Record losses and minimal gains: Assessing the fourth year of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine

An advance measured in mere dozens of meters per day is explained by the complete saturation of the line of contact with drones that conduct surveillance and strike targets up to 10–15 km beyond the front. The expansion of so-called kill zones means that classic mechanized offensive operations have become effectively impossible. This form of “demechanization” also increases the size of “gray zones,” where small assault teams supplied by unmanned ground systems and aerial drones move on foot, following the so-called infiltration tactic.

Infiltration, rather than massing manpower and equipment, is the product of a tactical evolution in the way combat operations in Ukraine are conducted. In 2022, Russian forces were still attempting maneuver warfare using mechanized formations and tank breakthroughs, with artillery and aviation employed as direct fire support assets.

In 2023, as drones were increasingly used as strike weapons (FPV drones and bomb-carrying copters such as the “Baba Yaga”), a gradual shift toward “meat assaults” began. A textbook example is the battle for Bakhmut, where Wagner Group losses alone reached 20,000 killed.

In 2024, small mobile groups conducting high-speed “banzai attacks” on motorcycles, quad bikes, buggies, and other ersatz armored vehicles became the primary assault unit of the Russian Armed Forces. These were used in an effort to “burst through” kill zones as quickly as possible.

By 2025, kill zones and the gray areas bordering them had taken over the entire front. The use of not only mechanized armor but of almost any equipment dropped sharply. Assault teams shrank to pairs and trios attempting to infiltrate the thinning defensive lines between enemy positions.