Punishment by addiction: Why lifting oil and gas sanctions could be the best sanction

The foundation for sanctions policy lies in a country's ability to restrict the supply of its goods or services to a state that violates certain rules of behavior, and its capacity to refuse to purchase goods and services from that country. In this context, Western countries' ban on supplying many of their products to Russia is understandable and, most importantly, feasible. The same applies to the embargo on Russian energy carriers imposed by the U.S., Canada, and, much later and with some exceptions, the European Union. A further level of restriction involves banning the sale of goods produced in third countries that use Western components and technologies, then using these restrictions as an instrument of pressure. An even more advanced approach involves pressuring specific companies with the threat of restricted access to Western markets if they assist in trading with Russia. This is precisely the situation faced by Chinese banks and financial institutions in Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries.

However, this does not mean that one country can prohibit another from trading with third countries simply because it wants to. Notably, even sanctions imposed against individual ships of the “shadow fleet” often lack solid justification. For instance, noting that certain tankers have entered North Korean ports appears to be an attempt to leverage globally recognized UN restrictions against the ships in question, but the utility of such actions is suspect. It is practically impossible to completely halt the operations of the “shadow fleet,” and even if sanctions are announced against hundreds of ships, the potential consequences remain unclear. Moreover, regardless of the sanctions, tankers can still navigate international waters and straits, as the free movement of commercial vessels is guaranteed by international conventions including the Copenhagen Convention of 1857 regarding the Baltic straits and the Montreux Convention regarding the Turkish straits.

The attempt to justify restrictions based on environmental damage also seems to be out of place. While gaps in international law in this area are evident, such legislation is unlikely to be applied to ships of the “shadow fleet.” Straits like the Skagerrak or the Bosphorus cannot be blocked for any commercial vessel or group of ships. Coastal authorities have the right to “initiate restrictive procedures up to the detention of a vessel” only if there are “clear objective signs” of an environmental threat. Passage might be denied to ships insured by companies that have been deemed as unreliable after previously failing to pay insurance claims following a wreck. However, taking such steps would represent a highly expanded interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The mere fact that a tanker, which appears somewhat outdated and sails under the flag of Liberia or Belize, is transporting Russian oil from Ust-Luga to India with Ingosstrakh insurance cannot be grounds for its detention or restriction of navigation, and there are no direct indications that any countries intend to restrict the movement of such vessels. Occasionally, news emerges on this topic, usually based on vague statements by officials. These statements typically conclude by acknowledging the importance of “ensuring that any new measures can be practically applied and comply with international law.”