Igor Ivanov’s meetings with Madeleine Albright and Bill Clinton were clearly constructive in nature, which did not prevent the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry from making a very sharp statement on missile defense at a press conference (Photo: AP )
The overwhelming majority of Americans did not even pay attention to the fact that the Russian Duma ratified the START-2 Treaty. During Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's visit to Washington last week, where he, buoyed by victory in a seven-year war with his own parliament over ratification, negotiated with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the American press and public were busy doing anything but discussing problems of reducing nuclear offensive weapons. Politicians and journalists these days argued furiously about whether the administration had the right to use force when it took the Cuban boy Elian Gonzalez from his relatives in Miami in order to give him to his father (see Leonid Velekhov's article in this issue). The fate of the treaty, according to which the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States should be reduced by half, to 3000-3500 warheads, seemed to concern no one overseas, which contrasted sharply with the excitement that the ratification of START II caused in Moscow.
In one package
In fact, passions are also boiling in the United States, but they do not spill out. American politicians, generals and military experts are now arguing with foam at the mouth about how to further build the process of nuclear disarmament and what the parameters of new agreements should be. Many prominent American security experts with whom Itogi's correspondent discussed these problems at the April 26-28 conference at the US Navy Adjunct in Monterey, California, believe that a new diplomatic breakthrough in the field of disarmament is in store for us in the near future.
“The ratification of START II gave Clinton a chance to realize his long-time dream of signing a major Russian-American disarmament agreement,” said Thomas Graham, a leading Russia expert at the Carnegie Endowment. Indeed, the current US president, although he considers it his historical merit that during his reign nuclear arsenals have been significantly reduced and America's security has strengthened, he has still not been able to add his name to any Russian-American disarmament treaty.
This is due, in particular, to the fact that the US Senate prohibited the administration from conducting any negotiations on new agreements until START-2, signed by George Bush in January 1993 literally in the last days of his presidency, is approved by the Duma. So Bill Clinton essentially had his hands tied for seven years.
And now he has a chance to sign an agreement on a new major reduction in nuclear weapons - START-3 - before he leaves. At first glance, this task is difficult to accomplish. The American military is not ready to agree even to reduce the level of nuclear warheads on each side to 2,500. And Russia, whose nuclear arsenal by 2007 will in any case amount to several hundred warheads, would like to lower the threshold to one and a half thousand (see diagram).
In addition, we should not forget that both the entry into force of START-2 and the signing of START-3 are possible only if the parties comply with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), signed in 1972. The Americans intend to deploy a missile defense system, which should protect the entire territory of the United States, which is in direct contradiction with this treaty. Washington invites Russia to modernize the treaty. Russia so far strongly objects to this. Last Monday, Igor Ivanov published an article in the New York Times in which he emphasized that the destruction of the ABM Treaty would break the entire system of international relations. The minister directly threatens the Americans: “If the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty, Russia will consider itself free from all obligations in the field of nuclear arms reduction. The question will also arise about the fate of the agreement on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.” He spoke in the same spirit at the disarmament conference held in New York last week.
Willingness to compromise
It is doubtful that the head of the Russian foreign policy department believes in the effectiveness of such threats. After all, Americans are well aware that the Russian military-industrial complex is capable of producing no more than a dozen missiles per year. Most likely, the minister’s stern tone is intended for internal use. His task is to demonstrate to the Duma that diplomats, negotiating with the Americans, stood to the last.
In fact, Russia (and the United States) is clearly willing to compromise. As our magazine wrote (see "Itogi" #16, 2000), Moscow will most likely agree that Alaska, from which the United States plans to begin deploying its missile defense system, will be named a new missile defense area to replace the old one. The Americans, for their part, are ready to take into account the peculiarities of the political climate in Russia. Until recently, it seemed that the conditions of the election campaign would force Clinton to make a decision at the end of July to deploy a national missile defense system. Now this is by no means obvious. There are signs that the administration would like to leave this difficult decision to the next American president. Moreover, not everyone in the Pentagon considers the very possibility of creating a national missile defense system in the foreseeable future to be proven. The other day, a high-ranking representative of the US military department told reporters that if the interceptor missile test planned for June turns out to be unsuccessful, like the previous one, the generals will not advise the Secretary of Defense to advocate for the deployment of missile defense. Moreover, the same official casually noted that “the Joint Chiefs of Staff have never been enthusiastic about the idea of deploying a missile defense system.” It is no coincidence, apparently, that just these days there were reports in the press that missile defense would cost the taxpayer no less than 60 billion dollars. No matter how rich America is, for her this amount is astronomical.
But even if, under pressure from circumstances, Clinton is forced to approve the deployment of missile defense, the possibility of compromise still remains. As Russian experts admit, the text of the document does not give a clear answer to the question of what constitutes a violation of the treaty - carrying out work to deploy a missile defense system or putting it into operation. In any case, the administration is by no means going to follow the lead of the most conservative Republicans and announce the termination of US participation in the treaty. “If the goal of the Clinton administration was to destroy the ABM Treaty,” Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, not without irony, at the Disarmament Conference, “then it did it in a strange way - openly conducted not only consultations with Congress, but also broad discussions with our allies and other states , including primarily Russia and China." So Moscow will have a choice - to accuse the United States of violating the treaty immediately as soon as Clinton signs the corresponding decision, or to wait about seven or eight years and see whether the Americans succeed or not.
Here and now
Clinton's desire to conclude the START III Treaty and amend the ABM Treaty during the upcoming Russian-American summit in early June is so great that he even violated diplomatic protocol. After all, the last summit took place in 1998 in Russia, and now it’s Putin’s turn to go to America. The president's obvious desire to sign a new treaty even forced American legislators from those who advocate the deployment of missile defense to address Clinton with a special message. In it, they warn the president against concluding any agreements that could prevent the deployment of a missile defense system.
It is obvious that everything is moving in a direction quite favorable for Russia. And the main thing here, if you are carried away by trade, is not to miss the moment, because next time such favorable conditions for concluding START-3 will not develop very soon. Not until the next American president wants to immortalize his name by signing a disarmament treaty. After all, the Americans are not in trouble; unlike Russia, they can maintain their nuclear missile potential at the current level for as long as desired.
Bearing in mind the seven-year ordeal of the START-2 Treaty, one can assume that START-3, if it is signed in the last days of the Clinton presidency, will face a difficult fate. Surely he will have many opponents both in the US Senate and in the Russian Duma. But, fortunately, we are not very pressed for time. A sharp decline in Russia's nuclear potential is expected only in 2007, when our heavy missiles will be removed from combat duty. And seven years is exactly the period that, as practice has shown, legislators need to mature before ratification.
However, even if the current favorable situation results in concrete actions to reduce nuclear weapons, this will not add harmony to relations between the United States and Russia. Now it can be argued that the second Russian president intends to build his Western policy on the old foundation - he puts security guarantees, primarily nuclear, at the forefront. Indeed, until recently, for the United States, the nuclear aspect in our relations was the main one. But the more predictable Russia becomes, the more responsible its leadership, the less importance Americans tend to attach to nuclear problems. The fact that the US Congress, journalists and society as a whole were interested in the Cuban boy much more than in successes in the disarmament field cannot be attributed to the American mentality and the election struggle alone.
American experts believe that in the coming years the importance of the nuclear factor in our relations will steadily decline, and the new American administration will finally stop viewing Russia as a superpower. And the Kremlin will have to take this into account.