The ATACMS factor: Assessing the missiles’ impact one month after Kyiv got the green light to strike targets inside Russia

The Biden administration’s decision to authorize the use of Western-made long-range missiles officially came in response to the deployment of North Korean troops in the combat zone, rather than to Ukraine’s repeated appeals for such permission. However, the diplomatic significance of the decision may outweigh its military value if ceasefire negotiations really do begin. Strikes on Russian airfields and ammunition depots may have had some effect on the Kremlin’s calculus: since late November 2024, there has been a noticeable decline in the use of Russian FAB glide bombs equipped with UMPK guidance kits.

In any case, Ukraine’s consistent use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles at their maximum range will force adjustments in Russian planning. Logistics and troop movements will likely be adapted to account for the increased threat, complicating transport distances and response times.

False escalation

Many observers feared that the use of Western missiles on Russian territory would provoke a new wave of escalation from Moscow. Instead, Russia deployed the “Oreshnik” — a new intermediate-range ballistic missile equipped with hypersonic warheads — targeting the Pivdenmash aerospace plant in Dnipro. Putin described the missile's impact as comparable to a nuclear strike or a meteorite, though experts remain skeptical about its effectiveness when used without a nuclear payload.

While further strikes on Russian territory could prompt additional Oreshnik launches, the most severe consequence is likely to be an increase in Russian attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure — a pattern seen repeatedly when “red lines” set by the Kremlin have been crossed. By itself, the Oreshnik is unlikely to significantly influence the course of the war in Ukraine. Its estimated payload of 1.5 tons of explosives is equivalent to three quasi-ballistic Iskander missiles or three Kinzhal missiles. The Kremlin clearly has far more of these in stock than it does of the expensive Oreshniks. Meanwhile, the strike against Pivdenmash put the new missile’s very limited accuracy and destructive capacity on display, and the results were not game-changing.

From the perspective of nuclear escalation, nothing appears to be all that new. For more than two years Ukraine has been carrying out strikes on territory that Russia officially claims as part of its sovereign soil, and Putin’s response continues to be conventional. Oreshnik is not the first nuclear-capable system Russia has launched at Ukraine — both Iskanders and Kinzhal missiles can be armed with tactical nuclear warheads, and these systems have been striking Ukrainian targets since the start of the full-scale invasion. In other words, the Oreshnik functions more as a political signal than a practical military tool, with its message aimed not at Ukraine, but at the country’s Western allies, particularly in Europe.

Given that the overall effectiveness of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles will largely depend on the consistency of their supply to Ukraine, it is important that the suppliers of these long-range weapons not take Putin’s posturing too seriously. Even if the missiles are incapable of turning the tide in the war, Kyiv’s position is much more favorable with them than it would be without them.