Putin and what army? Why Russia keeps putting off mobilization

RU

On the battlefield in Ukraine, August and early September were marked by Russia's offensive in the Pokrovsk sector of the Donetsk Region. While the advance was fairly rapid by the standards of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Russian “war correspondents” have been complaining almost constantly about shortages of personnel and the resulting exhaustion within the advancing group. More and more wounded soldiers in recovery are being forced back to the front, and UAV operators and servicemen from other military branches are being transferred to serve in the infantry (1, 2).

As a result, pro-war Russians are wondering whether a new wave of mobilization is in order, especially since Ukraine has reinvigorated efforts to expand its ranks with the adoption of a draft dodgers law. If Wall Street Journal sources are to be believed, Russian commanders were already emphasizing the need for mobilization to Putin more than six months ago.

To the displeasure of the “patriotic” crowd, Russian officials at various levels of government continue to assure the public that no new wave of mobilization is planned (1, 2, 3), and they frequently report on the supposed successes of contract military recruitment — which is stimulated by frequent pay raises for those willing to enlist voluntarily. The Russian leadership most likely expects to meet at least its short-term military objectives — such as the complete capture of the Donetsk Region — without calling a nationwide mobilization.

The Kremlin's calculations do not seem to have been affected by the Ukrainian breakthrough into Russia's Kursk Region: according to estimates from Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, the Russian command managed to pull roughly 35,500 troops to this sector in a few weeks by transferring reserves from quieter parts of the front. As a result, Russian forces even launched a counter-offensive and regained control over several villages.

Personnel

Its current rate of personnel replacement allows the Russian Armed Forces to compensate for its losses, according to the international research group Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT). “There was a difficult period in the first half of 2024, when the trickle of recruits was too slow to make up for losses and create new units. However, the issue appears to have been resolved by raising bonus payments. We saw an increase [in the number of recruits] in the second quarter, and in the third quarter, there was another pay raise, probably resulting in another increase. Whether it will help in the long term remains to be seen. The issue may need to be revisited closer to the end of the year. Until then, the situation is unlikely to become threatening. The only scenario that would necessitate mobilization is the encirclement or destruction of a large group of troops. But the situation on the ground makes such a development almost impossible,” the experts conclude.

Military analyst Yan Matveev adds that if mobilization did take place, it would not help the Russian Armed Forces achieve its tasks in the short term:

“I don't think that even a second wave of mobilization can guarantee Russia’s capture of Donetsk Region. Putting together a large infantry force is not enough. And it won’t be that large in any case — maybe another 300,000 troops, which is fewer than last year's number of contract recruits, if we are to believe the available reports. They may be able to recapture Kursk Region. But the Russian forces could manage it even without mobilization if they allocate more troops and resources.”

The fate of the soldiers mobilized in the previous wave remains unclear. Their wives are set to resume protests demanding their husbands’ return home. Probably the best-known Russian mobilized serviceman, the author of the Vault No. 8 Telegram channel, complains about the lack of rotation and keeps count of his fellow soldiers who have sustained wounds and suffered illnesses over two years of active frontline duty. Matveev is sure that such a long stay at the front has a detrimental effect on the mobilized. “Admittedly, soldiers are gaining experience, but the overall impact is negative, of course. Fatigue builds up, both physical and psychological. They become prone to negative effects like fatalism. Nothing good comes out of this.”

CIT believes this problem has not yet become critical for the Russian army:

“The mobilized have become somewhat less involved in assault actions, giving way to mostly fresh volunteer contract servicemen. Therefore, the troops’ fatigue has a smaller impact. In addition, strict, or should we rather say brutal, discipline — all those pits, basements, and so on — so far allows commanders to maintain order among the troops. Known cases of desertion by entire units can literally be counted on one's fingers, and this is one of the hallmarks of a tired army.”