Victory in the air: Protecting Ukrainian cities from Russian missiles

The attack on Ukraine on the night of February 24, 2022 began with a massive strike by short-range cruise and ballistic missiles. Over 160 missiles struck predominantly military targets. In the process, 137 civilians were killed and 316 were wounded. The Russian command hoped to use a wall of fire during the first days of the campaign to stun the enemy's political leadership, disrupt troop control and ultimately deprive the disorganized AFU units of the will to resist as part of the “storm and onslaught” strategy – a lightning-fast military special operation (“Kyiv in three days”). But the blitzkrieg failed and with it the intensity of the use of long-range weapons decreased.

While Russian forces fired about 600 rockets (55 per day) during the first 11 days of fighting, and more than 1,100 (42 per day) during the first 26 days (by March 21), by the 40th day (April 4), U.S. estimates put the total number of rockets fired at more than 1,400, which means the average number dropped to 35 per day. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke of 2,154 Russian missiles (28 per day) on May 10 (76th day of war) and 2,709 missiles (23 per day) on June 23 (120th day of war). By midsummer (July 21), according to Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, Russia had used 3,650 missiles, including 1,486 cruise missiles and 1,403 air-to-surface missiles. To date, the average number of missiles fired has dropped to 20 per day and continues to decline.

In spring, reports started surfacing about rapid depletion of the number of missiles (up to half of the prewar stocks) and their low efficiency (failures at the level of 20% to 60% of the total number of launches). At the same time, launches became sporadic with considerable interruptions. The shortage of long-range weapons was also evidenced by the change in the range of missiles used: while at the beginning of the campaign, predominantly Kalibrs and Iskanders were used, the Russian forces gradually switched to strikes against ground targets using expensive Onyx and X-22 anti-ship missiles, and even anti-aircraft guided missiles for the S-300 system.

Russian forces managed to resume missile launches comparable in numbers to the spring ones only in October and November. On October 10, Ukraine was attacked by 84 cruise missiles and 24 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The very next day, the number of missiles dropped to 28 and UAVs to 15. On October 31, Russia fired 55 X-101 cruise missiles, one X-59 guided air missile, 22 S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, four UAVs of the Shahed-136 (aka Geran-2 - probably a localized version or a disguised remake of the loitering munitions purchased from Iran) and Lancet-3 types. And on November 15, more than 90 missiles were fired at Ukraine: around 70 X-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles, 20 naval Kalibrs and 10 Shahed-136/131 kamikaze drones (the latter is known in Russian sources as Geran-1).

The latest available data indicate that as of 24 October, Russia had used 4,500 missiles against Ukraine (taking into account the more recent launches, the total number is probably closer to 5,000) and thus had almost exhausted its resources of land-based guided long-range weapons. According to the estimates of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, today Russia possesses only 13% of the pre-war stocks of Iskander missiles, although it still has about 43% of sea-launched Kalibr missiles and 45% of Kh-101 and Kh-555 aircraft missiles.