Russian UAV operators less likely to be reassigned to assault units after Moscow launches Unmanned Systems Forces, mirroring move by Kyiv

Russia’s military has officially created a new branch dedicated to unmanned aerial systems, Deputy Commander Sergey Ishtuganov announced on Nov. 12.

In an interview with the pro-Kremlin outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda, Ishtuganov said that regular regiments, battalions, and other units of Russia’s new drone forces have already been formed.

“Their combat work is carried out according to a unified plan and in coordination with other military formations,” he said. “At the same time, the expansion of existing units and the creation of new ones continues. The ranks include drone operators, engineers, technicians, and other support specialists.”

Ukraine created a similar branch, the Unmanned Systems Forces, by presidential decree on Feb. 6, 2024. The Ukrainian branch unites units that use unmanned and robotic aerial, naval, and ground systems.

When speaking about the creation of Russia’s drone forces on June 12, 2025, Vladimir Putin said: “We know how the enemy operates. But overall, I don’t think we’re lagging behind in any way.”

It remains unclear when exactly the new Russian branch was formally established. However, in December 2024, Defense Minister Andrey Belousov said the formation of the unmanned systems forces was expected to be completed by the third quarter of 2025. Then, on June 12 of this year, Vladimir Putin confirmed that the process of creating the new branch was underway. There is no available presidential decree establishing the drone forces in the public domain, suggesting it was not published.

Defense analyst Ian Matveev told The Insider that while the establishment of a separate drone branch will likely make Russian forces more effective, it could also complicate cooperation with other branches:

“Until now, individual drone units operated independently at the front, differing in size, organization, and subordination. Some were autonomous, while others were attached to brigades, divisions, or regiments. Soldiers themselves actively used drones as well. The first attempt to create a dedicated command was the Rubikon program, which seems to have been considered a success, and now we’re seeing a full-fledged branch [of the military] being formed.

On one hand, this will strengthen Russian drone capabilities. For example, UAV operators will be less likely to be reassigned as assault troops, meaning their experience and skills will be retained. On the other hand, Russia’s military system works on the principle that ‘what isn’t permitted is forbidden.’ So I wouldn’t be surprised if ‘independent drone operators’ come under restrictions or get cut. That would mean infantry units that once managed their own drone support would now have to rely on the drone forces — and, as we’ve already seen with artillery, coordination between branches in the Russian military is notoriously poor. Soldiers and pro-war bloggers constantly complain about it.”

Drone developer and CEO of the aviation company Avianovatsii, Sergey Tovkach, told The Insider that the absence of a dedicated drone branch had previously led to major problems when it comes to access to munitions and counter-drone defenses:

“The biggest issue is that drone operators don’t have access to proper explosives. They use improvised infantry munitions: modified mines, demolition charges, and homemade devices like pipes filled with plastic explosives and ball bearings. Drones need specialized warheads, but mass-producing them has been impossible because no official drone branch existed.

The navy faced a serious challenge defending against Ukrainian sea drones. Ideally, the best way to hit them would be with [other] drones, but to do that, you’d need to bring people with improvised explosives aboard a patrol ship, and no sane captain would agree to that, since he’s responsible for his crew. If a drone suddenly detonates onboard, the captain would be jailed, no questions asked.

Drone operators also lack access to aviation-grade explosives. The air force has plenty of unused munitions — for instance, S-6 rockets that aren’t relevant to current combat but have excellent warheads. If you remove the warhead, you have a ready-made charge for a drone.

The creation of a dedicated branch is crucial from an organizational standpoint. You need to formalize these specialists’ roles, set requirements for them, create a standardized pool of munitions, and centralize intelligence collection. Previously, only Wagner Group and [separatist] units in Luhansk and Donetsk had centralized reconnaissance; the regular army didn’t. Now the army will, and that’s a huge step forward.”