Weekly Russia-Ukraine war summary: Russia faced with growing vehicle shortage, AFU withdraws from Velyka Novosilka, lull in Kursk Region
In the Lyman sector, Russian pro-war bloggers are outraged (1, 2, 3, 4) at the situation in Russia's 20th Combined Arms Army because of “false reports” of the capture of Novoehorivka and “meat-grinder assaults” aimed at pushing the front line to the previously reported coordinates. Ukraine's 3rd Separate Assault Brigade also denies Russia's capture of Novoehorivka, while Russian pro-war blogger Rybar attributes the confusion to the use of outdated Soviet maps.
Mutual strikes and sabotage
This past week, the AFU Air Force reported (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) intercepting 343 of 577 launched Shahed-type and other UAVs. Another 181 drones were “radar lost.” Two Kh-59/Kh-69 air-launched cruise missiles were also reported launched and downed on the night of Jan. 25.
In turn, Russia's MoD reported (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15) intercepting 247 Ukrainian fixed-wing UAVs over Russia and occupied Crimea, as well as destroying two amphibious drones in the Black Sea. Ukrainian strikes on the following targets were reported over the course of the week:
Losses
OSINT researcher Cyrus studied statistics on Russia's losses of armored vehicles using information from Oryx and Andrew Perpetua. Both sources indicate a decrease in armored vehicle losses. However, since overall losses remain high, this may not indicate an improving situation for the Russian Armed Forces, but a growing shortage of armored vehicles.
The Insider analyzed the situation with the warring sides' vehicle stocks and the prospects of their depletion for further combat operations. As for the Russian Armed Forces, their stocks of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery systems at storage bases have been depleted by about half, and the vast majority of the remaining vehicles are in unsuitable condition and could only be stripped for parts. With the manufacturing of new armored vehicles limited to several hundred units a year, Russia cannot even cover its losses on individual parts of the front like the Pokrovsk sector. Military analysts predict a complete depletion of Russian armored vehicle stocks or a sharp change in tactics with a decrease in the intensity of offensive actions within the next eighteen months. The Russian Armed Forces are already adapting. Instead of using armored vehicles in “meat-grinder assaults,” they are increasingly turning to a variety of non-armored vehicles including scooters, motorcycles, ATVs, and civilian cars.