Maneuver vs attrition. Why the AFU has been so successful in Russia’s Kursk Region

Since the first months of its full-scale war with Ukraine, the Kremlin has been determining the scope of the war zone arbitrarily. The “special military operation” was initially intended to remain confined exclusively within the territory of Ukraine (excluding Crimea and the city of Sevastopol), while Ukrainian strikes on internationally recognized Russian territory were qualified by Moscow as terrorist acts.

Following Russia’s withdrawal from the northern regions of Ukraine in 2022, the country’s military command announced that the fighting would be centered in the Donbas. Meanwhile, Russia’s borders were guarded by comparatively weak units, some of which included conscripts. Neither the army units at the border nor the border guards were supplied with drones and electronic warfare equipment, nor were they entitled to “special military operation” bonuses, which they could have used to purchase the missing items themselves. They had hardly any heavy equipment or anti-tank weapons.

Combined with a history of largely unsuccessful incursions into Russian territory by Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) sabotage and reconnaissance units, the Kremlin propagandist cliche about the inviolability of Russia’s state borders lulled Moscow into a false sense of security. Russia’s “North” grouping of forces, which was created in the spring of 2024 for the defense of the border region, among other purposes, was diverted for use in an offensive in the Kharkiv Region. However, Russia’s spring maneuver offensive did not succeed, and the troops ended up stuck in positional battles around Vovchansk.