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Hungary and Slovakia could diversify away from Russian oil if they wanted to, experts explain
ContentsHungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said his country will not stop importing Russian oil via pipeline because he “cannot change geography,” referring to Hungary’s lack of access to the sea. Orbán claims that Budapest has no other option but to buy oil from Russia.
“I can't change geography. I try to be a strong man. I can change policy, but I can't change geography. Hungary is a landlocked country, so we have pipelines only. So we have to buy it [oil] from the Russians.”
In a comment to The Insider, Isaac Levi, a leading analyst on Europe and Russia and a “shadow fleet” expert at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), explained Orbán’s calculus, saying that the Hungarian prime minister’s statement is not true to fact. Bulgaria's case has proven that lifting the exemption and rapidly phasing out Russian oil is possible: the country managed to switch to alternative supplies while keeping fuel prices stable or even decreasing them. In reality, Orbán does not want to give up Russian oil because it would harm MOL, the country’s largest oil and gas company. Hungary does have alternative options, contrary to what Orbán and his officials state:
“We know that Hungary is purchasing at a discount when buying Russian crude oil. However, we've actually seen that increased reliance from MOL on Russian crude oil has been realised over the past few years. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, prices at the pump for consumers have not gone down, meaning that it's basically Orbán’s government and the company MOL who are profiting from the high reliance on Russian crude even though they don't need this oil and other countries have been able to successfully diversify.
Hungary is being very persistent in not reducing its reliance on Russian crude oil, even though they have the capacity and alternatives to buy non-Russian crude oil through the Adria pipeline, which could provide enough capacity for the total demand of Hungary and Slovakia.”
Attila Holoda, a Hungarian energy expert and former CEO of MOL Upstream, concurs. According to Holoda, Urals crude offers such a significant price advantage that MOL is reluctant to purchase oil through the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, even though the port and pipeline capacities are sufficient.
A pipeline map showing oil routes from Croatia to Hungary (“Adria”) and from Russia to Hungary (“Friendship,” or “Druzhba”).
Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó responded to Holoda’s proposal by saying that no one had ever tried to operate the Adria–JANAF pipeline at one hundred percent, and that “no pipeline can operate at one hundred percent continuously.” Of course, pipelines have to be periodically shut down for maintenance. In response, Holoda points out that Hungary has storage tanks with reserves for temporary outages — enough to last for several months. Moreover, the Druzhba pipeline also occasionally breaks down. Over the past year, this has happened at least twice, according to CREA.
According to Holoda’s estimates, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline is capable of delivering up to 1.2 million tons of oil per month to Hungary and Slovakia. Converted to annual capacity, that amounts to a maximum of about 14 million tons. MOL’s two refineries have never processed such volumes, Holoda notes.
“People easily believe scare stories when they’re told, ‘if we stop buying Russian oil, fuel prices will rise above 1,000 forints ($3).’ But none of those who say this stop to think: ‘Since we’re buying oil cheaply from the Russians, because they are in a difficult position, then why isn’t our fuel cheaper?’ It isn’t cheaper because in this market everything is sold at the benchmark price.”
In addition, Holoda adds, Orbán’s government would no longer be able to use “cheap gas” as a campaign trump card. If the authorities sharply lowered gasoline and diesel prices to win votes, MOL’s competitors would appeal to Brussels, and the EU would force Hungary to abandon Russian oil imports as a violation of fair competition rules. He concludes:
“In short, if we stop importing Russian oil, it will be bad for Putin’s regime and his war machine, and even worse for MOL and the dozens of companies involved in the procurement process. The halt will be tangible in the state budget due to lower tax revenues, but most Hungarian consumers will hardly notice it. There will still be fuel at gas stations — and not at 200 or 1,000 forints [$0.60-$3].”
Cheap oil in exchange for giving up the veto on EU decisions
In 2024, Russian oil delivered via the Druzhba pipeline accounted for 87% of Hungarian and Slovakian supply. The purpose of the sanctions exemption that allowed these countries to buy Russian crude was to give them additional time to reduce their dependence on Russian energy. However, they are using this exemption to undermine the EU’s common position on Ukraine and to block efforts to strengthen sanctions against Russia, which would require the approval of all 27 member states. When the EU was preparing to extend sanctions against Russia, including the freezing of roughly $200 billion in Russian assets held in European banks. Hungary declared it would veto the decision unless Budapest were allowed to continue receiving Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline via Ukraine.
Similarly, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico threatened to halt all financial and military aid to Ukraine unless the outcome documents of the EU summit in March 2025 included an explicit requirement to resume gas transit through Ukraine to Slovakia and Western Europe. Unlike other EU member states that have publicly declared their intention to phase out Russian energy, Hungary and Slovakia are open about their plans to prolong their strategic dependence on imports from Russia.
Between the start of the full-scale invasion and the end of 2024, Hungary and Slovakia imported 27 million tons of oil worth €13 billion and 32 billion cubic meters of gas worth €20 billion. Although the exemption was intended as a temporary measure to reduce dependence, in practice, oil purchases have hardly changed: in 2024, imports by Hungary and Slovakia were 2% higher than in 2021. EU legislation on the exemption has no clear end date, which allows MOL — the sole refiner in Hungary and Slovakia and the last company in Europe still purchasing Russian oil — to legally continue imports without any incentive to stop financing Russia’s war.
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