Amnesty is not subject to

Today, September 22, the State Duma will have to consider in three readings the bill on amnesty for participants in the armed conflict in the North Caucasus, introduced on September 18 by Vladimir Putin.

There is no doubt about the voting results. Moreover, after the death of the leader of the all-Caucasian underground, Shamil Basayev, the leaders in both Moscow and Grozny spoke about the need for such an amnesty. According to their plan, it is necessary, first of all, to give the opportunity to return to peaceful life to the militants who continue to fight. In addition, some of the militants under investigation or convicted, as well as military personnel accused of committing minor crimes, will be covered by the amnesty.

However, this amnesty also has its critics. The general meaning of their objections is “Chechen murderers will be released, but Russian officers will remain in prison.”

I risk disagreeing with either one or the other. There is no doubt that amnesty is necessary, but in its proposed form it is meaningless.

At first glance, the intentions of the authors of the project are clear. This is exactly what the authorities have done more than once in the “hot spots of the planet” in order to stop the guerrilla war or get out of the confrontation with the armed underground. To pacify, it is necessary to give armed opponents of the authorities the opportunity to lay down their arms and “come out of the shadows,” but to freedom, and not to prison. It is necessary to show the partisans and underground fighters that if they surrender, their past struggle with weapons in their hands will not be declared a crime requiring punishment. To prove this, those insurgents who were previously convicted for participating in this armed struggle are forgiven. But the country does not consist of partisans alone, and in order to avoid tension in society, the government symmetrically forgives those who committed crimes while fighting on the side of the government. In fact, such an amnesty would mean for an internal conflict the same thing as the conclusion of peace means for a war between states. Those who yesterday, being armed and in uniform, fought with each other on the orders of their officers, shot, killed, today lay down their arms, take off their greatcoats and, if not tomorrow, then the day after tomorrow they will be able to shake hands with each other. Without feeling guilty and without fear of punishment. Civil world. However, it would be unreasonable and unfair to release those who did not fight, but committed war crimes - terrorists, murderers of civilians, rapists, and so on, which is why especially serious criminal offenses are not amnestied.

This is the general logic developed in the twentieth century, and even included in the documents of international law. Thus, the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (which states do not really like, since they do not want to recognize either the existence of a civil war or the validity of laws other than national ones - well, like we have in the Caucasus) recommends holding a broad amnesty at the end of the conflict.

But to what extent does the amnesty proposed by the president follow this generally accepted logic? How much will it really contribute to ending the conflict and pacifying the region?

Let us turn to the experience of previous amnesties that took place after the “first Chechen war”.

On March 12, 1997, the State Duma adopted a resolution “On declaring an amnesty for persons who committed socially dangerous acts in connection with the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic” (a rare, almost the only case when things are called by their proper names!). That amnesty applied to both Chechen militants and Russian military personnel who left their units without permission or refused to serve in Chechnya, but did not apply to those who committed serious crimes. About five thousand people were amnestied within six months. Everything would be fine, but the peculiarities of the application of that amnesty “spun” the already established human trafficking market: relatives of ordinary criminals kidnapped or bought up hostages, primarily soldiers, and exchanged them for their imprisoned relatives, for whom this was formalized as an amnesty.

On December 13, 1999, an amnesty was declared for members of “illegal armed groups” (IAF) who committed crimes from August 1 to December 16, 1999, and surrendered before February 1, 2000 (then this period was extended until May 15). The first strange thing: we forgive them for everything committed before December 16 and judge them for what they did between December 16 and the day of surrender. According to the General Staff, about 2,500 militants then laid down their arms, of which 750 were amnestied. The second strange thing: it turns out that the majority were convicted? But there weren’t that many Chechens in Russian prisons—in 2003, there were less than half a thousand militants.

In fact, at that time, mainly those who were in filter centers or pre-trial detention centers were released under amnesty. Many of them had nothing to do with the militants, but fell under the hot hand in the confusion that reigned then. But even against real militants, the investigative authorities often could not properly formalize criminal cases and, after the expiration of the time allotted for the preliminary investigation, they would still have to be released. But in any case, relatives most often paid the employees a ransom through intermediaries for their release. Then, however, a number of other real militants were granted amnesty. Again, most, if not most of them were then abducted by “unknown persons”. The kidnappers were in armored personnel carriers, drove freely through checkpoints, often took those “amnestied” from the location of security forces, and then disappeared without a trace.

On June 6, 2003, the State Duma adopted a resolution “On declaring an amnesty in connection with the adoption of the Constitution of the Chechen Republic.” The new amnesty, actively lobbied by the head of the administration of the Chechen Republic Akhmad Kadyrov, also included “persons who committed socially dangerous acts during the armed conflict and counter-terrorism operations within the borders of the former Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic” from December 12, 1993 to August 1 2003, who refused to participate in illegal armed groups or voluntarily surrendered their weapons - that is, militants - and military personnel. The amnesty period was extended until September 1, 2003, but in fact it continued into the spring of 2004. The following were not amnestied: murder, intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm, kidnapping, rape, robbery, terrorism, hostage-taking, banditry and much more, including Article 317 “Encroachment on the life of a law enforcement officer, military personnel, or even their loved ones.”

And the last point makes no sense of the good idea itself. Participation in hostilities - attacks, sabotage, and other forms of guerrilla warfare - were not designated as acts covered by the amnesty.

Who—“those who have not stained themselves with serious crimes”—should now “return to peaceful life”? Unless they were scouts who got lost in the mountains due to a misunderstanding and had been collecting a herbarium for fifteen years. After all, everyone else who took at least some part in hostilities or attacks on federal forces can be charged with articles that are not subject to amnesty. Anyone who was in a group, say, that planted a landmine on which an armored personnel carrier exploded, in any case can be charged with “murder” or “attempt on the lives of law enforcement officers or military personnel.” He does not have to plant the landmine himself; it is enough to deliver ammunition to the detachment or participate in reconnaissance of the area.

That is, there is practically no one to be amnestied. And if someone is amnestied, it is only due to the lenient oversight of the authorities who decided not to charge them with articles of the Criminal Code that are not covered by the amnesty. And there are no guarantees that in the future the same authorities will not decide to initiate a criminal case under these articles against the amnestied person. Like, new circumstances have come to light. And the fate of a person turns out to be very uncertain.

That amnesty was handed over to the administration of the Chechen Republic - Kadyrov - and he used the situation to fill the ranks of controlled armed groups at the expense of those amnestied. In fact, the condition for the application of the amnesty was the militant’s consent to join these units.

During the officially established period, 171 militants took advantage of the amnesty, many of whom no longer took part in hostilities; At the same time, 226 military and police officers were amnestied.

But even when all the deadlines had passed the amnesty procedure, they continued to use them to replenish their units. Ramzan Kadyrov began to declare “amnestied” all militants who surrendered their weapons and were ready to serve him. And there were many more of them who did not go through any legal procedures.

Among the “Kadyrovites” there were many who did not participate in any amnesty, but in practice, to be released from criminal punishment, it was enough to swear allegiance to Kadyrov. And without this, the official amnesty did not save from “disappearance”. That is, there are three paths: to Ramzan, to the mountains or to nowhere...

On July 15, 2006, the head of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee and director of the FSB of Russia, Nikolai Patrushev, invited the militants to lay down their arms before August 1 (then the deadline was extended until September 30), promising to consider the cases of those who surrendered carefully and impartially... But before, was it different? The bourgeois press, greedy for sensation, hastened to call it an “amnesty,” but the call had no legal basis, just like Ramzan’s “amnesty.” There were almost no real militants who responded to Patrushev’s proposal.

And now, finally, a draft of a new amnesty, almost coinciding with the previous one, is being voted on in the Duma. Yes, the geography has been expanded - in addition to Chechnya and Ingushetia, there is also Dagestan, Stavropol Territory, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia - the list of acts not covered by the amnesty has been somewhat expanded (added aggravated torture, forcible deprivation of liberty, human trafficking, use slave labor and some more, including the previously omitted genocide), and some articles, on the contrary, were dropped...

At first glance, the logic of dividing the responsibility of ordinary militants and their leadership is consistently followed: now the organizers of illegal armed groups and criminal communities are not subject to amnesty, and their ordinary members can receive amnesty.

Article 279 - “Armed rebellion”, “Organization of an armed rebellion or active participation in it for the purpose of overthrowing or forcibly changing the constitutional system of the Russian Federation or violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation” - and any militant, except for our botanist scouts with a herbarium, are also not covered by the amnesty , falls under this article. It equally falls under the already mentioned Article 317 “Encroachment on the life of a law enforcement officer...”

That is, “not subject to amnesty.”

Will such an amnesty solve the problem of concluding a “civil peace”? The answer seems obvious...