Drones vs. Depots: Ukraine’s new strategy targets ammo caches — and Russia has no response

As the saying goes, “amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.” This has never been truer than in the age of industrial wars, where the growing numbers and rate of fire of artillery and small arms increased armies' demand for ammunition. For both the Russian Imperial Army during World War I and the Soviet Red Army in World War II, logistics were complicated by the vast distances between munitions factories and the front lines — as well as by the notoriously poor condition of Russia’s road network.

The Russian army's supply system was built along the lines that remain largely unchanged to this day: in peacetime, munitions were stored in large depots with rail access, and in wartime, they were transported either from these depots or directly from factories by rail to an unloading station closest to the front (referred to as the “railhead” or “final unloading point” in military terms).

In the old days, ammunition was unloaded and moved to the front by horse-drawn carts; later, trucks took on this role. This cumbersome but effective system was overseen by Russia’s Main Artillery Directorate, established in 1862. In 1960, the name was changed to the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate (GRAU), which manages Russia’s artillery and munitions to this day.

Even during the wars of the 20th century, centralized depots were prime targets for enemy fire. In World War II, Soviet depots were attacked by German aircraft, such as the Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers. The Red Army defended the sites using ground-based air defenses and fighter aircraft. Nazi Germany lacked the strategic air power to strike depots and factories deep in Soviet rear areas, and the logistics system from that time has remained largely intact. It was used during the war in Donbas from 2014 to 2022 — and is still being used during the current full-scale invasion of Ukraine.