On thin ice: Russia and China’s delicate balancing act in the Arctic

While Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 made working with Western states in the North challenging, it remained possible inside the tacit zone of Arctic exceptionalism. However, since the start of the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both Sweden and Finland have joined NATO, meaning that every Arctic state other than Russia is now a member of the alliance. The Arctic Council, which served as the chief international platform for dialogue and cooperation on Arctic issues, has been largely put on ice.

For Russia, the Arctic is central to the country’s identity, economy, and policy direction — both foreign and domestic. The Arctic was outlined as a priority region in Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, and economically, the region contributes 6% of Russia’s GDP and 10% of exports, according to official statistics.

While Moscow has long preferred to see the region function as an effective Arctic-states-only zone, ever since 2022 enforcing such an initiative is no longer a real option. Sweeping sanctions make any new form of cooperation in the North nearly impossible, and Russia’s economic troubles make it difficult to invest in the region independently. In February 2026, Russia and China ratified a protocol to cooperate on the Yamal LNG plant in Siberia, a move necessitated by the EU’s plan to phase out all Russian LNG imports by 2027. But while the visible trade and military cooperation between Russia and China project an image of partnership, the reality is far less clear.