
In the recent March elections in three regions, the Union of Right Forces almost entered local parliaments. In the Moscow region, the rightists have 6.9%, in the Oryol region - 6.98%, in the Leningrad region - 6.99%. And in no region – 7.01%. Of course, miracles happen, but such a coincidence, plus the numerous data on “crooked” calculations cited by the Union of Right Forces, convinces us that we are not talking about a miracle, but about the creation of human hands.
As a result, the Union of Right Forces passed only four regional parliaments - in Komi, Stavropol, Samara and Tomsk regions. Let's add to this the failure of the right in St. Petersburg. Yes, the party showed at the last elections that it is alive (which looked advantageous, but only against the background of Yabloko, which was not allowed to enter in its St. Petersburg “domain”, and in other regions it looked extremely pale), but nothing more . In fact, the action that was already carried out in 2004 was repeated, when the right entered several legislative assemblies (Bryansk, Kurgan, etc.). The “technologist” was the same both then and now – Anton Bakov. The technologies are also similar - the use of populist rhetoric plus the renunciation of Chubais and Gaidar. Now only the figure of Nikita Belykh has been added, who can present his alibi to any pensioner - during Gaidar’s price liberalization and Chubais’s privatization, he studied in high school.
If in modern Russia passage to the Duma depended only on electoral technologies, then on such creativity, in combination with financial and information resources, it would be possible to build a successful election campaign on a national scale. The current point of view that Russian voters do not want new faces in politics is a stereotype that has little in common with reality. It is no coincidence that the creation of electoral blocs was prohibited - as soon as a bright politician appeared in the region and created his own political project, he had an excellent chance of ending up in the local parliament, taking away votes from United Russia. Therefore, the figure of Belykh can be perceived by Russian voters. Moreover, the Union of Right Forces has preserved the regional infrastructure, and in a number of subjects of the Federation the party includes very serious politicians - such as Boris Nadezhdin in the Moscow region or the rector of one of the most successful Tomsk universities Anatoly Kobzev.
However, the current situation in Russia is such that electoral technologies, although important, are not decisive. You can conduct an excellent election campaign and be removed from the elections a week before its end for formal reasons. You may not be allowed to participate in the elections at all - if the handwriting expert does not like 10.01% of the autographs on the signature sheets. You can finally find yourself in the position of the Union of Right Forces, having received a couple of hundredths of a percent of votes less than the voting threshold, and console yourself by going to the courts and proving that in fact the party received a couple of percent more. All this will not change the essence of the matter - the party will find itself outside the Duma.
In the current conditions, one can enter the Duma only if one manages to obtain immunity from tricks when counting votes. And only the Kremlin can give such immunity. During the March 11 vote, it appears that the federal government simply distanced itself from the right, neither helping nor hindering them. Without purposefully removing them (otherwise the situation would have developed according to the catastrophic scenario of “Motherland” in the spring of 2006), but also without interfering with the regional authorities if they did not want to see the right in their parliament. The result is obvious - in the current state of affairs, the Union of Right Forces is more likely not to enter the next Duma than to overcome the 7% barrier. And the question of what result the party will get is clearly of secondary importance - 5%, 6%, 6.9%...

Now the Union of Right Forces faces a difficult choice. If the party wants to negotiate with the Kremlin, it must prove its usefulness to it. Explain why the federal government needs a liberal party in the Duma in a situation where the very fact of its appearance there can weaken the position of United Russia, which, after the appearance of the Social Revolutionaries, does not look unconditional. However, the argument that a more democratic composition of the Russian parliament is important in order to please the West no longer works after the 2003 elections. Therefore, other arguments are needed that are more significant for the Kremlin.
For example, the SPS could start promoting unpopular social initiatives (which it avoided in early 2005, criticizing monetization - the Kremlin clearly did not like this). In this case, United Russia would be spared the unpleasant role of a propagandist for all the unpopular projects that the Kremlin sends to the Duma, giving it over to the right. But then the right must become convinced monetizers and ardent defenders of the policies of Mikhail Zurabov. And if we add to this a pronounced “anti-Orange” component in the party propaganda (now the Union of Right Forces is carefully distancing itself from the “Other Russia” so as not to become “persona non grata” in the Kremlin, but nothing more), then the chances of building relations with the authorities will rise even more. In this case, “Civil Power”, the current potential spoiler (vote taker) for the Union of Right Forces, may also remain unclaimed.
However, such a scenario (some will call it cynical, others – pragmatic) may cause conflicting feelings among party members. Firstly, this way the party may lose a significant part of the activists and voters - both the “core” part of the electorate (traditional liberals) and the pensioners who voted on March 11 for the good guy Nikita Belykh. Secondly, it is unknown whether the party, if its popularity declines, will receive guarantees from the federal government for passage into the Duma - or whether we will be talking about the final result, even significantly worse than 6.9%.
In 1999, the Union of Right Forces was able to enter the Duma not only with the help of a bright election campaign, but also through a system of agreements - by supporting the second Chechen war and nominating its candidate for the post of mayor of Moscow. In response, Vladimir Putin supported the economic program of the right, which significantly increased their votes in the elections. In 2003, agreements did not work out - and the PCA did not overcome the 5% barrier. Now the party is again faced with a similar problem - only possible agreements look much more “stressful” and less profitable than eight years ago.