The Russian government under Putin has been trying to find common ground with the young people for a quarter of a century — with varying degrees of success. Here is a brief journey into the state youth policy in contemporary Russia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, its system of youth policy was ruined, while creating a new model proved to be a challenging task. The integration of youth policy into the emerging state institutions did not happen overnight: organizations were constantly formed and disbanded, the bodies responsible for policy implementation were frequently renamed, and their powers were continuously redefined. Developing a new approach to engaging with the younger generation required both time and significant financial resources — neither of which the state could afford in the early 1990s.

"Groza" provides a concise overview of how the system of "patriotic" education for young people has developed since 2000 and explores the potential future initiatives.

2000 – 2004: conceptualisation

In 2000, Vladimir Putin became the President of Russia, marking the beginning of a period in which youth policy was conceptualised. During his first presidential term, key documents were introduced, laying the foundation for the creation of state-run youth organizations that would later take on the responsibility of “patriotically” educating young people.

During the early years of Putin's presidency, the key objective was to establish a regulatory framework that would enable the state to instill “spiritual and patriotic values, as well as a sense of loyalty to the constitutional and military duty” in young people. To this end, several important texts were adopted, including the Governmental decree "On Military-Patriotic Youth and Children’s Associations" and "Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation for years 2001-2005" program.

The “Youth of Russia” program, which had been introduced under President Boris Yeltsin, continued to operate, offering social benefits to young people, supporting youth entrepreneurship, and assisting young families. After the collapse of the USSR, the program prioritised creating a supportive environment for young people and establishing social protection systems. However, due to limited funding and the absence of a comprehensive legal framework, several aspects of the program were not fully implemented. On a positive note, the program did result in the organization of leisure activities for young people, such as providing funding for summer camp trips.

The youth policy of this period can be seen as thrifty compared to the following presidential terms, as large-scale and costly initiatives for “youth education” only began to emerge during Putin's next term.

Following the “colour revolutions” within the post-Soviet space, it became evident that the state needed new and more effective ways to engage with young people. The Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine served as stark examples of the strength of youth movements, prompting the government to recognise the need to safeguard the recently restored stability.

2004–2008: new formats

The conceptual framework developed by Putin's second term required a more advanced approach — the regulatory system needed to incorporate state institutions responsible for youth affairs. Responsibility for youth policy shifted among various government bodies: initially, the State Committee for Youth Affairs of the Russian Federation was established, later to be renamed the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Rosmolodyozh), while its bodies under which it operated were to be changed over time.

During this period, large-scale pro-government youth organizations were established under the leadership of Vladislav Surkov, head of the political bloc of the Presidential Administration. His initiatives set a new course for propaganda efforts. In 2005, two key movements emerged: the anti-fascist group Ours (Nashi) and the Young Guard of United Russia (Molodaya Gvardiya Yedinoy Rossii, MGER). Ours launched a variety of projects, including Pigs Against (Hrushi Protiv), which campaigned against poor customer service in stores; Advocates for the Body (Advokaty Tela), which promoted a healthy lifestyle; and the well-known Stop the Bully (StopKham), aimed at preventing road rage and reckless driving. Meanwhile, the Young Guard of United Russia developed its own initiatives, such as I’m a Volunteer (Ya Dobrovolets), which fostered a nationwide volunteer movement; I’m a Citizen (Ya-Grazhdanin); and I-Cology (Ekologi-Ya).

"United Russia" is the largest political party in the Russian Federation and the ruling party.

The Seliger Forum was a direct offshoot of Ours, originating within the movement itself. When Ours was disbanded, control over the forum was handed over to the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs. It became one of the most prominent pro-government events. While the first gathering in 2005 drew around 3,000 participants, by 2009, attendance had skyrocketed to 50,000.

The Seliger Forum was an all-Russian youth educational forum that took place in Russia from 2005 to 2014. It was established on the initiative of the youth movement “Nashi” and the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh). The forum was held at Lake Seliger in the Tver Region of Russia.

The Young Guard of United Russia states its goal as “instilling in young people a sense of patriotism and pride for their country”.

The Young Guard of United Russia (Molodaya Gvardiya Yedinoy Rossii, MGER) is still active today.

Almost immediately, the Young Guard of United Russia began recruiting young people into the ranks of the United Russia party. In 2006, it launched the federal project Political Workshop-2006 (PolitZavod-2006), which allocated 20% of places in party lists to young people.

Both The Young Guard of United Russia and Ours received support from the Kremlin, ensuring they had no funding issues. Their financial backing came from private businesses and Moscow city budget. Despite The Young Guard of United Russia’s charter requiring the organization to publish financial reports, none have been made available on its website.

From the very start, Ours and the Young Guard of United Russia have been seeing each other not as allies but rather as rivals, constantly competing for administrative resources. This rivalry became particularly evident in 2011, when a new nomination of a Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration led to a shift in favouritism from Ours to the Young Guard of United Russia, elevating it to one of the most influential pro-government youth organizations.

2008–2012: A New President, the Same Course

During Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs was established as the main body overseeing youth policy. This marked the final stage in the institutionalisation of state propaganda efforts aimed at young people. Initially, the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs operated under the Ministry of Sport, Tourism and Youth Policy, but by 2018, it was placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Russian government.

In 2008, Russia adopted the “Concept for the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to 2020”, which for the first time recognised state youth policy as an independent area of governance. The Concept reinforced the existing approach: creating platforms for engagement with young people and establishing social mobility mechanisms to harness their potential “in the interests of the country’s innovative development”. In 2012, Dmitry Medvedev approved the “Concept for a Nationwide System for Identifying and Developing Young Talent”, further cementing this strategic direction.

The activity of the pro-Kremlin Ours movement began its decline. Receiving funding from the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs led to some projects being transferred under the control of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs leadership — including the Seliger forum — while others branched off and became autonomous, such as Stop the Bully. The Federal Agency for Youth Affairs was keeping events more tightly controlled, which became especially relevant in the context of the Bolotnaya Square protests.

The term "protests on Bolotnaya Square" refers to the demonstrations in Moscow that took place between 2011 and 2013. These protests began after the December 4, 2011, State Duma elections and continued during the Russian presidential election campaign and after the March 4, 2012, presidential election, in which Vladimir Putin won in the first round. Participants of the rallies claimed that the elections were marred by violations of federal law and widespread fraud.

Concurrently, the Young Guard of United Russia continued its recruitment efforts and promoted “its own” people into the highest echelons of power. “Youth Primaries-2011”, a reminder of the 2006 Political Workshop project, were launched, and in February 2012 the head of the Young Guard of United Russia, Timur Prokopenko, became deputy head of the Domestic Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration.

The new goal for the Young Guard of United Russia was defined by the Bolotnaya Square protests — the organization was to support student clubs and provide students with leisure activities to prevent the emergence of new large-scale protest movements.

This way, students became the Young Guard of United Russia’s target audience.

2012–2018: “Patriotic” becomes “Military-Patriotic”

The 2011-2012 protest movement, in which politically active youth played a significant role, forced the Russian authorities to rethink their approach to engaging with the younger generation. This shift was also influenced by new nominations within the government: Vyacheslav Volodin, who replaced Vladislav Surkov — the ideologist of the now-defunct Nashi movement which did not survive the Bolotnaya — as the head of the political bloc in the Presidential Administration, chose to build his own system of “patriotic education”.

For example, stricter control was imposed over pro-government rallies and forums: after opposition activists turned Seliger-2012 into what was essentially an anti-Putin platform, organizations deemed disloyal to the authorities were no longer allowed to participate.

The "Politics" shift at the 2012 summer "Seliger" forum was led by opposition blogger Dmitry Ternovsky. The forum itself also saw participation from organizations founded by opposition figures: "RosPil" and "RosYama" (Alexey Navalny) and the "Left Front" (Sergey Udaltsov). Opposition activities were carried out during the forum: for example, in the early hours of July 28, the phrase "Putin, leave on your own" appeared on the sidewalks of the forum grounds.

In 2015, a new forum named Territory of Meanings was created to replace Seliger, retaining much of the latter's functions.

The Young Guard of United Russia began to play an increasingly significant role in youth outreach, especially after the dissolution of Ours, which put an end to their competition. In March 2014, one of the Young Guard leaders, Sergey Pospelov, became the head of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, effectively merging party and state resources.

Fundamental changes in the system of “patriotic” education truly began only after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The sharp ideological shift implemented by the Russian authorities required a corresponding adjustment in youth policy.

Following the “Crimean Spring” the focus of youth education shifted to a distinctly military approach to patriotism. Alongside loyalty to the state, the traits of “ideal” youth now included a readiness to “serve the Fatherland” and support for “traditional” values.

This direction was formally institutionalized in November 2014, when the Russian government issued a decree approving the framework for youth policy up to 2025. Among its goals was stated the “formation of a national-state identity among young citizens”.

The militarisation of “patriotic” education was also evident in the creation of Young Army (Yunarmiya) — a movement established by the Russian Defense Ministry in 2015. It brought together all previously existing military-patriotic movements and became a foundation for “pre-conscription training”. Any child aged eight or older can join — as of December 2023, the number of participants has already exceeded 1.5 million. The values being instilled in Yunarmiya members are well illustrated by the movement's anthem:

To serve Russia is a destiny for you and me,

To serve Russia, a land so wondrous and free,

Where a new sun rises in the sky so blue.

Shoulder to shoulder, Russian troops march through,

Though the path of service may be hard and long,

With faith and loyalty to Russia we belong.

2018-2024: “Patriotic” instruction comes to academic institutions

Since 2016, Sergey Kiriyenko replaced Vyacheslav Volodin as First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Kiriyenko adapted the system to fit his own approach. He promoted technocracy, which moved the emphasis from militarism to careerism. Under the sponsorship of the Kremlin's domestic policy curators, the number of professional and educational competitions and forums increased dramatically in the late 2010s. Formally non-governmental bodies like Knowledge (Znanie) Society and Russia — the Land of Opportunity NGO were used in addition to the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs to engage young people.

The Federal Agency for Youth Affairs also hosts the previously mentioned Territory of Meanings, the Tavrida cultural forum in Crimea, and a number of regional youth forums, including Ladoga, iVolga, Baikal and Mashuk. Initiatives such as Your Move (Tvoy Khod), My Country—My Russia (Moya Strana - Moya Rossiya) the student olympiad I Am a Professional (Ya Professional) and even a “school” for the state personnel reserve — the Leaders of Russia competition, which trains managers for the Russian bureaucracy — are being created under the umbrella of Russia — the Land of Opportunity NGO.

"Your Move" – a nationwide student project that invites students to join a broader student community or participate in grant competitions to bring their ideas to life.

"My Country – My Russia" – a competition for original projects and initiatives aimed at the socio-economic development of villages, small towns, and major cities across Russia.

However, the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine and the outbreak of full-scale war forced political managers to return to a militaristic version of “patriotism”.

The most significant changes to youth policy occurred in 2022, when new implementation procedures and regulatory frameworks were put in place.

A new “value norm” for Russian society was enshrined in law with the establishment of a “registry of traditional values” in January 2022. The document presents those as binary oppositions to “Western values” — altruism versus egoism, collectivism versus individualism, patriotism and serving the Fatherland versus self-serving. On the basis of these concepts and the “pentabasis” idea created by Kiriyenko's associate and political strategist Andrey Polosin, mechanisms for cultivating “patriotic” youth started to take shape.

“Pentabasis” is a model developed by the political bloc of the Russian Presidential Administration. The main curators are Alexander Kharichev, head of the Presidential Directorate for Supporting the State Council of Russia, and Andrey Polosin, a political strategist and Vice-Rector of the RANEPA. It is promoted as a value-ideological foundation of Russian society.

”Pentabasis” consists of five structural elements, each corresponding to a specific ”value”: creation for the individual, traditions for the family, harmony for society, trust in institutions for the state, and patriotism for the country.

The foundation of a new “Pioneer” organization —The Movement of the First in July 2022 to centralise ideological work with children and teenagers — was one of the first steps in this direction. Additionally, since September 2022, schools have been holding “Conversations About Important Things”, a new weekly course where students study Russian history, discuss socio-political issues, and learn how to be “patriots”. A special “patriotic” course named “Foundations of Russian Statehood” was developed for university students.

Grozа wrote the article dedicated to Foundations of Russian Statehood — read it on our website. Unfortunately, this text is only available in Russian.

The raise in funding “patriotic” education is the clearest indication of the Russian authorities' concern for youth policy. In the 2022 budget, the expenditure amount for this purpose was initially set at 5 billion rubles, but in the end, the government spent twice as much — 11,4 billion rubles. In 2024, it reached a record 45.85 billion rubles.

Sixth term

The government's youth propaganda strategy is currently set to run until 2030, with the goal of increasing the percentage of “patriotic” youth to 70%. The war against Ukraine has further shaped youth policy. In a speech to the State Council as early as 2022, Putin emphasized the value of youth volunteer movements. It is possible that the Movement of the First may no longer be enough to fulfill the state's patriotic agenda.

That same year, Dmitry Artyukhov, chairman of the State Council Commission on Youth Policy, proposed a national project to consolidate all youth initiatives and support programs under a unified framework.