Under pressure

As the Russian army slowly advances, Ukraine is losing positions it’s held for years

Like our earlier reports on the combat situation in Ukraine, this article takes stock of the recent developments on the battlefield based on open-source information. Meduza has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the very start, and our detailed military analyses are part of our commitment to objective reporting on a war we firmly oppose.

Our map is based exclusively on open-source photos and videos, most of them posted by eyewitnesses on social media. We collect available evidence and determine its geolocation markers, adding only the photos and videos that clear this process. Meduza doesn’t try to track the conflict in real time; the data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old.

Key updates as of July 19, 2024

Russian troops are continuing their offensive in Ukraine’s Donbas region. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) are losing ground north of Bakhmut, in the Toretsk area between Horlivka and Bakhmut, west of Avdiivka, in Krasnohorivka, and near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka. While not all these losses are equally critical, the failure to halt the Russian advance along a broad front — from Krasnohorivka in the south to Toretsk in the north — could prove costly for the Ukrainian army by late summer and early fall.

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The Siversk sector

Russian troops continue to achieve localized successes north of Soledar, advancing toward the city of Siversk. They’ve captured the village of Rozdolivka and are pushing along the Bakhmut–Siversk railway.

Another Russian formation, which captured the village of Spirne northeast of Rozdolivka after months of fighting, has unexpectedly pushed several kilometers into Ukrainian defenses and seized the village of Ivano-Daryivka. This advance toward Siversk from the south and east appears to be part of a larger plan by the Russian command to capture Siversk and eventually reach Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Chasiv Yar

West of Bakhmut, Russian troops have taken control of the Kanal microdistrict in Chasiv Yar, which is separated from the city center by the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas Canal. They’re now attempting to cross the canal, but it remains unclear how successful these efforts have been and whether the Russian command plans to launch a direct assault on Chasiv Yar.

Russian forces are also advancing on the flanks. South of Chasiv Yar, near Klishchiivka, they’ve secured strategically important high ground, enabling them to advance toward the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas Canal. Additionally, the Russian army is attempting to take the Kalynivka microdistrict to facilitate a future crossing of the canal north of Chasiv Yar.

Toretsk

The Russian army is continuing its attacks on all settlements south and west of Toretsk, moving toward the Russian group advancing on Chasiv Yar. The Ukrainian command has sent reinforcements from other parts of the front, including Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Svatove. The battles here have become a series of counterattacks, with Ukrainian forces trying to push back in the settlements of Pivnichne, Druzhba, Pivdenne, and Niu-York.

Despite these counterattacks, Russian troops continue to advance northward. In Niu-York, they’ve reached the Phenol Plant, which is likely to become the main fortified area for Ukrainian forces in this settlement. The Russian Aerospace Forces have already begun heavy bombardments of the plant using precision-guided bombs. Fierce battles are also ongoing on the southern outskirts of Pivnichne, in and around the high-rise buildings. Both sides are using tanks and other armored vehicles and are sustaining losses.

The Avdiivka front

The Russian army has captured the last villages (most of Novoselivka Persha, Voskhod, and Yasnobrodivka) that stood between it and the major natural obstacle of the Vovcha River. Once Ukrainian forces retreat behind the river, it is likely that the Russian army will try to break through north of the river’s bend, through the villages of Prohres and Vozdvyzhenka, toward the Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka road which serves as the main supply line for the AFU groupings in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

Beyond the Vovcha River, near Prohres, there’s a line of large, well-fortified AFU strongholds. (Some were established after Russia captured Avdiivka in February; it’s likely that Ukrainian forces continued to fight between Avdiivka and the Vovcha under harsh conditions to buy time to reinforce the new defensive line.) However, holding these new positions will be challenging given the Russian army’s air superiority.

Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka

A recently published video suggests that Russian troops have reached the Kurakhove–Vuhledar road, which serves as the main supply line for the Ukrainian grouping in Vuhledar. This crucial route has enabled them to hold Vuhledar since March 2022, despite numerous Russian assaults.

A small Russian unit advanced about four kilometers (2.5 miles) to reach the road but lost their equipment in the process. It remains unclear whether they have secured their new positions. The loss of this supply line could have serious consequences for the defense of Vuhledar.

To the west of Vuhledar, south of the regional center Velyka Novosilka, Russian forces are still expending significant resources in an attempt to reclaim territories lost during the AFU’s 2023 summer offensive. In June, Russian troops captured Staromaiorske, and in July, they took the neighboring village of Urozhaine. The battle for the ruins of Urozhaine lasted several weeks, with Russian forces losing dozens of pieces of equipment in an offensive that held more symbolic than strategic value.

Other developments

Ukrainian sources have confirmed that the AFU’s bridgehead in Krynky on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River no longer exists. In actuality, Ukrainian troops were evacuated from this bridgehead back in May and June, with some being redeployed to defend Vovchansk and the village of Lyptsi in the Kharkiv region. Ukrainian media, citing the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reported that AFU personnel losses in Krynky, including both dead and missing soldiers, amounted to about 1,000 people (from the fall of 2023 to the summer of 2024).

Heavy fighting continues in Vovchansk and on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv. The AFU still holds the advantage, thanks to reserves transferred to this sector, including the 414th Marine Unmanned Strike Aviation Systems Regiment, a large unit of drone operators unofficially known as the “Magyar Birds,” which previously defended the bridgehead in Krynky. This regiment is also conducting strikes on rear units of the Russian grouping in this sector, stationed in Russia’s Belgorod region.

However, Ukrainian attacks in Vovchansk seem to be waning. Russian forces have managed to improve their positions in the high-rise residential area and on the grounds of the Aggregate Plant in the northern part of the city. The situation for both Russian and Ukrainian infantry remains difficult: they’re engaged in street fighting with significant supply challenges and are under constant attack from drones, piloted aircraft, and artillery.

Russian units have also crossed the Kharkiv–Belgorod border in another location, 40 kilometers (25 miles) west of Kharkiv’s outskirts, where fighting has been ongoing since May. Russian troops were spotted in the Ukrainian village of Sotnytskyi Kozachok near the border. It’s unclear whether this is an attempt to open a new front or a diversionary attack to force the Ukrainian command to transfer reserves away from Kharkiv.

In the eastern part of the Kharkiv region, as well as in neighboring areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the slow Russian advance continues. Russian troops are now attempting to force their way across the Zherebets River near Makiivka in the Luhansk region. They’ve managed to capture most of the village, which has been a battleground since the fall of 2022.

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