Heroes, mercenaries, victims: public opinion is categorically unwilling to accept Putin's myth about the participants in the war as a new elite
Over the past two years, Vladimir Putin has insisted that participants in the 'special military operation' (SMO) constitute a new and genuine elite of Russia, demanding their promotion into the real administrative elite, while propaganda has been occupied with creating a cult of the 'SMO heroes' based on the late-Soviet cult of Great Patriotic War veterans. This political campaign is designed to erect a barrier against any attempts to rethink or question the necessity and legitimacy of the war in Ukraine.
However, a recent survey by the Levada Centre shows that the campaign’s success so far has been limited. Responses regarding attitudes toward participants in the war in Ukraine reveal three patterns of perception: a pattern of heroisation, a pattern of de-heroisation, in which they appear as mercenaries prone to brutality, and a pattern of victimhood, referring to individuals psychologically scarred by the war.
The last pattern dominated public perceptions of Afghan war veterans following the withdrawal of Soviet troops and implied condemnation of that war as meaningless. The mercenary pattern, by contrast, is characteristic of the current war and corresponds with survey data showing that only a quarter of those surveyed believe SMO participants are motivated by a sense of duty, while around 40% think they are driven by a desire to improve their material situation.
Respondents show even greater caution regarding the consequences of returning 'SMO veterans'. Almost equal proportions believe it will either lead to greater law and order and social cohesion (44%) or to increased crime and conflict (39%). Even among those expressing support for the 'special operation', a third chose the latter response. When applied in practical terms, this question makes the ambiguity in perceptions of 'SMO heroes' even clearer and reflects a growing societal view of their potential danger, while independent data indicate a rapid increase in serious crimes involving them.
Vladimir Putin has good reason to be concerned about the 'proper' treatment of SMO participants. Public perceptions are far removed from the remake of 'war veterans who fought fascism' that he promotes in his speeches. Even segments of the population relatively loyal to the authorities and the war harbour significant doubts about the war’s costs, and these doubts extend to their views of its participants. It is precisely this part of society that Putin and his propaganda apparatus are trying to compel to accept the official narrative, which projects the current war onto the Great Patriotic War rather than Afghanistan, and allows no doubt about the heroism of its participants.
The mythology of the ‘new elite’ and its political objectives
Despite the enormous efforts of propaganda, the Russian population largely does not view SMO veterans as heroes fulfilling their duty to the homeland or as a 'new elite'. On the contrary, even fairly loyal segments of the population are well aware of the ambiguity and contradictions of their role and image, as shown by the results of a September poll by the Levada Centre. This perspective largely reflects the implicitly conflicted attitude toward the war that exists in Russian society despite repression and pressure from the regime’s media and administrative resources.
The heroisation of Ukraine war participants over the past year and a half has become one of the Kremlin’s most important political campaigns. Vladimir Putin set the tone, referring to SMO participants as the 'elite' of Russian society no fewer than six times over the past two incomplete years. The first such statement was made in January 2024, when he contrasted war participants as the true 'elite of the country, into whose hands Russia can be entrusted', with those 'who expose their genitals or show their rear' (referring to participants of a 'naked party'). A month later, in his address to the Federal Assembly, he devoted several paragraphs to the topic, now contrasting the true elite, consisting of war veterans, with those 'who in previous years filled their pockets through various economic processes of the 1990s', and stressed the need to promote them to leadership positions across all areas of life. At that time, he also launched the special personnel programme ‘Time of Heroes’ to advance war participants into positions of power under the aegis of the presidential administration. It is believed that, in the most recent elections, SMO participants were widely represented under Putin’s direct instruction, and Russian governors are now creating special positions for them in their administrations. This has become an almost obligatory signal of loyalty (→ Kynev: A New Start).
According to historian Konstantin Pakhalyuk, who analysed their narratives, no fewer than 28 documentaries about SMO participants have aired on the Russia Today channel alone. Russian schools are widely installing memorial plaques for students who died in the war in Ukraine and establishing 'memorial desks' in their honour. The Ministry of Education intends to supplement the study of Great Patriotic War heroes with a list of SMO participants as part of a new subject, 'Spiritual and Moral Culture of Russia,' to be introduced into the school curriculum from 2026 under Putin’s directive. The cult of SMO heroes is indeed being modelled on the late-Soviet cult of Great Patriotic War heroes. This parallel is also inspired by Vladimir Putin ('Today the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War honourably preserve and continue the martial traditions of the Motherland, reliably guard its sovereignty and security, and defend our land and citizens in Donbas and Novorossiya from neo-Nazis').
In reality, this forced campaign reflects an ongoing, hidden struggle within Russian society over the interpretation of the war, its meaning, and its costs. According to Putin, the imposed cult of 'SMO heroes' and their presence in the administrative elite are intended to serve as yet another barrier against negative interpretations of the war and doubts about its justification. The Levada Centre survey once again shows that Putin’s concerns are not unfounded, but it does not indicate that his efforts have been successful.
Three patterns: heroes, mercenaries, victims
In response to the question, 'In your opinion, how has the special operation affected those who had to go through it?'41% of those surveyed by the Levada Centre said the war had 'scarred their souls'. Positive effects – 'made them resilient and courageous' and 'made them intolerant of evil and injustice' – were reported by 43% and 17% of those surveyed (respondents could give more than one answer, with an average of 1.45 responses per respondent). The opposite options – 'made them cruel, prone to violence' and 'made them indifferent, cynical' – were chosen by 19% and 11% respectively.
‘How do you think the war has affected those who had to go through it?’ 1990, 2025, % of those surveyed
It can be said that the responses reveal three distinct patterns of attitudes towards participants in the war: a pattern of heroisation, a pattern of sympathy, which interprets them as victims ('the war scarred their souls'), and a pattern of de-heroisation, portraying them as 'mercenaries' (cruel and cynical). Of all responses, 41% fell into the first category, 28% into the second, and 21% into the third (shares are normalised to the total number of responses). The group with a predominantly positive view comprises just over 40% (those noting resilience and courage), the group with a negative orientation about 20% (those citing cruelty and a propensity for violence), while around 25–27% see war participants as victims or express a mixed attitude (12% were undecided).
Among younger respondents (aged 18–39), 23% identified 'cruelty and a propensity for violence' as characteristic of war participants, rising to 32% among those who rely on Telegram for information. Middle-aged respondents (40–54) are more likely to adopt the 'victim' pattern, with 47% choosing 'the war scarred their souls'. Among habitual television viewers, the heroisation pattern is predictably more prevalent (53%). This picture becomes particularly striking when compared with public attitudes toward Afghan war veterans, according to the 1990 Levada Centre survey (then VTsIOM) conducted after Soviet troop withdrawal. At that time, the heroisation pattern accounted for 28% of responses, the negative 'mercenary' pattern for 11%, while the victim pattern was dominant. It is worth noting that perceiving war participants as 'victims' without attaching either positive or negative moral judgements also signals a view of the war as pointless or not worth the sacrifices imposed by the authorities (the so-called 'Afghan pattern').
The shift in perception of 'SMO heroes' towards the mercenary pattern is, however, hardly surprising. In contrast with the image Putin and the propaganda apparatus are trying to impose on public opinion, Russians hold a realistic view of the social motives behind participation in the SMO. In a survey conducted a year ago by the Chronicles project, when asked what motives drive the ‘volunteers’ (as those contracted with the Ministry of Defence are officially described), 37% of those surveyed said that they were ‘solving their financial problems,’ and only 24% said that they were ‘fulfilling their civic duty’ (another 30% believed that both incentives were present).
The balance of costs and two projections
In response to a second Levada Centre question, what will happen when the war ends and SMO participants return, 44% of those surveyed chose 'an increase in law and order and social cohesion', while 39% selected 'an increase in conflict and crime'. These two groups are thus almost equal, with a slight tilt toward the pro-regime option coming primarily from older respondents and regular television viewers (51% and 58% respectively chose 'increase in law and order'). Even among those declaring support for Putin and the SMO, 35% anticipate an increase in crime and conflict after the war.
In this sense, the practical framing of the question shifts attitudes towards caution and concern. Among those expecting a rise in crime upon the return of 'SMO heroes', a quarter still adhere to the heroisation pattern, while 35% of those surveyedlean towards the mercenary interpretation.
Respondents’ concerns appear well-founded and reflect an emerging societal perception of the danger posed by SMO participants. According to data compiled by the publication Verstka, based on media reports and Russian court records, over three years since the war began, more than 750 people have been counted as victims of SMO participants: at least 378 killed and a further 376 sustaining life-threatening injuries. The publication notes that the actual figure is likely higher, as not all court records are publicly accessible and not all instances of SMO participation are documented. Most of the increase in victims involves relatives and acquaintances of veterans, with the crimes predominantly domestic in nature and linked to alcohol and drug use.
Vladimir Putin’s concern over the 'proper' treatment of war participants is therefore understandable. Russian public perceptions are far from the remake of 'war veterans who fought fascism' that he promotes in his speeches. In the Levada Centre survey, roughly half of those surveyed recognised heroic traits in participants, while the other half viewed them either as dangerous mercenaries or through the lens of the 'Afghan pattern', perceiving them as victims of a war that was not worth the cost.
This pattern aligns closely with responses to the question of whether the SMO has brought more benefit or harm to Russia. In the latest Levada Centre survey with this question conducted in May this year, 33% of those surveyed chose 'more benefit', compared with 40% selecting 'more harm'. Notably, among those who claimed to support the SMO, over 30% still judged that it had caused more harm.
It should be noted that Levada Centre surveys are conducted face-to-face, which may increase bias towards socially desirable (more conformist) responses. As previously observed (→ Koneva, Rogov: Second Demobilisation), respondents are asked to place their attitude toward the SMO on a scale of 'support, mostly support, mostly do not support, do not support', without the option 'undecided' initially. Consequently, the proportion of undecided respondents (who are only recorded if they take a long time to answer) is below 10%, and support for the SMO ranges between 75–80%. In contrast, surveys by the 'Chronicles' and ExtremeScan projects explicitly include the options 'support, do not support, undecided, prefer not to answer', allowing respondents to avoid giving a criminalised negative answer. In these surveys, voluntarily expressed support for the SMO drops to 50–52% of those surveyed.
Support for the war according to data from the Levada Centre and the Chronicles/ExtremeScan projects, % of those surveyed
The gap between 'reluctant' and 'voluntary' supporters of the SMO (around 25% of all survey participants) highlights the 'key' group over which Vladimir Putin is competing. This segment is characterised by the view that, even if the war had its justifications, its costs are simply too high. It is precisely this group that the authorities need to compel to accept the official narrative, which frames the current conflict not in terms of Afghanistan but of the Great Patriotic War, leaving no room for doubt regarding the heroism of its participants.