Zorba the thief: How the Serniya smuggling network and a Greek mathematician helped the FSB buy military technology

In February 2018, Evgeny Grinin from Serniya attempted to order precision measuring equipment from Minnesota. The Americans declined his initial direct request. Then, Bogonikolos stepped in and agreed to place the order, but with the addition of a few extra items to avoid raising suspicion in Minnesota.

In another case in November 2019, while communicating with the company Photon Pro, Bogonikolos acknowledged the need to falsify the final user declaration by listing a Dutch company, knowing well that the goods were intended for Serniya and destined for Russia. On the same day, in a conversation with an Aratos Group employee, Bogonikolos admitted that the blank declaration he would fill out for his company referred to an order “for the Russians.”

In February 2018, Evgeny Grinin from Serniya attempted to order precision measuring equipment from Minnesota. The Americans declined his initial direct request. Then, Bogonikolos stepped in and agreed to place the order, but with the addition of a few extra items to avoid raising suspicion in Minnesota.

In another case in November 2019, while communicating with the company Photon Pro, Bogonikolos acknowledged the need to falsify the final user declaration by listing a Dutch company, knowing well that the goods were intended for Serniya and destined for Russia. On the same day, in a conversation with an Aratos Group employee, Bogonikolos admitted that the blank declaration he would fill out for his company referred to an order “for the Russians.”

Between 2018 and 2020, Bogonikolos procured ten NATO tactical antennas for the Aratos Group. These antennas were specifically designed for armored combat crews in warfare environments, adhering to NATO's military standard. To facilitate the purchase, he informed the Florida-based manufacturing company that the antennas were destined for private pleasure yachts in the Netherlands. Exporting these antennas to Russia would have required an export license. Correspondence between Grinin and Bogonikolos revealed that Serniya was the true buyer.

In January 2021, Alexei Ippolitov sent Grinin and other Serniya employees a list of orders from major Russian scientific and educational institutions involved in the development of quantum computers. The products were intended for defense and dual-use technologies, particularly for the development of a military quantum computer to create “prototype quantum cryptographic complex equipment used in information security” and “secure quantum communication networks for civilian and military purposes in conditions of war.”

Bogonikolos was tasked with providing the necessary lasers from California for this project. “F2, F3, F4 - Kolya,” Grinin wrote in a letter to one of his employese, meaning that the lasers codenamed F2, F3, and F4 would be handled by Bogonikolos [“Kolya” is a Russian diminutive nickname for “Nicholas” — translator’s note]. The Aratos Group then placed an order for the three lasers from a California-based manufacturing firm. While communicating with the manufacturer, Bogonikolos signed documents — knowing they contained false information — stating that he was the ultimate user of the equipment being purchased.

In 2019, Bogonikolos, working through Grinin, assisted the Russian university MEPhI in purchasing 30 high electron mobility transistors from a US company in North Carolina. The export of these transistors to Russia requires a government license. The end-user declaration was issued to Bogonikolos's firm, but the actual delivery was made to Majory, a UK-based legal entity, before being forwarded to Russia.

In the same year, Bogonikolos aided Grinin in acquiring a low-noise cesium frequency generator from Colorado. Transporting this $143,000 generator to Russia would have also required an appropriate export license. However, it too made its way to Russia through Majory.

In 2020, Bogonikolos, once again operating through the Aratos Group, placed an order for 20 digital-to-analog converters (DACs) and shipped them to Photon Pro. The DACs were intended for a Russian customer from the Serniya network, who communicated with Ippolitov and Grinin using the email [email protected]. The email signature featured the designation of military unit 33949, which, as it turns out, was the ultimate recipient of the DACs. This military unit is a part of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). The end-user declaration was issued to Bogonikolos's company in the Netherlands, but the DACs traveled to Russia through a transshipment point in Hamburg, Germany.

In 2021, Bogonikolos ordered a “Hi-Resolution phase and Frequency Offset Generator” from Colorado and “microwave tunable notch filters” from Maryland. In the declaration, Bogonikolos' firm claimed that the equipment would be utilized in a laboratory in the Netherlands for the development of satellite and radio equipment. In reality, the products were routed through Photon Pro, and eventually ended up at Russia's VNIIFTRI (the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for Physical-Engineering and Radiotechnical Metrology).

In August 2022 — after sanctions were imposed on several firms within the Serniya network — Bogonikolos proceeded to order a high-power gallium nitride solid-state power amplifier (with frequencies ranging from 6 to 12 GHz) from California. Bogonikolos once again wrote up an end-user declaration for Aratos Group.