, unless there is a real threat of violence (as previously repeatedly noted, in particular, by the European Court of Human Rights).

It is also worth noting that a report under Part 20.3.1 CAO was compiled in mid-March in Krasnodar against local activist Alipat Sultanbegova. Sultanbegova shared on a social network a text from someone else's page adding a comment, which, according to law enforcement officers, could be perceived as an insult against the police. A report under Article 20.3.3 CAO on discrediting the actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was compiled against the activist at the same time.

In the second half of March, the Leninsky District Court of Chelyabinsk dismissed the case under Article 20.3.1 CAO against local activist Alexei Tabalov due to the expiry of the limitation period. In September of 2021, police officers compiled a protocol against Tabalov for inciting hatred against the police based on his posts made on his personal Telegram channel in February of the same year. Law enforcement officers found the texts of these posts to contain the “slang” “contemptuous” and “ironic” assessment of “the police officers” as a social group.

In the second half of March, an administrative offense case under Article 20.29 of CAO (mass distribution of extremist materials) against Yevgeny Kochegin, the head of the Your Watch (Vash Dozor) movement and an ex-coordinator of the Navalny Headquarters, was discontinued in Volgograd. In December 2021, after “Kill the Beggars!” by the Russian punk band Pornofilmy was declared extremist, Kochegin published several Telegram posts in support of the band, one of which contained the banned song. In our opinion, this song was banned inappropriately, since it is obviously a satire that ridicules the state’s social policy. As a result, the administrative offense case under Article 20.29 was opened against Kochegin. However, in February, the Volgograd Regional Court sent the prosecutorial claim to ban the song for a new trial. In March, the Dzerzhinsky District Court at the request of the group's lawyers decided to exclude the song from the Federal List of Extremist Materials for the duration of this lawsuit; thus, Kochegin’s case was also dismissed.

Sanctions for “Rehabilitation of Nazism” and Display of Nazi Symbols

In early March, the Samara Regional Court fined Andrei Shabanov 60 thousand rubles under Article 354.1 Parts 1 and 3 CC (publicly denying the facts established by the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as disseminating information expressing clear disrespect for society on Russia’s days of military glory and memorable dates related to the defense of the Fatherland). The case was based on his VKontakte posts including a meme with a disrespectful statement about the St. George ribbon; an image captioned “On May 9, 1945, Stalin took away from Hitler the right to repress the peoples of the USSR. Happy Victory Day, tradition carriers!”; and a post, in which Shabanov criticized Victory Day celebrations calling them “victory frenzy.” Shabanov faced charges under Article 354.1 Part 1 CC for uploading a photograph of Hitler to the Immortal Regiment website on May 8, 2020. In court, Shabanov apologized for choosing such a confrontational format of expression and explained that he considered “the official exploitation of people's memory of the War” unacceptable and “wanted to demonstrate the dangerous parallels between the political regimes of the USSR and Germany in the 1930s and modern Russia.” We believe that Shabanov's actions were qualified incorrectly. In and of itself, uploading photographs of Nazi leaders to a website, even on the eve of May 9, constitutes neither public approval of the crimes of Nazism, nor dissemination of any information about veterans or the activities of the USSR during the war years, nor dissemination of any information about memorable dates or symbols of military glory. Moreover, Shabanov's VKontakte posts were not intended to justify Nazism. Their purpose was to criticize Stalinism and the ways of celebrating Victory Day that Shabanov viewed as unfitting.

In March, we found out about another case under Article 354.1 CС opened against 54-year-old Tambov activist Andrei Polyakov. The defendant is under travel restrictions, and his case is currently in court. According to investigators, on January 27, 2020, Polyakov left a comment under a post on a regional public webpage about a patriotic action held in Tambov on the Day of the Lifting of the Siege of Leningrad. His comment included a text and a video with deliberately false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War. According to the Investigative Committee, “other facts of him making public posts with similar information on a social network” have been revealed as well. As reported by Polyakov, the case was initiated at the request of a local Stalinist, who complained that Polyakov was spreading false information about Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, Stalin's “scorched earth” Order No. 428, the blockade of Leningrad and the evacuation of Stalingrad. Some episodes were added to the charges during the investigation. In our opinion, the law should not put any limits on disseminating information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War.

In March, a series of nine cases were initiated in St. Petersburg against seven people under Article 354.1 Parts 1 and 3 СС for uploading photos of Nazis and collaborators to the Immortal Regiment Project website in May 2020. According to investigators, photographs of Stepan Bandera, Andrei Vlasov, Joseph Goebbels, Adolf Hitler, Josef Mengele and Hermann Goering were uploaded to the site. The defendants include Andrei Amkhanitsky, Georgy Vasiliev, Nermin Yusufovich, unnamed residents of St. Petersburg born in 1989 and 1996, a 20-year-old St. Petersburg resident and a 23-year-old resident of Novgorod.

In early March, the Zabaykalsky Krai Court in Chita placed local lawyer and social activist Marina Savvateeva under arrest for 10 days under Article 20.3 CAO for displaying Nazi symbols. The charges were based on her post sharing a historian's explanation of the symbols of a particular Nazi unit. The day before, Savvateeva was fined 30 thousand rubles, presumably under Article 20.1 Part 3 CAO (insulting the state and society on the Internet) for her message in the Protestnoye Transbaikalie chat. We do not know the content of the incriminating publication, but, since Savvateeva is not a supporter of Nazi ideology, most likely the sanctions against her were ungrounded.

In mid-March, the Belogorsky District Court of the Republic of Crimea placed Abdureshit Dzhepparov, a veteran of the Crimean Tatar national movement, under arrest for 15 days under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO. The case was based on Dzhepparov’s post on his Facebook page made in 2019, in which he shared a video based on the music radio broadcast by renowned BBC presenter Seva Novgorodtsev. The video contained the analysis of the well-known similarities between the Soviet “March of the Aviators” by Pavel German and Yuly Hayt and Horst Wessel’s “Banners up” (Die Fahne hoch), the anthem of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) and used historical photos with swastikas.

In the second half of March, the Krasnogvardeysky District Court of Crimea placed Zair “Smedlya” Smedlyaev, yet another Crimean Tatar activist and the head of the Central Electoral Commission of the Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar people, under arrest for two days under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO. The case was based on a Facebook post shared by Smedlya back on March 1, 2014, and written by the head of Crimea’s Azerbaijani community, who reported on an act of vandalism that took place on February 28, 2014, citing a letter by Anatoly Gendin, the executive director of a progressive Judaism community. The incident involved unknown people placing several Nazi symbols and an anti-Semitic inscription on the synagogue doors. The publication intended to draw attention to the anti-Semitic incident and condemn it. On the same day, Smedlya was also fined 40 thousand rubles for discrediting the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

In our opinion, sanctions under Article 20.3 CAO should only take place if the Nazi symbols are displayed to promote the corresponding ideology. This article should not apply to publishers of historical materials. The note to the current version of Article 20.3 CAO states that its provisions do not apply if Nazi symbols are used to form a negative attitude towards the ideology of Nazism, and no signs of Nazi propaganda are present.

Prosecution for “Insulting the Feelings of Believers”

In late March, the magistrate of the Judicial Sector No. 40 of the Admiralteysky District in St. Petersburg issued a sentence under Article 148 Part 1 CC (public actions expressing clear disrespect for society and committed in order to insult the religious feelings of believers) against blogger Irina Volkova. The court sentenced her to 180 hours of community service. The case against Volkova was initiated in October 2021 based on a photo posted by Volkova on Instagram in August 2020. The image shows her squatting with her back to the camera, against the background of St. Isaac's Cathedral, with her skirt pulled up and her underwear visible. In our opinion, the sanctions against Volkova are inappropriate. SOVA Center opposed the introduction of the parts on insulting the feelings of believers into Article 148 CC, since, in our opinion, this vague concept does not and cannot have a clear legal meaning. As to signs of inciting hatred towards Orthodox believers that could entail liability under Article 20.3.1 CAO, Volkova’s post does not show anything of the sort.

Persecution against Religious Organizations and Believers

Muslims

In early March, the Southern District Military Court issued a sentence under Article 205.5 Part 2 CC (participating in the activities of a terrorist organization) and Article 278 CC with Article 30 Part 1 CC (preparation for violent seizure of power) to five supporters of the radical Islamic party Hizb ut-Tahrir. Riza Izetov and Remzi Bekirov were sentenced to 19 years of imprisonment, Shaban Umerov – to 18, Raim Aivazov – to 17, and Farkhod Bazarov – to 15 years behind bars.

We believe that there were no sufficient grounds for banning Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization, since this party was never implicated in terrorist attacks. Thus, we view the charges of terrorism against Hizb ut-Tahrir followers made solely based on their party activities (holding meetings, reading literature, etc.) as inappropriate. In our opinion, the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir preaches the idea of establishing a worldwide Islamic caliphate does not by itself provide sufficient grounds for charging its followers with planning a violent seizure of power in Russia.

In mid-March, the Southern District Military Court delivered a verdict in the second Simferopol Hizb ut-Tahrir case. Akim Bekirov, Seytveli Seytabdiev and Rustem Seytkhalilov were sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment, and Eskender Suleymanov and Asan Yanikov – to 15 years of imprisonment under Article 205.2 Part 2 and Article 278 CC with Article 30 Part 1 CC. The second Simferopol case involves 29 defendants, four of whom are on the wanted list. In August 2020, after the end of the investigation, the defendants were divided into five groups, probably for the convenience of the court.

In the second half of March, the same Southern District Military Court issued a verdict for involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir against two Crimean Tatars, Timur Yalkabov and Lenur Seydametov. Yalkabov was sentenced to 17 years of imprisonment under Article 205.5 Part 1 (organizing the activities of a terrorist organization) and Article 278 CC with Article 30 Part 1. Seydametov was sentenced to 13 years in prison under Article 205.5 Part 2 (participating in the activities of a terrorist organization) and Article 278 CC with Article 30 Part 1.

It is also worth noting that, in mid-March, the Military Court of Appeal in Vlasikha of the Moscow Region finished its review of complaints against the verdict in the Bakhchisaray Hizb ut-Tahrir case issued by the Southern District Military Court in September 2020. The court confirmed the long terms of imprisonment (from 13 to 19 years) issued to six defendants, reduced the term of the seventh defendant, Seyran Saliyev, to 15 years by removing one of the charges against him, and overturned the acquittal of the eighth defendant, Ernes Ametov, sending the case for a new trial to the court of the first instance.

On March 4, as part of the investigation in the case of Bakhrom Khamroev, a member of the Memorial Human Rights Center detained on February 24 and arrested the next day on charges of publicly justifying terrorism (Article 205.2 CC), searches were carried out in the offices of the International Memorial, the Memorial HRC and the Civic Assistance (Grazhdanskoye Sodeystvie) Committee in Moscow. After the search of the Civic Assistance Committee premises, its head Svetlana Gannushkina was interrogated as a witness in the case. According to the investigating authorities, Khamroev promoted the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir in several Facebook posts, in which he shared two materials in the Uzbek language related to the party, and a video of the Arabic-language channel Al-Waqiyah TV dubbed in Uzbek. Khamroev has been defending the rights of migrants from Central Asia and Russian Muslims for many years, in particular those charged with participating in Hizb ut-Tahrir. He has always vehemently denied any personal involvement in the organization. The searches took place against the backdrop of the widening pressure campaign against Memorial. In December 2021, the court decided to liquidate the International Memorial and the Memorial HRC for their systematic violation of the “foreign agents” legislation when distributing their materials. The decision on the liquidation of the International Memorial was approved by the appellate court in late February 2022, and the decision regarding the Memorial HRC – in early April. We consider the claims against both organizations inappropriate.

It became known in mid-March that a court in Saratov sentenced a 51-year-old local resident to two years in a minimum-security penal colony with restriction of freedom for a period of eight months under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC (participating in the activities of an extremist organization) for involvement in the banned religious association Tablighi Jamaat. Tablighi Jamaat is a religious movement banned in Russia since 2009 – in our opinion, without proper grounds. The movement advocates fundamentalist Islam but has never been implicated in any calls for violence. Therefore, we regard prosecutions against its supporters as inappropriate.

In late March, the Omsk Regional Court reviewed a prosecutorial appeal and toughened the sentence issued in mid-January by the Kirovsky District Court of Omsk against three followers of Tablighi Jamaat. Instead of the fines imposed by the district court, Sultan Dyusekenov was sentenced to two years in a minimum-security penal colony under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC. Abdimomun Mamytov and Murat Baltabaev received suspended sentences of one and a half years under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC.

A newly opened criminal case on involvement in Tablighi Jamaat under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC against three residents of Dagestan was reported in the second half of the month.

Jehovah’s Witnesses

We have no information about any sentences under Article 282.2 CC issued against Jehovah's Witnesses in March.

In mid-March, the Sverdlovsk Regional Court once again overturned sentences against three Jehovah's Witnesses – Alexander Pryanikov, Venera Dulova and Darya Dulova – under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC. Now they are considered innocent and have the right to have their record cleared. However, all the three, along with other believers, are also defendants in another criminal case currently being tried in the Karpinsk City Court.

In late March, the Kostroma Regional Court reviewed the case of Sergei and Valeria Raiman and found them guilty under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC of organizing the activities of an extremist organization. As a result, taking into account their previously served sentence, the court gave Sergei and Valeria Raiman suspended sentences of three and two years respectively with a two-year probationary period. At the previous stage of the case, the spouses were found guilty of participating in the activities of a banned community under Article 282 Part 2 CC, but the cassation instance, satisfying the prosecutorial claim against the verdict, returned the case for retrial on appeal. However, the punishment remained practically unchanged.

The persecution against believers continued in March. Also in Kostroma, the homes of a 68-year-old and a 72-year-old Jehovah's Witnesses were searched on March 15 as part of the investigation in a new criminal case under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC.

It was also reported in March that, back in mid-February, a criminal case under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC was opened in Krasnoyarsk against Igor Gusev. In Vyselki of the Krasnodar Territory, 76-year-old Vladimir Kolesnikov was also named a suspect under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC.

In the Knyaz-Volkonsky rural settlement of the Khabarovsk Krai, 60-year-old believer Valery Rabota was arrested under Article 282.2 CC in early March.

In mid-March, Sergei Gromov from Kazan was detained at Moscow's Vnukovo airport; he was arrested under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC and sent to a pre-trial detention center in Kazan. Searches took place in Kazan on March 18; Alexei Gerasimov became a suspect under Article 282.2 CC.

In the second half of March, Nikolai Saparov was detained at the Maykop airport (the Adyghe Republic). Two days later, he was placed under arrest for two months under Article 282.2 CC. In addition, it was reported on March 28 that another Jehovah's Witness from Maikop, 46-year-old archeologist Georgy Godizov, was added to the Rosfinmonitoring List of Terrorists and Extremists, and a criminal case was opened against him. Godizov and his family have left the country.

On the same days, five believers were arrested in Balakovo of the Saratov Region after a series of search raids: 61-year-old Alexei Bogatov, 59-year-old Vladimir Mavrin, Sergei Tyurin, Yevgeny Fomashin and Andrei Murych.