Dmitry Mironov, A Putin’s “Sonny”

The story of one of the most closed officials in Russia — the chief personnel officer of the Russian regime

In the Kremlin hierarchy, there exists a unique position. “It’s a kind of caste of chosen people,” said Aleksey Dyumin, now the Secretary of the State Council and formerly one of Putin’s long-time bodyguards. Dyumin spoke with such reverence about adjutants.

“An adjutant is an officer for special assignments who is always by the president’s side, accompanies him on all trips, sleeps in adjoining rooms, and fulfills his every, even the most delicate, request,” a former employee of the Federal Guard Service (FSO) explained to IStories.

The individuals in these positions are usually unknown to the public: the nature of their work demands special secrecy. However, paranoia and fear of conspiracies have led Putin to rely on those he could trust unconditionally: his adjutants and bodyguards have stepped out of the shadows and assumed key positions in the government.

One of them is Dmitry Mironov, a man who served as an adjutant and carried out Putin’s personal assignments for many years. Over the long years of working together, they became so close that Mironov essentially became a member of the presidential family. “My sonny,” is how Putin affectionately refers to his former adjutant, according to a close acquaintance of Mironov.

Recently, this “sonny” has become the chief personnel officer of the Russian regime. IStories reveals the story of his rise to power and the incredible wealth his family has amassed.

Who is Dmitry Mironov

Dmitry Mironov’s name first became known to the general public in 2014 when Putin appointed him head of the main anti-corruption department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

The idea of placing his bodyguards and adjutants in key government positions came to Putin after the mass protests of 2011–2012, wrote Novaya Gazeta. At the rallies, in addition to the opposition, members of the political elite appeared, and even some officials of the presidential administration expressed approval of the protesters.

“Many people still believe that these protests were planned by someone, that it was a failed attempt at a coup. The President couldn’t trust anyone in the law enforcement agencies due to the constant intrigues of their leaders. But the guys from his ‘personal guard’ were loyal only to him. From them, he received truthful, real information about what was actually happening,” Novaya Gazeta quoted a former employee of the Presidential Security Service (SBP).

Viktor Zolotov, who had protected Putin for almost 15 years, was appointed to head the newly created National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardiya). Zolotov was given control of part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs — the Internal Troops, OMON, and SOBR. Aleksey Dyumin was sent to the Ministry of Defense. And Dmitry Mironov was envisioned by Putin as the Minister of Internal Affairs.

Mironov studied at the Moscow Higher Military Command School with a specialization in “engineer for the operation of armored and automotive equipment.” As a cadet in 1991, he was selected to join the Kremlin Regiment and later worked in the Kremlin Commandant’s Office, where he was responsible for organizing sports and festive events.

At some point, Mironov was introduced to Oleg Klimentyev from the SBP. Later, Klimentyev introduced Mironov to Putin. This marked the beginning of his career as an adjutant.

After more than 20 years of working side by side with Putin, Mironov was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and just two years later, he was sent to head the Yaroslavl Oblast. Similar appointments were given to other former bodyguards and adjutants: Aleksey Dyumin became the governor of Tula Oblast, Yevgeny Zinichev — of Kaliningrad Oblast, and Sergey Morozov — of Astrakhan Oblast.

By the time Dmitry Mironov was appointed governor, Yaroslavl Oblast was considered one of the most protest-prone regions in Russia: in the 2011 parliamentary elections, United Russia showed the lowest result in the country.

“Mironov has access to the president, he can just pick up the phone and call [the president],” Alexander Vorobyov, leader of the Yaroslavl communists, told Novaya Gazeta. Immediately after Mironov took office, the region received a large budget loan from the Ministry of Finance for the first time, investments began to flow in, and Gazprom, which had halted its investment program in the region due to debts, announced that it would invest about 3.3 billion rubles in the gasification of Yaroslavl Oblast. “What stopped your predecessors from going to Miller and making a deal?” asked Rossiya 1 correspondent Sergey Brilyov during an interview with Mironov. “I don’t know,” he replied ruefully.

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In the first two years of Mironov’s governorship, Putin visited Yaroslavl Oblast four times — during that period, he visited only annexed Crimea more often. Under the previous governor, Sergey Yastrebov, Putin visited Yaroslavl Oblast only once. In public, the president addressed Mironov simply as “Dima.”

Nonetheless, Mironov was clearly uncomfortable in the role of governor, and public speaking was difficult for him.

“An ordinary FSO officer by mentality, he can’t stand publicity,” a former government employee describes Mironov. The unapproachability of the new regional head shocked the people of Yaroslavl. He did not meet with the local administration or deputies, and he did not attend sessions of the regional Duma. In 2017, during the first gubernatorial elections in Yaroslavl Oblast in 10 years, Mironov ignored all debates — other candidates had to speak to an empty podium.

The former adjutant’s career took another leap in late 2021. On the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin appointed Mironov as his assistant. The following year, he headed the Presidential Commission on Civil Service Issues.

All major appointments in the Russian government go through this commission — it is one of the key bodies in the presidential administration, explains a former Russian government employee. Of course, it’s not all-powerful — “the last word belongs to Putin,” the source says, “but it’s this commission that puts the candidate files on his desk.” This commission decides whether or not a person can be appointed to a position, and it proposes candidates to Putin, explains Nikolai Petrov, an expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Additionally, Mironov chairs the presidential commission on personnel policy “in certain federal government agencies,” where he is responsible for the selection of all high-ranking security officials.

Thus, Mironov became the chief personnel officer of the Putin regime.

From time to time, the Kremlin website publishes news about personnel commission meetings, but these are very brief reports, mostly without photos, videos, or transcripts. The only public events where Mironov appears are those related to the Russian Cossacks, whom the authorities have focused on as a significant mobilization resource. Mironov heads the Presidential Council on Cossack Affairs and personally sponsors Cossack units participating in the war with Ukraine, providing them with drones and various equipment.

Brotherly business

While Dmitry Mironov was building his career in public service, his younger brother, Evgeny, was engaged in business. Mironov doesn't like to talk about him.

“He’s doing his own thing,” was how he responded to a Komsomolskaya Pravda reporter’s question about what his brother does. He did not elaborate further.

All of Evgeny Mironov’s business successes are linked to the state-controlled Gazprom.

In 2015, he acquired a stake in the company Technospetsstroy, a small construction contractor for Gazprom. The company built local gas pipelines in the north, with annual revenues of about 200 million rubles. After Mironov’s brother joined, the company’s income skyrocketed.

In 2016, Technospetsstroy became involved in one of Gazprom’s largest projects — the construction of the Power of Siberia pipeline to export Russian gas to China. According to the company’s available financial reports, Technospetsstroy received at least 30 billion rubles from Gazprom as part of this project.

In 2020, the founder of Technospetsstroy, Evgeny Monastyrly, passed away, and Mironov became the sole owner of the company. Its revenue continued to grow, reaching 19 billion rubles in 2023.

The creation of Gazstroyproyekt, Gazprom’s unified mega-contractor, didn’t hinder Technospetsstroy’s operations. Mironov’s company became an intermediary between Gazprom’s subsidiaries and Gazstroyproyekt.

This scheme works as follows: Technospetsstroy receives contracts from Gazprom’s subsidiaries, but since the company cannot handle the entire volume on its own, it hires a subcontractor. IStories found out that this subcontractor turned out to be Gazstroyproyekt.

“This convoluted scheme has long been in place to ensure that certain people receive funds,” says a person familiar with the workings of government contracts. “Usually, it’s to provide for an ‘honorary shareholder’ or to fulfill some task for which the state or a state company does not want to allocate funds directly. Such decisions are made at the highest levels.”

If a company has no other clients besides Gazprom, yet has political connections, such a scheme could resemble a money-laundering operation, says Andrey Yakovlev, an associate researcher at the Davis Center at Harvard.

It’s not just Mironov’s brother who is linked to Gazprom. His wife, former model Tatiana Lai, receives a salary from the company Peton Khimtek, a major oil and gas contractor for Gazprom. The family business of Andrey Kurnosenko, the former first deputy of Mironov at the Main Directorate for Economic Security and Anti-Corruption (GUEBiPK) and currently head of the Main Anti-Corruption Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is also connected to Peton.

Not just Power of Siberia

Evgeny Mironov receives contracts from Gazprom (from its subsidiary Moek) through another construction company, SK Rustrest. In 2023, the company’s revenue amounted to 11.6 billion rubles, and the shareholders received dividends of 1.5 billion rubles, according to its financial reports. Mironov owns 50% of the company, meaning he could have received half.

The main client of SK Rustrest is Russian Railways (RZD). The company has renovated four railway stations in Moscow (Paveletsky, Leningradsky, Belorussky, and Yaroslavsky) and has been actively involved in the construction and reconstruction of the Moscow Railway. Another important client of SK Rustrest is the Group 1520, which is considered the largest contractor for RZD.

A significant portion of Rustrest’s revenue comes from contracts with the state-owned Mosvodokanal. In 2020–2022, Rustrest signed contracts with them worth nearly 3 billion rubles. Mosvodokanal is not unfamiliar to the Mironov family. It is headed by Alexander Ponomarenko, the partner of Lyubov Komissarenko, who co-owns a joint real estate development business with Dmitry Mironov’s father.

Gazprom, Technospetsstroy, and SK Rustrest declined to respond to questions from IStories.

The Lyubertsy connection

Except for his brother, all the men in Dmitry Mironov’s family are military.

His grandfather, Timofey Mironov, was a Hero of the Soviet Union and commanded an artillery battery during World War II.

His father, Yuri Mironov, is a retired colonel who has served in the Central Sports Club of the Army (CSKA) since the 1970s and has been an advisor to the CSKA head since 2014. In 2023, Mironov Sr. organized a fund under the CSKA brand to assist “participants of the Special Military Operation,” which purchases drones, equipment, and humanitarian aid. He also owns a private security firm, which receives contracts from the Moscow City Hall to guard bridges; in 2024, the contract amount exceeded 250 million rubles.

Yuri Mironov is now trying his hand as a real estate developer in the Moscow region. Lyubertsy is a coveted target for developers due to high demand for new housing in the area. Since 2023, Mironov has owned 25% of the company “Specialized Developer ‘Parus’” in Lyubertsy, which currently has several development projects.

One of the large plots of land was obtained by Parus through a straightforward scheme: first, the company leased the land and then bought it from the city at a discounted price — just 15% of its cadastral value, amounting to slightly less than 16 million rubles.

Parus was able to acquire the land because it was supposedly the owner of a warehouse building on the plot. According to documents, this building was constructed in less than three months, yet satellite images from that time show no visible structure.

Shortly after, Parus resold the plot.

The head of the city administration, under which Mironov Sr.’s company acquired the land, was Vladimir Volkov, a familiar figure to the Mironov family.

When Dmitry Mironov became the governor of the Yaroslavl region in 2017, he appointed a minor Lyubertsy official — Volkov, the same person who helped his father with the Lyubertsy plot — as head of Pereslavl-Zalessky. Two years later, Volkov became the head of Yaroslavl. After Mironov left the governor’s office in 2021, Volkov also stepped down.

Mironov Sr.’s partners in Parus are also connected to the Lyubertsy authorities in one way or another.

Other partners

Apart from Mironov, a share in Parus is now owned by Anna Babikova. Her husband, Yuri Babikov, shares the name of Volkov’s former deputy when he headed the administration of the Kraskovo urban settlement in the Lyubertsy district.

Almost 19% is owned by Mamed Azizov, until recently the director of Lyubertsy’s main management company, LGZT. Previously, Lyubov Komissarenko, the partner of Alexander Ponomarenko (head of Mosvodokanal), also owned a share in the company. The son-in-law of Vladimir Ruzhitsky, who headed Lyubertsy from 2005 to 2022, worked at Mosvodokanal. Ruzhitsky is now the head of the local Council of Deputies.

Yuri Mironov also owns a 25% stake in “Specialized Developer ‘Desna’” along with the wife of former long-time head of Lyubertsy, Vladimir Ruzhitsky, Valentina. Other co-owners include Ekaterina Semaeva, the wife of Ruzhitsky’s former colleague in the Moscow Regional Duma, Sergey Semaev, and Lyubov Komissarenko, the partner of Ponomarenko, head of Mosvodokanal.

Desna is building residential complexes in Lyubertsy. The company currently owns over 70 hectares of land, mainly intended for high-rise residential development.

Dmitry Goryachev, the general director of Parus, did not respond to questions from IStories and blocked the correspondent. The general director of Desna also ignored the questions.

The benefits

Before Putin allowed officials to stop disclosing their income information in 2022, Dmitry Mironov’s income declarations were quite modest. Before joining the presidential administration, he earned about 2–3 million rubles a year, and after that, around 4 million. His wife appeared in the declaration in 2019, but she also did not show significant income.

Until 2016, the presidential adjutant owned a nearly 128-square-meter apartment in Moscow, in the elite residential complex Golden Keys, located in the protected area of the Setun River floodplain, which even has a mini-zoo with llamas. Dmitry Medvedev and Alexey Ulyukaev have apartments in neighboring buildings.

But apparently, this apartment was not enough for Mironov. As IStories found out, he used a common scheme among officials to obtain prestigious housing from the state by claiming he was in need.

In May 2016, the Presnensky District Court received a lawsuit from “D. Yu. Mironov,” in which the plaintiff claimed he had gifted his existing apartment to the state and, as someone in need of improved housing conditions, received a service apartment from the Presidential Property Management Department under a social rental agreement. He then went to court and requested that the gift agreement be recognized as an exchange agreement and the service apartment be declared his property. The court ruled in his favor. In 2017, the 128-square-meter apartment disappeared from Mironov’s declaration, but a new one — 176 square meters — appeared.

Dmitry Mironov did not respond to IStories’ questions.