How Chechnya and the Kremlin Are Preparing for the Death of Ramzan Kadyrov

The successor will be the one who can guarantee the Kadyrov family’s security and keep Chechnya under Kremlin control

One of the main topics of recent weeks has been who will become the new head of Chechnya after the death of Ramzan Kadyrov. The reason for these discussions is news about his deteriorating health. At the end of December, Kadyrov was urgently hospitalized in Moscow, reported by Novaya Gazeta Europe. On January 11, Ukrainian media, citing sources in Ukrainian intelligence, reported, that the head of Chechnya suffered kidney failure and that his relatives rushed to the hospital.

A source close to the Kremlin and ruling United Russia party told IStories that the situation with Chechnya’s leadership is extremely serious, and the Kremlin is “working” on a solution. Another source close to the Kremlin says, “As long as Kadyrov is alive, nothing will happen.” “Everything that is happening in Chechnya right now is being carefully concealed, and very complicated processes are underway. The people have been seriously wound up, none of them are talking about what’s going on. The locals were told, ‘If there are any leaks — we’ll simply destroy everyone, the whole family down to the seventh generation,’” the Kremlin-linked source says.

Another reason to talk about a successor is the car crash involving Adam Kadyrov, Ramzan’s 18-year-old son, who is often named as the future head of Chechnya. However, by law, Adam cannot lead Chechnya before 2037, when he turns 30.

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A likely scenario is the appointment of someone loyal to Kadyrov. That person will be from the largest Chechen teip (tribal organization or clan) Benoy, two IStories sources, a former FSB officer and a representative of the Chechen diaspora, say. Adam Delimkhanov (a State Duma deputy from Chechnya) and Magomed Daudov (chairman of the Chechen government), Kadyrov’s closest allies and long considered candidates for succession, both belong to this teip.

Political analysts, Chechen activists, and human rights defenders told IStories that two things are required from the new head of Chechnya. Kadyrov needs someone who will guarantee the security of his family and the preservation of their power. Moscow wants to maintain stability in the region, avoid clan infighting (especially armed conflict), and prevent uprisings by people who suffered under Kadyrov’s rule.

Here’s how Chechnya and Moscow are preparing for a change of power in the region after Ramzan’s death.

How Grozny is preparing

The main plan: to stay in Chechnya. To preserve his family’s power in Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov is promoting his successor — his 18-year-old son Adam. Adam has two older brothers, Akhmat and Zelimkhan, but for some reason they did not live up to their father’s hopes.

Adam Kadyrov became widely known after he beat Nikita Zhuravel in a pretrial detention center in August 2023. Zhuravel was eventually imprisoned for blasphemy (he posted a video of himself burning a Qur’an with a mosque in the background and uttering words mocking Muslims) and treason. The entire story was a PR campaign to distract attention from news about Ramzan Kadyrov’s illness, Novaya Gazeta Europe wrote.

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After the beating of Zhuravel, Adam began receiving numerous awards and positions in various Chechen structures. By April 2025, he had risen to the post of head of Chechnya’s Security Council, a position equivalent to a regional minister. Ramzan Kadyrov is building an informal power center around Adam. He instructed Adam Delimkhanov, one of his main allies, to “train” Adam and pass on his connections, including those in the criminal world. Kadyrov’s son has proven to be “a pretty good student.”

The appointment of a “regent” as head of Chechnya, who will act in the interests of the Kadyrov family, is quite realistic, Dmitry Dubrovsky, a political scientist and lecturer at Charles University in Prague, says. This person will lead the region until Adam Kadyrov turns 30. Adam’s young age and lack of personal authority will not be an obstacle, Dubrovsky believes: “Adam’s authority is his surname, his lineage. Within the Russian Federation, a region has emerged which is ruled by a personalist dictatorship with a dynastic method of transferring power.”

Another way Ramzan Kadyrov is protecting his children is by marrying them into loyal and influential families and friends.

The marriages of two sons ensured Kadyrov is related by blood to the Delimkhanov and Geremeyev families, who are themselves related to each other. On June 8, 2024, in a single day, Zelimkhan Kadyrov married the granddaughter of Adam Delimkhanov, while Adam Kadyrov married the daughter of the senator from Chechnya, Suleyman Geremeyev. The Delimkhanov-Geremeyevs are the second most influential family in Chechnya.

Kadyrov’s daughters — Aishat, Khadizhat, and Tabarik — are married to the children of people who were Ramzan’s close friends even before his rise to power, “clearly in the hope that they will be able to protect his daughters after his death,” as Novaya Gazeta Europe wrote.

In addition, Ramzan Kadyrov is expanding his personal army. In 2004, when Akhmat Kadyrov was killed, Ramzan headed his father’s security service. At that time, there were about 3,000 fighters under his command, formally assigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Over the next few years, Ramzan Kadyrov subordinated the detachments of other field commanders to himself.

The exact size of the army at Kadyrov’s disposal is unknown. In the summer of 2022, The Insider estimated the number of those at 18,000–20,000 people. In January 2024, 25,000 servicemen took part in a military parade in Grozny participated. Before the war in Chechnya, there were 7 Kadyrov’s people units; by the end of 2024, 10 new ones had appeared, Proekt wrote.

Ramzan Kadyrov is protective of his fighters. These detachments, which recruit fighters from Chechnya, actually participated in combat operations in Ukraine only during the first months of the war. On the Ukrainian front, Chechnya is represented by the Akhmat Special Forces, which recruits people from all over Russia. Much earlier than in other regions, Chechnya began luring volunteers with one-time payments of several hundred thousand rubles. Now, 80–85% of the Akhmat Special Forces are not Chechens.

The backup plan: to escape abroad. Ramzan Kadyrov cannot be sure that Putin will keep his promise regarding guarantees of safety for his family. Therefore, unbeknownst to Moscow, he held talks with representatives of Middle Eastern Muslim monarchies about the safety of his relatives and assets, sources told IStories. Kadyrov has real influence in the Middle East, including an established network of informal contacts, Novaya Gazeta Europe’s sources say.

In the United Arab Emirates, Kadyrov’s relatives and associates own a great deal of real estate. IStories reported about this here and here. Last year, Kadyrov’s nephew Khamzat was the first among Ramzan’s closest relatives to obtain citizenship of the UAE. After him, citizenship of this country was to be arranged for other relatives as well.

How Moscow is preparing

The main requirement from Moscow for Ramzan Kadyrov’s successor: Chechnya must not become a problem again, especially during the war with Ukraine.

Recently, Apti Alaudinov was removed from the list of candidates for the post of head of the region, a former FSB officer and a representative of the Chechen diaspora told IStories. The main reason is that Alaudinov and his entire family do not command the same authority in Chechnya and the diaspora as other clans.

The issue is that during the First Chechen War, Alaudinov’s relatives fought on the side of the federal forces. Alaudinov himself has said, that in that war he lost his father and older brother. While many Chechens switched to Russia’s side during the Second Chechen War, support for Moscow during the first one is still condemned by many in Chechnya. After the Second Chechen War, Alaudinov began working in the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs, rising to become head of the ministry by 2011. However, in 2019 he fell out of favor. After the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Alaudinov returned to the fold, becoming commander of the Akhmat Special Forces — the very unit in which, for the most part, non-Chechens serve.

Thus, the best positions in the struggle for the post of Kadyrov’s successor are held by his two closest associates — Adam Delimkhanov and Magomed Daudov. Because of this rivalry, there is currently a conflict between them, sources told IStories.

Adam Delimkhanov. During the First Chechen War, Delimkhanov fought on the side of the separatists; in the Second Chechen War, he entered the service of Ramzan Kadyrov. Delimkhanov helped Kadyrov deal with his rivals. For example, in 2006 he led the operation to kill Movladi Baisarov in Moscow — a former Kadyrov bodyguard and commander of the Chechen Gorets detachment. In 2008–2009, Delimkhanov was involved in the killings of Ruslan and Sulim Yamadayev, representatives of a once-powerful Chechen family that had competed with the Kadyrovs in the 2000s.

Delimkhanov oversees people who engage in raiding operations throughout Russia. He also controls Chechen diasporas in Russia and abroad. Delimkhanov spends most of his time outside Chechnya; he is a State Duma deputy.

Magomed Daudov. During the Second Chechen War, Daudov fought on the side of the militants; during one of the battles, Kadyrov’s men captured him. Daudov agreed to serve Ramzan Kadyrov and earned his trust. Daudov brought Kadyrov the head of field commander Suleyman Elmurzayev, Kadyrov’s blood enemy, who had claimed responsibility for the murder of his father Akhmat. Daudov is now responsible for repressions in Chechnya, including personally torturing people. Last year, Kadyrov appointed him head of the Chechen government.

IStories reported in detail about Daudov here.

What will happen after Kadyrov’s death

After Kadyrov’s death, Chechnya’s governance system will remain unchanged, as during his reign, the Benoy teip has grown significantly and its representatives have infiltrated all the region’s power structures, according to a representative of the Chechen diaspora and a former FSB officer.

There will be no real struggle for power, mass protests, or destabilization of the situation in Chechnya, Dmitry Dubrovsky from Charles University in Prague argues. For Moscow, the main task will be to preserve the status quo, so no changes in the principles of regional governance are necessary: “Moscow, which is up to its ears in the war in Ukraine, doesn’t need unstable Chechnya on top of that. They will accept anyone who guarantees the status quo.”

Political analyst Abbas Gallyamov suggests that Kadyrov’s death could lead both to a struggle between clans for power and to mass protests. “There are many dissatisfied people in Chechnya, and many of them are in the Chechen elite. And if they feel that the system has weakened enough and it is possible to reveal themselves and start fighting it, they will definitely do so,” Gallyamov says. As for the choice of successor, Moscow will first and foremost look for a person who will minimize risks, the expert believes: “Chechnya is not the priority. The priority is not to waste resources. Everything is focused on the Ukrainian issue.”

Chechnya no longer poses either a military threat or a threat of separatism to Moscow, a Russian journalist who writes about Chechnya and asked not to be named notes. While Ramzan Kadyrov is alive, the federal authorities will not engage in a change of power in Chechnya. Moscow has its own candidates for the position of regional head, but they are not public figures, the journalist says. At the same time, Moscow still does not fully understand what challenges Kadyrov’s death might bring and what kind of Chechnya the federal authorities would like to see: “Everything is up in the air and will be decided on the fly.”

The journalist does not expect any serious struggle for power after Kadyrov’s death: “Any opposition will be dealt with easily by the new authorities, and, I suppose, with qualitatively new methods — through imprisonments, not killings. But I very much doubt that there will be anyone to deal with.”

“A very large number of residents of the Chechen Republic hope that this regime will collapse. They hope, but they don’t say it out loud. But if you take off the rose-colored glasses, many understand that absolutely nothing will change. The authorities already have a plan B, and a plan C, and so on. If it doesn’t get worse, it certainly won’t get better,” Amina Larsson from the Chechen human rights association Vayfond says.