Дата
Источник
Сохранённая копия
Оригинал материала
The Kremlin’s laundromat: Billionaire Moldovan fraudster Vladimir Plahotniuc repeatedly flew to Moscow for secret high-level talks
Billionaire Vladimir Plahotniuc, who was recently arrested in Greece in connection with the “Moldovan laundromat” case, regularly visited Moscow using a passport that bears a false name, flight records and copies of documents that are available to The Insider show. Additionally, according to wiretap data, Vladimir Putin’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Dmitry Kozak, has been negotiating with Plahotniuc since June 2024 as part of a Kremlin effort to secure the support of Moldova's richest man ahead of the country’s presidential elections. Plahotniuc last flew to Moscow at the end of April 2025.
Content
The oligarch’s many names
Negotiations with Kozak
How the Kremlin interferes in Moldovan politics
The oligarch’s many names
On July 22, Moldova's richest man, Vladimir Plahotniuc, was arrested in Greece at the request of Interpol on charges of involvement in laundering $20 billion in corrupt Russian money through the so-called “Moldovan laundromat.”
Along with Moldova, Plahotniuc's extradition was also demanded by Russia, which has officially filed criminal charges against him for money laundering. But there is ample reason to believe that Moscow’s accusations are in fact part of another scheme. “Something tells us that the Russian request is simply an attempt to provide Plahotniuc with protection and freedom,” said Viorel Cerneucanu, head of Moldova's General Police Inspectorate.
Cerneucanu pointed out that Moscow had previously issued a warrant for the arrest of another fugitive Moldovan oligarch — Ilan Shor, who now lives in Russia and carries a Russian passport. And there are other precedents. Russia once fabricated a case against its own spy, Sergei Cherkasov, in an attempt to secure his extradition from Brazil (which ultimately failed), and also opened a case against Artyom Uss (the son of the then-governor of the Russian region of Krasnoyarsk), who was arrested in Italy. Uss was never extradited, but Russian agents managed to orchestrate his escape from house arrest.
There is serious cause to conclude that Cerneucanu is right. According to a police report, more than 20 fake IDs with different names were seized from Plahotniuc during his arrest. These included Ukrainian, Russian, and Bulgarian passports in the name of Mikhail Taushanov (born February 22, 1962).
As The Insider has discovered, Plahotniuc, the organizer of one of the largest scams in recent Russian history, has been traveling to Russia under this name on a regular basis. During these visits, not only has he encountered no problems with the law — he has been holding meetings at the highest levels of the Kremlin.
Negotiations with Kozak
In April 2025, the Moldovan investigative project Malenkaya Strana (“Little Country”) published excerpts from wiretaps of Vladislav Darvai, who from 2019 to September 2024 was Russia's trade representative in Moldova (he is now head of the Presidential Administration's information department for border cooperation). Talking to his mistress Natalia Pelin in 2024, Darvai admitted that he was involved in organizing a secret visit by Vladimir Plahotniuc to Moscow, where the oligarch was to meet with Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Dmitry Kozak.
From Darvai's confused and disjointed speech, it was clear that Plahotniuc had decided to come to Moscow — despite the criminal case against him — for secret talks with Kozak. He was supposed to arrive on June 4 and stay at the National Hotel. So as not to be caught on camera, Plahotniuc was instructed to wear dark glasses and a cap with a low visor during his journey. He was taken from the airport in an unmarked car — one bearing license plates that would ensure it was not stopped by the police — and he was not allowed to leave his hotel room during the entire three-day visit.
According to the wiretaps, the billionaire also paid to have the hotel's fitness center closed for his exclusive use. However, he was asked not to go to the massage parlor, where one of the employees, a “Moldovan woman from Bălți,” might recognize him (The Insider was able to confirm that such a masseuse did in fact work at the hotel at the time).
In 2014, OCCRP and the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta reported on a scheme to launder criminal proceeds involving banks in Russia, Moldova, and the Baltic states. Under this scheme, close $22 billion was transferred from Russia through Moldovan government institutions, which at the time were controlled by Deputy Speaker of Parliament Vladimir Plahotniuc.
The scheme was set up as follows: two companies pretended to borrow money from one another, with a Russian company and a Moldovan citizen acting as guarantors for the loan. Then one of the front companies “defaulted” on the loan, and the “creditor” made a claim against the guarantor. Since a Moldovan citizen was involved in the transaction, the case was referred to a Moldovan court, where a corrupt judge issued an official order obliging the Russian company to pay the debt. The court would then appoint a bailiff, who was also part of the fraudulent scheme, to open an account at Moldindconbank, where the Russian company transferred the money, thereby paying off a non-existent debt.
Mir is a Russian payment system created by Moscow after the imposition of international sanctions following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
The billionaire paid to have the fitness center at the National Hotel in central Moscow closed for his exclusive use.
According to the wiretaps, Plahotniuc's visit was supposed to last “until Friday” — meaning until June 7. The Insider examined the flight database and indeed found that a man with a passport issued in the name of Mikhail Taushanov flew to Moscow from Dubai on the afternoon of June 4, 2024 and then flew back to Dubai from Moscow late in the evening on June 7.
Darvai's wiretaps end in June, so it is unclear what exactly Kozak and Plahotniuc might have agreed on, but from the context of the conversation, it appeared they were discussing the billionaire’s return to Moldovan politics, which “without him has turned into some kind of circus.” Darvai’s conversations also make clear that Plahotniuc’s sit-down with Kozak was intended to be only a preliminary meeting before a conversation with Putin.
According to Darvai’s description, Kozak rebuked Plahotniuc: “You do understand that everything that is happening now [in Moldova] is mainly your fault? You had all the power, but you played around.” Plahotniuc replied that he was working to correct his past mistakes and that he was ready to return to Moldova, but he could not do so alone, which was why he had flown to Moscow.
How the Kremlin interferes in Moldovan politics
Judging by the wiretaps, the next meeting between Plahotniuc and Kozak took place a week later in Minsk. And as can be seen from the flight data, it was far from the last. Using the same passport in the name of Taushanov, Plahotniuc flew to Moscow in July and October of 2024, as well as in March and April of 2025. This was a very turbulent period in Moldovan politics, and the Kremlin was actively trying to influence events in its preferred direction.
In 2014, OCCRP and the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta reported on a scheme to launder criminal proceeds involving banks in Russia, Moldova, and the Baltic states. Under this scheme, close $22 billion was transferred from Russia through Moldovan government institutions, which at the time were controlled by Deputy Speaker of Parliament Vladimir Plahotniuc.
The scheme was set up as follows: two companies pretended to borrow money from one another, with a Russian company and a Moldovan citizen acting as guarantors for the loan. Then one of the front companies “defaulted” on the loan, and the “creditor” made a claim against the guarantor. Since a Moldovan citizen was involved in the transaction, the case was referred to a Moldovan court, where a corrupt judge issued an official order obliging the Russian company to pay the debt. The court would then appoint a bailiff, who was also part of the fraudulent scheme, to open an account at Moldindconbank, where the Russian company transferred the money, thereby paying off a non-existent debt.
Mir is a Russian payment system created by Moscow after the imposition of international sanctions following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Plahotniuc then flew to Moscow in July and October 2024, as well as in March and April 2025.
Russian pressure reached its peak in October-November 2024 during Moldova’s presidential elections, which coincided with a nationwide referendum on European integration. It is not difficult to understand why the Kremlin needed the support of a Russia-friendly billionaire: money played a significant role in its interference efforts. In addition to Plahotniuc, fugitive billionaire Ilan Shor received help from Moscow to set up the “Victory Bloc” and to buy votes for his political forces operating on the ground in Moldova. At first, the money was brought by couriers flying from Chisinau to Moscow via Turkey. But when the Moldovan security services began to intercept them on departure, Shor started distributing plastic Mir-branded cards loaded with money that could be cashed in Transnistria. The Moldovan diaspora in Russia was also used to disrupt the vote: on October 20, voters brought to Moscow by bus were fed for free in a restaurant next to the Moldovan embassy, and they were even given bus tours to Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Turkey — all so that they could stand in line at the polling stations Moldova had set up abroad.
During the second round of the presidential election, bribery was also extended to Moldovans living in the European Union, where special observers were posted at the entrances of polling stations to make sure that voters fulfilled their end of the bargain. In Estonia and Italy, voters saw people with cameras and smartphones diligently filming the faces of those entering the polling stations — and broadcasting the footage live. In Bologna, one of these videographers was identified as a student from Russia. She explained her interest in the Moldovan elections as being part of observation efforts carried out on behalf of a non-existent organization.
When it proved impossible to secure a majority of votes for its side through bribery, the Kremlin decided to create two large blocs with opposing political orientations in order to gain a majority in parliament. The first bloc makes no secret of its sympathies for Moscow, with four pro-Russian politicians — all of them former members of the Communist Party — now heading four different political forces. Igor Dodon’s Party of Socialists, Vladimir Voronin’s Party of Communists, Irina Vlah’s Heart of Moldova, and Vasile Tarlev’s Future of Moldova have announced plans to unite in an electoral bloc to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
In 2014, OCCRP and the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta reported on a scheme to launder criminal proceeds involving banks in Russia, Moldova, and the Baltic states. Under this scheme, close $22 billion was transferred from Russia through Moldovan government institutions, which at the time were controlled by Deputy Speaker of Parliament Vladimir Plahotniuc.
The scheme was set up as follows: two companies pretended to borrow money from one another, with a Russian company and a Moldovan citizen acting as guarantors for the loan. Then one of the front companies “defaulted” on the loan, and the “creditor” made a claim against the guarantor. Since a Moldovan citizen was involved in the transaction, the case was referred to a Moldovan court, where a corrupt judge issued an official order obliging the Russian company to pay the debt. The court would then appoint a bailiff, who was also part of the fraudulent scheme, to open an account at Moldindconbank, where the Russian company transferred the money, thereby paying off a non-existent debt.
Mir is a Russian payment system created by Moscow after the imposition of international sanctions following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
One of the political blocs in Moldova supported by the Kremlin makes no secret of its sympathies for Moscow.
Along with this coalition, the Kremlin is promoting the “pro-European” bloc “Alternative.” That grouping is led by Chisinau mayor Ion Ceban’s National Alternative Movement and also includes former Prime Minister Ion Chicu’s Party for the Development and Unification of Moldova, Mark Tkachuk’s Civil Congress, and former Prosecutor General Alexander Stoianoglo. The latter is best known for securing the release of Moldovan businessman Veaceslav Platon in 2020. Platon had been convicted in 2017 in a high-profile case involving the siphoning of funds from insurance companies Asito, Moldasig, and Alliance Insurance Group. Under Stoianoglo’s leadership, prosecutors sent the case back to the lower court and overturned the conviction. In March of this year, Platon was arrested again, this time in the UK. Investigators consider him one of the architects of the “Laundromat” scheme, with Plahotniuc identified as its main beneficiary.
In 2024, Platon ran for president of Moldova as a candidate for the pro-Russian Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM). The first round of voting for president was held alongside a national referendum on European integration, and Stoianoglo refused to participate in the referendum — or even to so much as accept a ballot.
Another key player in the emerging coalition is Ion Chicu, an economist and former prime minister who led the cabinet after Plahotniuc fled Moldova. Prior to the war, Chicu had been open to cooperation with Russia. in 2019, he called for lifting the ban on Russian television broadcasts, and in 2021, he discussed founding his own political vehicle — the “Party for the Development and Unification of Moldova” — with the help of Russian ambassador Oleg Vasnetsov. At that meeting, Chicu “shared plans for building and developing his political platform, expressing interest in constructive dialogue with all external partners for the sake of rebuilding Moldova’s economy to benefit its citizens.”
In the 2024 presidential election, Chicu received only 2% of the vote, but he attempted to have the results annulled. He then urged a boycott of the EU referendum, purportedly over fears that it would “deepen societal divisions.” Nevertheless, he now heads a political bloc that brands itself as being “pro-European.”
Meanwhile, former MP Mark Tkaciuk was seen in June attending the International Conservative Forum in Chișinău, organized by the MEGA (Make Europe Great Again) movement. Although Moldovan authorities did not ban the event, they barred several foreign delegates — those with openly pro-Kremlin or anti-Ukrainian views, along with those enjoying close ties to Ilan Shor — from entering the country. Previously, Tkaciuk had publicly called for the restoration of Russian propaganda TV channels in Moldova — just before the start of the presidential campaign.
By supporting two blocs with seemingly contradictory political views, Moscow may be aiming to broaden its appeal to voters. As part of that effort, support from Plahotniuc could be a key asset for the Kremlin.
With contributions by Dumitru Garcaliuc.
In 2014, OCCRP and the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta reported on a scheme to launder criminal proceeds involving banks in Russia, Moldova, and the Baltic states. Under this scheme, close $22 billion was transferred from Russia through Moldovan government institutions, which at the time were controlled by Deputy Speaker of Parliament Vladimir Plahotniuc.
The scheme was set up as follows: two companies pretended to borrow money from one another, with a Russian company and a Moldovan citizen acting as guarantors for the loan. Then one of the front companies “defaulted” on the loan, and the “creditor” made a claim against the guarantor. Since a Moldovan citizen was involved in the transaction, the case was referred to a Moldovan court, where a corrupt judge issued an official order obliging the Russian company to pay the debt. The court would then appoint a bailiff, who was also part of the fraudulent scheme, to open an account at Moldindconbank, where the Russian company transferred the money, thereby paying off a non-existent debt.
Mir is a Russian payment system created by Moscow after the imposition of international sanctions following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.