Kasyanov's choice

Mikhail Kasyanov’s departure from the “Other Russia” association is absolutely natural. The former head of government came to the radical opposition with one task - to become a candidate for the presidency of Russia, supported by this association. When it became clear to him that this was impossible, he slammed the door.

Kasyanov did a lot to fit in with his temporary allies. Let us remember that his entire career was the path of a moderate and careful official who moved up the ranks without missing a single step. Kasyanov never participated in any election campaign, was not a member of any political party, and did not speak at rallies - not only opposition ones, but also completely loyal to the authorities. There are serious reasons to believe that if the ex-prime minister had received decent compensation after his resignation - for example, the post of manager of the never created Debt Agency - he would have remained a person far from any opposition. However, the circumstances of his resignation - an almost open confrontation with the president - made such a scenario impossible.

Moreover, Kasyanov’s first attempt to become a political oppositionist - legal and moderate, in the style of the SPS and Yabloko - failed after he failed to lead the Democratic Party of Russia, a half-living political project with a controversial history and a decent name, which, with the corresponding financial infusions could be made into a brand.

However, Kasyanov’s participation in election campaigns was not included in the plans of the Russian authorities - not so much because of the popularity of the ex-prime minister (his rating was low even before the “dacha” scandal), but because of the precedent with Viktor Yushchenko, who was fired by Leonid Kuchma, and subsequently who took his place. The authorities seriously exaggerated the degree of the “orange” threat, as well as the West’s ability to influence Russian political processes. Just in case, Kasyanov - still moderate and careful - was pushed to the political periphery, although even then it was clear that he was much more like the Belarusian ex-Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir (who tried to lead the anti-Lukashenko opposition in the 90s without much success), than Yushchenko.

After this, Kasyanov theoretically had only two options: either leave politics for business, or look for allies among the radicals, relying on their organizational capabilities and ability to gather a sufficient number of activists for the election campaign. At the same time, ideologically motivated activists who will not run in the midst of a campaign to negotiate with the authorities on the terms of their candidate’s surrender.

The first option was impossible in Russian conditions - after the “Khodorkovsky case”, not a single large entrepreneur would want to take the risk of hiring a disgraced official. True, it was possible to try his hand at foreign business, but it is unknown how much Kasyanov would be in demand abroad. Thus, the option of radicalization was practically no alternative for him. Moreover, Kasyanov could bring an important resource to the “Other Russia” - of all its leaders, he was the only one who was perceived in society as a natural and logical presidential candidate.

As the former (and recent) “number two man” in the country, he could aspire to the presidential post without bothering himself with additional explanations about why he decided to enter the election race and who he was in general (Kasyanov’s popularity rating remains high even now ). Let's add to this the preserved connections in the elites and in the West. It is clear that all these advantages were combined with a lot of disadvantages (accusations of “oligarchy” and corruption - from the notorious “two percent” to the already mentioned dacha scandal), but the radical opposition did not have another such serious candidate. He is not there now.

In order to gain the support of the radicals, Kasyanov decided to take unusual, for him, one might say, revolutionary steps. He began to participate in the “Marches of Dissent”. He began to master the role of a street politician and rally speaker, a populist tribune (remember that one of Putin’s complaints against Kasyanov’s cabinet was the lack of ambitious goals, that is, fundamental anti-populism). He found himself in the role of a persecuted person during trips to the regions, when he, until recently the second person in the state, was denied halls for meetings with supporters.

It was all in vain. For radicals, Kasyanov never became completely “one of their own” - many of them did not believe in his conversion from Saul to Paul (or vice versa, as anyone likes!), considering this political step a ploy to try to return to power with the help of existing available resources. Many thought that Kasyanov, if not a “sent Cossack” (figures of this rank do not play such roles), could at any moment go back to the power camp. And all the efforts of the former prime minister to prove that he had become a “good oppositionist” could not refute this opinion. The former “moderate and careful” reputation of a conformist played a cruel joke on Kasyanov. Another popular (and, apparently, more fundamental) opinion - that Kasyanov came to the opposition to become its undisputed leader, did not cause delight among its other participants.

A wake-up call for Kasyanov was the unexpected appearance of alternative presidential candidates, who made the success of his candidacy unobvious. One can say a lot about the fact that these candidates were even less successful than Kasyanov: the elderly, half-forgotten Gerashchenko, Gulyaev, unknown to anyone outside a narrow circle, Bukovsky, who returned from Soviet (or rather, anti-Soviet) history. And also that they all resembled not so much real candidates with any serious support, but rather participants in political technology projects. However, the fact remains: if Gulyaev and Bukovsky really look like figures acting on the principle of “the main thing is participation,” then Gerashchenko, despite the weakness of his candidacy, may well suit many activists of the “Other Russia.” He is much less connected with the Putin regime than Kasyanov and does not cause rejection among the Democrats from the United Front, nor among the banned National Bolsheviks, nor among the Republicans. After his nomination, there was a clear impression that Kasyanov could “fly by.” Moreover, if Kasyanov was going to be nominated by the RNDS (one of the four movements that are members of the “Other Russia”), then Gerashchenko benefited from the image advantages of an independent candidate not associated with any political force. And for the other leaders of the “Other Russia”, Gerashchenko is more convenient than Kasyanov - he has much less leadership ambitions.

A completely probable election scenario emerged at the autumn conference of the “Other Russia” - Kasyanov and Gerashchenko would go to the second round, and the latter would receive the votes of Gulyaev, who could initially be supported by the “national-Bolshevik” wing of the conference (the Soviet banker is still closer to them than the former Putin's Prime Minister). Bukovsky, given his current political positions, could hardly count on any significant support or take the side of Kasyanov, who remains too much of a “nomenklatura” figure for him. The ex-prime minister could not lose a second time - the first, let us recall, was in the case of the Democratic Party: in this case he would turn into a patent loser.

Kasyanov tried to turn the situation around by proposing his own scheme for electing a candidate - with the nomination of candidates only from movements included in the “Other Russia”. Thus, one of these organizations should have taken responsibility for nominating, say, Gerashchenko’s candidacy - and from the very beginning showed its cards, showing the reluctance of its leadership to support Kasyanov’s candidacy (and at the same time be accused of splitting the “Other Russia”). The option is not very democratic (this is its obvious vulnerability), but more reliable for a politician who came to the camp of the radical opposition with one goal - to become a presidential candidate. The Other Russia rejected this plan. Then the door slamming happened - however, in the old Kasyanov style, if possible not too noisy, without loud accusations, leaving, albeit flimsy, the possibility of returning. If, of course, they call, which is very unlikely - unless Gerashchenko refuses to participate in the elections.

As a result of this whole story, Kasyanov looks like a selfish schismatic. The Other Russia lost its most promising presidential candidate and became involved in a political scandal. In general, the entire radical opposition lost - but its opponents can only rejoice.