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Kremlin spokesman claims the USSR could have defeated Hitler without allied help — but Zhukov, Khrushchev, and even Stalin disagreed
The Insider
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, speaking at the so-called federal educational marathon “Knowledge. Firsts,” recently commented on the support the Soviet Union received from its Western allies during World War II. The report put out by state-controlled Channel One quoted Peskov while interjecting an explanatory aside:
“‘We should still be grateful to our allies, they helped us in this Victory. And the famous Lend-Lease really did help us.’
At the same time, the press secretary of the Russian president emphasized that the Soviet army would have defeated Nazi Germany even without help from the United States.
‘We would have won anyway. We would have ‘eaten dirt,’ but we would have won,’ Peskov insisted.”
The “special military operation” (SVO) is a euphemism used by the Russian government to refer to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began on Feb. 24, 2022. The term is used in official Russian media, government statements, and pro-Kremlin discourse to justify Moscow's military actions, frame the invasion as a limited operation rather than an all-out war, and suppress dissent.
The modern Russian publication Science. Society. Defense, in an article pointedly titled Lend-Lease, World War II, and the Special Military Operation, offers useful historical context:
“The Lend-Lease Act was passed in the U.S. in March 1941 and was immediately extended to Great Britain. In October 1941, representatives of the USSR, USA, and Great Britain signed a protocol on mutual supplies in Moscow. The USSR expressed its willingness to pay for allied supplies using its gold reserves. In November 1941, the U.S. extended the Lend-Lease Act to the Soviet Union.
During World War II, total Lend-Lease aid from the U.S. to its allies amounted to about $50 billion, 22% of which went to the Soviet Union. By the end of 1945, U.S. Lend-Lease aid to the USSR amounted to $11.1 billion. This included (in millions of dollars): aircraft – 1,189; tanks and self-propelled guns – 618; motor vehicles – 1,151; ships – 689; artillery – 302; ammunition – 482; tools and machinery – 1,577; metals – 879; food – 1,726; and more.
In addition to U.S. aid, the USSR also received assistance from Great Britain and (from 1943) Canada, with the value of that support estimated at $1.7 billion and $200 million respectively.”
The $11.1 billion in aid that the U.S.sent to the USSR during the war equates to roughly $200 billion in today’s dollars.
A 1948 Soviet publication titled A Short History of the Great Patriotic War acknowledged the support while noting that its provision was not the decisive factor in Nazi Germany’s ultimate defeat:
“The USSR did indeed receive under Lend-Lease some types of weapons, as well as machines, equipment, and materials important to the national economy, including locomotives, fuel, communication equipment, various non-ferrous metals, and chemicals. A significant contribution, for instance, was the delivery of 401,400 vehicles by the U.S. and Britain. However, overall, this assistance was not considered substantial and could not have decisively influenced the course of the Great Patriotic War.”
The publication listed the ratio of foreign-supplied to domestically produced equipment: “artillery of all types – 1.9%, tanks – 7%, combat aircraft – up to 13%. Imported motor vehicles accounted for 5.4% of the Red Army’s fleet in 1943 and 19% in 1944. The total volume of allied supplies allegedly amounted to about 4% of Soviet military production.”
Modern Russian historians assess the scale of the aid differently. The same Science. Society. Defense article reports:
“Documents and testimonies that have become available in recent years allow for a more objective assessment of Lend-Lease’s role. While the total volume of supplies was about 4% of the USSR’s gross national product, in specific categories of arms and equipment — often highly valuable — the share was much higher. During the war, the Soviet aviation industry produced 122,100 aircraft of all types, and 18,300 aircraft were delivered under Lend-Lease, making up 15% of the total fleet. Allied bombers accounted for 20%, fighters for 16–23%, and naval aircraft for around 29%. Most of these planes, in terms of performance, matched or even surpassed their Luftwaffe counterparts.
Allied tanks made up 12% of Soviet tank production (98,300 vehicles including self-propelled guns). Although even the best Western tanks, such as the M4-A2 Sherman, were inferior in combat performance to Soviet models like the T-34, KV-1, and IS series, the first 501 tanks delivered in late 1941 played a significant role — this was a time when every tank was critically important.
Motor vehicle deliveries were vital to the Red Army and the economy. A total of 427,000 vehicles were supplied, while the USSR produced 219,000 during the war. This made the Red Army mobile and maneuverable, especially during the 1943–1945 offensives. Allied vehicles made up 70% of the Red Army’s motor fleet.”
The iconic BM-13 “Katyusha” rocket launchers were notably mounted on U.S.-made Studebaker truck chassis.
Marshal Georgy Zhukov, in a conversation with writer Konstantin Simonov, remarked:
“When analyzing our readiness for war in terms of economy and industry, one cannot ignore the factor of subsequent allied assistance — primarily from the Americans, since the British helped us minimally. This cannot be dismissed when analyzing the war. We would have been in a dire situation without American gunpowder; we couldn’t have produced the amount of ammunition we needed. Without American Studebakers, we’d have had nothing to tow our artillery with. They essentially provided the bulk of our frontline transport. The production of special steels needed for various war purposes was also tied to several American deliveries.”
Zhukov acknowledged that at the start of the war, the USSR lagged behind Germany technologically. In 1963, state security services recorded one of his private statements:
“Nowadays people say the allies never helped us... But how can one deny that the Americans sent us so many materials, without which we couldn’t have formed our reserves or continued the war… We had no explosives, no gunpowder. We had nothing to fill our rifle cartridges with. The Americans really bailed us out with gunpowder and explosives. And how much sheet steel they sent us! Could we have quickly set up tank production without American steel? And now people claim we had it all in abundance.”
Nikita Khrushchev, in his memoirs, wrote:
“I want to express my opinion and honestly recount Stalin’s view on whether the Red Army and the Soviet Union could have defeated Nazi Germany without help from the U.S. and Britain. First, let me mention what Stalin repeatedly said during our informal conversations. He frankly stated that without U.S. help, we wouldn’t have won the war: one-on-one against Nazi Germany, we couldn’t have withstood the onslaught and would have lost. No one ever officially touched this topic, and I doubt Stalin left written records, but I declare here that he mentioned this to me several times. He didn’t dwell on it, but in casual discussions on international affairs and when we returned to the war years, he would raise it.
…How did the war unfold? We must put ourselves in our wartime situation, especially after Hitler forced us to abandon Belarus, Ukraine, and vast regions of the Russian Federation, including the oil-rich North Caucasus. True, we held some key oil regions, but they were effectively disabled, their equipment dismantled, production and refining halted. Conditions were dire for industry. We lost the ability to economically use the occupied territories.
…We lost the largest aircraft, tank, and engine factories. What about the Stalingrad Tractor Plant? We lost that too. It also housed a major artillery plant supplying both field and naval artillery. Imagine the disaster that befell us. We were left without means of transportation, without factories producing vehicles, especially tractors and towing machines essential for war. We had no transport! We had to rely on horses, a return to the past. Much of our artillery reverted to horse-drawn transport. Only the Romanians were still using oxen to pull artillery. So should we have switched to oxen too? Such was the situation.
…That’s when the Americans and British stepped in, determined to keep us in the fight, to prevent our collapse. They supplied aircraft, vehicles, and weapons. When I saw the trucks we received, I couldn’t believe my eyes. And they came in large numbers. These figures are still unpublished.
…In short, goods poured in. Anastas Mikoyan once listed how much duralumin, steel, gasoline, aircraft, aircraft materials, and other military supplies we received. It was very substantial aid — especially vehicles. We gained the ability to ensure our troops’ mobility, which is decisive in modern warfare. The Germans had used mobility to devastating effect against France and us — breaking through, encircling, and destroying our forces. They panicked civilians and demoralized the military. Mobility gave them dominance.
…And long-range bombers? At the war’s start, ours were virtually symbolic. Occasionally a few would reach Berlin, but such missions were rare and ineffective. We couldn’t damage German industry with them. That required massive raids, and we lacked the capacity.
…I want to stress the quality and quantity of machines we received. Can you imagine how we could have advanced from Stalingrad to Berlin without them? I can’t. Our losses would have been enormous due to the lack of mobility. We also got a lot of steel and duralumin. Our industry was crippled, parts of it left to the enemy. In such conditions, U.S. help was enormously important.”
But Peskov holds a different view from Zhukov, Khrushchev, and even Stalin. He has his own formula for victory — one that does not require adequate supplies of equipment and materials: “eating dirt.” The effectiveness of this method remains difficult to assess.
The “special military operation” (SVO) is a euphemism used by the Russian government to refer to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began on Feb. 24, 2022. The term is used in official Russian media, government statements, and pro-Kremlin discourse to justify Moscow's military actions, frame the invasion as a limited operation rather than an all-out war, and suppress dissent.