Nukes of hazard: Weighing the risks of a military solution to Iran’s advancing WMD program

Israel does have its own bunker-busting bombs — which were used, for example, in a successful strike on a Hezbollah meeting near Beirut that killed Hassan Nasrallah last September. However, only the American GBU-57 30,000 bunker-buster is believed to be capable of penetrating Iran’s fortified nuclear sites. Even if the U.S. agreed to provide them, Israel lacks aircraft capable of carrying the ordnance.

Estimates suggest a campaign would require several hundred combat aircraft — including bombers, fighters, and airborne early warning systems — operating over the course of several days, or even weeks. The Israeli Air Force has only six KC-707 refueling aircraft, far short of what's needed for such sustained operations.

In short, a meaningful attack against Iran would have to be far larger in scale than Israel’s previous strikes on single nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007.

Is success guaranteed?

Even with U.S. involvement, the answer is still no.

An operation against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would be extraordinarily complex. The distance from bases and carriers to targets is vast, the number of known targets is high, the sites themselves are spread across remote and mountainous areas, and many of the key facilities are located underground and are heavily fortified.

The ongoing campaign against the Houthis shows that airstrikes alone rarely produce decisive results. In Yemen, underground weapons depots hit by B-2 bombers were quickly rebuilt using newly dug tunnels. In the case of Iran, the challenge is even greater. In short, it is highly unlikely that airstrikes alone could fully eliminate the country’s nuclear infrastructure.