PACE creates a platform for Russian opposition, suggesting participation in the assembly without voting rights

Photo: Wikicommons

On Oct. 1, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) decided to establish a platform for dialogue with the “Russian democratic forces in exile.” Vladimir Kara-Murza, one of the main initiators of the project, described it as a “milestone,” explaining that the decision promises the formation of a Russian opposition delegation at PACE that would give pro-democracy forces from Russia and Belarus a voice in the organization despite their countries’ exclusion from the Council of Europe. The decision was supported by an overwhelming majority in the assembly: 80 deputies voted in favor, while only four abstained.

The decision was preceded by debates in which Ukrainian representatives insisted on including fighters from the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps in the platform. The rapporteur, Estonian MP Eerik-Niiles Kross, drew a parallel with the criticism faced by Estonian independence activists in exile during the Soviet era, saying that, back then, people said they “meant nothing” and were “just drinking coffee in Stockholm.” Yet it was precisely those people who represented the idea of a free Estonia, which ultimately prevailed.

According to the resolution, participants in the platform would adhere to 15 principles, including recognition of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, support for the creation of a special tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine, and Russia’s payment of reparations. In Kross’s report, the key “Russian democratic forces” are identified as Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Anti-War Committee, Garry Kasparov’s Free Russia Forum, and the Free Russia Foundation of Natalia Arno and Vladimir Kara-Murza. Delegates will be prohibited from using Russian state symbols but will be allowed to display the white-blue-white flag as a mark of resistance.

Maria Pevchikh, head of investigations at the late Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation, reviewed PACE documents and drew attention to the mechanism for forming the delegation. She noted that while the ACF and the Navalny team are mentioned in Kross’s report, they do not fall under the definition of “Russian democratic forces.” The document instead states that the ACF “drew attention with actions that provoked criticism and disputes within the Russian opposition.”

Dmitry Gudkov, a co-founder of the Anti-War Committee and a platform sponsor, told The Insider that the initiative is “an attempt to get a foot through the door.”

“This lays the groundwork for cooperation within the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly. We are no longer just guests or speakers, but an internationally recognized platform. The new status will facilitate building formal relations with governments and foreign ministries. It will also provide us access to the Committee of Ministers with our resolutions and reports on passport issues, the fight against propaganda, and support for Russian media. It is a step towards institutionalization — exactly what we've been striving for.

Presently, we are drafting a document outlining the rules of procedure for this platform. Clearly, we don’t vote, but we do take part in sessions and speak, and also present proposals and resolutions. A meeting is planned for December to prepare the procedural document and form the delegation. Each organization mentioned in the resolution will nominate its representatives. The question of the number of delegates remains open.

The resolution lists the main organizations: the Anti-War Committee, Kasparov’s Forum, the ACF, and a few others. PACE has clear requirements: representatives must share the values of the Council of Europe and sign the Berlin Declaration. All questions and proposals have been sent countless times, and everyone has the necessary contact details.

The Berlin Declaration is open for signature at any time. Indeed, the meeting of the editorial board in Berlin took place during the Anti-War Committee conference, but a wide range of stakeholders were present. The document was originally discussed in a working group as a baseline version.

This version was proposed, then heavily edited, with all unnecessary content removed. In the end, only the key points remained. It contains no mention of the Anti-War Committee, Khodorkovsky, or anyone else.

The doors are open to any organization. The Berlin Declaration can be signed at any time, whenever you want. There was never a cutoff date. It remains open, and different people join every day.”

Political scientist Ivan Preobrazhensky, a columnist for The Insider, explains that the idea of replacing representatives of the Putin regime in the Council of Europe with opposition figures emerged almost immediately after the Kremlin cut ties with the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly.

“Initially, the driving force was primarily human rights activists and lawyers who had long-standing ties with the Council of Europe, particularly through the European Court of Human Rights. Later, they were joined by figures who identify as political opposition to the Putin regime. At the same time, negotiations were also underway with opponents of Alexander Lukashenko, who had usurped power in Belarus. Some of the proposals suggested that opposition politicians would participate in all Council of Europe bodies, including the Parliamentary Assembly, as representatives of their countries. There was also support for the idea of issuing a new ‘Nansen passport.’ This idea was discredited by an unsuccessful presentation in the early months of the full-scale war, when it was mockingly dubbed the ‘good Russian passport.’ However, as the IDs of those who left Russia after 2022 began to expire, its relevance only grew. Opposition representatives also hoped to influence national governments through the Council of Europe, particularly to advance the sanctions regime against Putin’s Russia, in order to accelerate the end of its military aggression.

In the end, the working group came to include people from multiple associations: some experts, some politicians. From the latter category, the first platform for cooperation was ultimately created — so far only with PACE. No qualified majority vote was required; what mattered was the absence of an active vote ‘against.’ Yet this platform is by no means an ‘alternative representation’ of Russia. PACE does not allow Russians to participate in assembly sessions on equal footing with deputies from other countries, and of course, they will not be able to vote.

However, after several years of effort, it finally appears that the first permanent advisory body has emerged — not a forum or a conference — within which some, though clearly not all, representatives of Russian civil society and the so-called opposition can regularly engage with European politicians and propose their solutions on a wide range of issues, from the legalization of new waves of Russians leaving the country over rejection of the Putin regime and its crimes to changes in the sanctions regime against Russia, which continues its aggressive war against Ukraine.”

SEE ALSO

• A non-united Russia. Why demanding consolidation from the Russian opposition is a moot point
• Revolutionaries without borders: How exiled opposition brought change to their countries