A pivotal moment for the 2023 summer offensive

Meduza shares an updated combat map with the latest developments from Kupiansk, Bakhmut, southern Ukraine, and the east bank of the Dnipro

Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Meduza has adopted a consistent antiwar position, holding Russia responsible for its military aggression and atrocities. As part of this commitment, we regularly update an interactive map that documents combat operations in Ukraine and the damage inflicted by Russia’s invasion forces. Our map is based exclusively on previously published open-source photos and videos, most of them posted by eyewitnesses on social media. We collect reports already available publicly and determine their geolocation markers, adding only the photos and videos that clear this process.

Meduza doesn’t try to track the conflict in real time; the data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old.

Key updates as of 5:00 p.m. GMT (1:00 p.m. EDT) on August 10, 2023

The entirety of the past week saw combat on the front lines in Ukraine that will likely determine the outcome of the summer campaign. Both sides sent some reserves into action and both achieved limited success on their respective offensives. Russian troops have advanced in the north, on the border of the Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions, and are now threatening communications for all Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) groups east of the Oskil river. The Ukrainian army continues to put pressure on the Bakhmut direction and southern Ukraine. The AFU also made a few new troop landings on the eastern bank of the Dnipro river in the Kherson region.

It appears that neither the AFU nor Russian forces are counting on a significant breakthrough. Both Russian and Ukrainian troops are advancing extremely slowly. The reason is that both armies have learned how to defend themselves with artillery, mines, and reconnaissance drones, but neither has figured out how to overcome these kinds of defenses. Both sides are currently focused on destroying equipment (primarily artillery) and personnel in hopes of “exhausting” the enemy. Only after that is accomplished will one side or the other launch a decisive offensive.

Kupiansk direction

• In late July and August, Russia’s Armed Forces went on the offensive on a broad front from the northern outskirts of Kupiansk to the western outskirts of Svatove.
• So far, the Russian army’s successes amount to capturing some villages with a few houses each near Karmazynivka and Raihorodok; a variety of settlements near Lyman Pershyi and Olshany, which were previously on the front lines and not controlled by anyone; and the ruins of the village of Novoselivske and the nearby Kuzemivka Station, which have changed hands several times since the fall.
• The real significance of the Russian offensive is greater, however, than a few captured settlements. Russia’s command has gradually been bringing new troops to this part of the front, chiefly regiments and brigades from the Western Military District that have, until recently, been recuperating on leave. In the north, the AFU do not have sufficient reserves to mount a sustainable defense.

• In late July, the Ukrainian army was able to repulse the first attack in the Karmazynivka and Raihorodok region and even push back Russian forces that had established bridgeheads on the western bank of the Zherebets river. However, then a new crisis arose: Russia’s Armed Forces began attacking from Lyman Pershyi and Olshany, in the south, and also launched a decisive assault on Novoselivske, which occupies a commanding height in the district. At the same time, the Russian offensive continues in the south of the same region, in the Kreminskyi forest and in the direction of Torske. These elements combine to threaten the collapse of the entire Ukrainian defense to the north of the Siversky Donets river.
• It’s likely that the AFU will have to transfer reserves to help troops in Kupiansk. The only place such reserves could come from appears to be the Bakhmut front, where the AFU have a numerical advantage.

Bakhmut front

• The AFU have halted the offensive to the north and north-west of the destroyed city. In June, they were unable to liberate Berkhivka and Yahidne, the closest suburbs to Bakhmut.
• The Ukrainian army is striking the main blow to the south, in the Klishchiivka–Andriivka–Kudryumivka triangle. The goal is to reach Bakhmut’s southern districts and, in the future, its eastern outskirts, where the main road used to supply Russian troops in the area is located. Several weeks of almost continuous assaults from the south led to the AFU capturing the Russian fortified area to the west of Klishchiivka and Andriivka, but heavy fire from Russian artillery has prevented Ukrainian troops from liberating the villages themselves. There were also battles in Klishchiivka but the latest video footage seems to show that Russia’s Armed Forces were able to repulse Ukrainian attacks.

• The AFU continue to strike the rear of Russian groupings, destroying Russian artillery to the east of Bakhmut. If the Ukrainian army can suppress Russian fire, Klishchiivka and neighboring villages will fall.
• The Russian command was able, with great difficulty, to form a group that could close the gap in the front left after Wagner Group departed Bakhmut. However, forces there are still insufficient to reliably stop a Ukrainian offensive. The Russian command is likely hoping that the AFU will be forced to transfer troops to the north, where a Russian breakthrough is emerging near Kupiansk (discussed above), and that doing so will cause Ukraine’s counteroffensive on Bakhmut to lose strength. Considering the fact that the front in the south of the country is attracting other Ukrainian reserves, counting on the AFU needing to weaken its forces outside of Bakhmut is probably logical.

Southern Ukraine

After the failure of the offensive aimed for the Sea of Azov, which the AFU launched with groups formed specially for the operation, Ukraine sent troops into battle, which were likely originally intended to penetrate deep into Russian defenses after an initial breakthrough in the area.

The new Ukrainian forces managed to advance in two directions:

• South of Orikhiv, the AFU finally reached the Russian Armed Force’s first fortified defensive line near the village of Robotyne. Ukrainian forces were able to break through between Robotyne and the village of Verbove and to reach the outskirts of Robotyne from the east. However, they were unable to liberate the village on the way.
• On the border of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions (in the direction of Velyka Novosilka) the AFU was able to broaden the front for its offensive. In June, Ukrainian forces advanced to the south along the narrow valley of the Mokri Yaly river, but Russian troops stationed on the hills above the valley wouldn’t allow the AFU to proceed farther. Now, with the help of an offensive from Rivnopil, Ukrainian troops have forced Russia to abandon its positions on the hills. At the very beginning of August, Ukraine’s Armed Forces liberated Staromaiorske (or, at least, most of it — a lack of video evidence makes it difficult to say for sure). On August 8, the Ukrainian army launched a decisive assault on the neighboring village of Urozhaine, across the Mokri Yaly.

• If the AFU manage to gain a stronghold in Staromaiorske and Urozhaine, they may need time to build a new expansion to the front, which will require that they liberate Priyutnoye, to the south of Staromaiorske. After that, they could begin an offensive in the direction of Staromlynivka, where the first Russian fortified defensive line is located.
• The Ukrainian command is clearly counting on exhausting Russian troops and destroying a significant part of their artillery by the beginning of the battle for Staromlynivka. To that end, the AFU has been constantly striking the Russian rear in Staromlynivka itself, as well as in neighboring villages. If the Russian army lacks the reserves to defend the “fortified line,” just the fact that it is fortified — with concrete structures and anti-tank installations that are visible from space — won’t play a significant role against Ukraine’s offensive.

Eastern bank of the Dnipro

Russian reserve troops are stationed mainly in the territory between Crimea and Dnipro. From there, they can transfer by rail to any area that’s under threat. The AFU are trying to stop the transfer of Russian reserve to the Zaporizhzhia region by landing troops on the Dnipro’s east bank.

• In June, the AFU created a bridgehead near the ruins of the Antonivsky bridge. Swamps and the Konka river (a tributary of the Dnipro) separate this bridgehead from the city of Oleshky. Russia’s Armed Forces therefore were never able to destroy the bridgehead, but neither could the AFU approach the Konka.

• In August, the AFU managed to cross the Konka to both the north and south of Oleshky. The main danger to Russia’s Armed Forces is a bridgehead near the village of Kozachy Laher, to the north. If Russia doesn’t transfer reserves there to destroy the bridgehead, Ukrainian forces will, in the future, be able to leave the swamps and cut off an important road from Oleshky to Nova Kakhovka. However, an offensive on Crimea will not be possible until the AFU can supply the bridgeheads across the Dnipro and accumulate troops there. With bridges across the wide river destroyed and taking Russian artillery fire, this will be difficult to accomplish.

The data points reflected in the combat map above are typically at least 48 hours old. Meduza is careful in working with data, but mistakes are still possible, and perhaps even inevitable. If you spot one, please let us know by sending an email to reports@meduza.io. Thank you!