Politics in a burqa

All Russian politics today is an endless guessing game. Since significant decisions - be it the appointments or resignations of high officials or the sale of large companies - are made in secrecy and come exclusively from one person (and you know his name), the probability of guessing the outcome is comparable to the probability of hitting your finger in the sky.

Well, take the same resignation of the Prosecutor General, the reasons for which not a single official bothered to explain. More than two weeks later, the president finally said that... “there are no complaints about Ustinov’s work,” he simply “worked in this position for too long” and will soon be appointed to an equivalent position. It is obvious that the president holds all of us, including, by the way, his inner circle, as one of my colleagues put it, as “hamsters.” If the whole thing had been a matter of banal personnel rotation, then the name of the new prosecutor general would have been known not three weeks later, but three days later, and in the president’s submission to the Federation Council about Ustinov’s resignation it would have been indicated “in connection with a transfer to another job.” But no, for almost three weeks a version was being developed, designed to somehow clarify the reasons for such a lightning-fast special operation to eliminate the Prosecutor General, and last weekend all the Kremlin propagandists on state television channels finally voiced this version: the deputy of the former Prosecutor General Yu. Biryukov, they say, did not give way case of furniture smuggling by the Three Whales company. Whether this is true or not, one can only guess about that. But it is known that the “furniture” business began back in 2000 and cost the life of Novaya Gazeta journalist and State Duma deputy Yuri Shchekochikhin. Several people have now been arrested in connection with the case, but not a single one is from the government agencies that provided protection for the company, which, according to Novaya Gazeta, was involved, in addition to furniture, in the arms trade.

Does this version explain Ustinov's resignation? Not at all. Are there many companies that used customs terminals covered by the FSB and the Administration of the Presidential Administration for the import and export of goods? It is obvious that if the former prosecutor general is somehow connected with the “Three Whales” case, then such claims are nothing more than a facade. In authoritarian regimes, loyal officials are not removed from high positions for unprofessionalism and corruption. They film it, and even in an atmosphere of heightened secrecy, only when there is a threat to the personal safety of the autocrat. Everything else is secondary.

Thank God, Russia is not the first and not the only country with an authoritarian regime and with a president whose powers are close to dictatorial. Therefore, in addition to guessing on coffee grounds, you can try to understand and somehow calculate the logic of V.V.’s personnel decisions. Putin. And he makes decisions based on the dilemma between professionalism and loyalty. Strictly speaking, in democracies, the president or prime minister - the leader of the parliamentary majority - proceed from the same dilemma. However, the need to win votes every four years - and for party members twice as often - forces them to choose, if not the most capable officials, then, in any case, not the worst.

In non-democratic regimes, as experience shows and as recently convincingly demonstrated in a study by Professor of the Russian School of Economics Konstantin Sonin and his co-authors, the loyalty of the immediate environment is of self-sufficient importance for the autocrat - the personal safety of the sovereign is at stake, while professionalism, on the contrary, can pose a threat: competence ( which gives the official a certain degree of independence) sometimes transforms into dangerous political ambitions.

Putin, of course, is also not indifferent to who occupies key positions in the state. Therefore, he cannot afford the luxury of appointing only those who are loyal, but who are completely stupid or incompetent: something will definitely explode somewhere, or collapse, or they will seize a school in Beslan, or they will monetize benefits so that the cost of the reform will be many times higher than planned . Or maybe? Judging by the fact that none of those directly involved in the case responded for the mediocre operation to rescue the hostages in Beslan (well, except perhaps Dzasokhov, the former president of the republic, who, however, was not put in office by Putin) - the potentially disloyal and almost universally incompetent governors answered , who began to be appointed from Moscow solely on the principle of loyalty, we can conclude that loyalty is certainly more important than competence. Where are people needed who are loyal and at the same time at least minimally competent? In the sphere of decision-making, which is personally controlled by V.V. Putin.

Who is included in this circle? Well, first of all, those whom we see on television news at meetings with the president in the Kremlin: the prime minister, his deputies, heads of law enforcement agencies, the head and deputy heads of the administration, although the latter appear less often on television screens.

No, of course, this does not mean that Prime Minister Fradkov is competent. But after the experience with Prime Minister Kasyanov, by all accounts, one of the most professional prime ministers of the last two decades, whom the president convicted of disloyalty (he allowed himself to speak out against the arrest of Khodorkovsky and the defeat of Yukos) and therefore fired him, and even with the risk of getting screwed in his person leader of the opposition, it is obvious that in the post of second person in the state, devotion to the sovereign in soul and body is much more important than competence.

On the other hand, former Prosecutor General Ustinov was obviously both incompetent (the Khodorkovsky case, which caused too much resonance precisely because of the many far-fetched facts; the case of the terrorist attack in Beslan, which did not satisfy either the victims or observers), and was not loyal. In the sense that he had at least two loyalties: in addition to the president - to the deputy head of the administration I. Sechin.

Finally, the third example is the former presidential assistant for economics A. Illarionov. He was obviously competent, moreover, he was valuable to the president as a critic of government actions. In conditions when there is essentially no media, and officials strive to report only that information that will bring them the favor of the sovereign and promotion (exactly as it was in the USSR, as a result of which the Politburo had a poor understanding of the true situation in the country) - that is, the president is constantly experiencing an information hunger (hence, by the way, the exaggerated fears of, for example, the Orange Revolution) - Putin should have forgiven Illarionov’s independence of view and desire for publicity. However, disloyalty, manifested precisely in having one’s own point of view, cost Illarionov his office in the Presidential Administration.

What follows from this in light of rumors about possible resignations and appointments in the government and the presidential administration?

First:

will keep its place. He has two important qualities - loyalty (Ustinov’s lesson will make the prime minister think twice before running for advice to his former curator, I. Sechin) and incompetence (even Kremlin-controlled journalists laugh at the prime minister endlessly muttering some kind of incoherence at government meetings publications). Consequently, by definition, he cannot claim to be the leader of any, even imaginary, opposition.

loyal in the sense that he is one of Putin’s long-time and close associates, not loyal because he allows himself public hysterics and equally hysterical actions such as demonstrative insults at government meetings or resignation requests, which are no longer countable. In addition, Gref is not part of the so-called institutional union - that is, he does not belong to the main corporation of the state - former or current employees of the KGB-FSB, and, therefore, cannot be a subject of corporate solidarity. As for competence, based on Putin’s current tasks - establishing state control over the economy, Gref’s usefulness also tends to zero. From this we can assume that in the near future he will either be sent into honorable retirement - to some state business, or will be deprived of all powers and, accordingly, Gref’s weight in the bureaucratic market will be minimized, leaving him to head the ministry without powers and without resources.

From the point of view of loyalty to the sovereign, he has all the same pros and cons as Gref (the disadvantages are perhaps greater, since he bears the title of “Chubais’ alter ego”). But as for competence, the situation is the opposite: Kudrin manages to satisfy the ever-increasing demands of the security forces and at the same time somehow balance the budget, not allowing it, taking into account oil prices, to deviate into the critical deficit zone. However, as we have seen, competence versus loyalty makes little difference. Kudrin, however, has one more factor that ensures his administrative stability in the coming months.

This factor is

, appointed to the position of “successor for consideration.”

Considering that both of today’s “successors for consideration,” Medvedev and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, are loyal, but not professional (the first has not yet had the opportunity to prove the opposite, and it is unlikely that he will, given that he is in social affairs; the second this incompetence is demonstrated endlessly by the chaos in the ministry itself and the ongoing scandals in the army), support for national projects supervised by Medvedev from Finance Minister Kudrin is a necessity that the president cannot yet refuse. Consequently, the survival of the Minister of Finance directly depends on whether Putin places his bet on Medvedev as his heir or abandons (which is more likely) this idea.

Position

looks preferable: his loyalty is sealed by corporate solidarity, since he comes from foreign intelligence. In addition, the well-known conflict between the Minister of Defense and Igor Sechin eliminates the problem of second loyalty, as was the case with the former Prosecutor General.

The latter, by the way, does not mean at all that as the hour “X” approaches - the end of the legitimate powers of V.V. Putin - Ivanov will not conclude a truce with representatives of the corporation that raised him. Not only with Sechin, but also with another deputy head of the Administration, Viktor Ivanov, who oversees personnel appointments that are not in the area of ​​close interest of the president. In any case, the resignation of the Minister of Defense is not in sight: he is needed by a variety of Kremlin clans. Putin - because he is loyal and hated by the army generals, therefore, he does not have the opportunity to betray. The Gazprom clan, which is promoting Medvedev and preparing for a war with Rosneft and the Chairman of its Board of Directors, I. Sechin. Sechin himself, who now, after the resignation of the Prosecutor General, needs a strong ally. As for Sergei Ivanov, his choice will become clear only when the struggle for the Kremlin enters its final phase. One thing is clear: unlike all the other players named above, he has the most serious resource for trading in the bureaucratic market.

The only thing that can compete with him is

Yakunin, like Medvedev and Ivanov, owes his rise personally to Putin; moreover, unlike the first, he is part of the KGB brotherhood and, unlike the second, belongs to the so-called Orthodox circle of the president. Yakunin recently won a tactical victory over Transneft (Putin not only moved the “pipe” away from Lake Baikal, but also thereby postponed the completion of the oil pipeline for a long time, which is beneficial for Yakunin’s business), and, unlike Medvedev and Ivanov, does not shine too much on public (except perhaps in the affairs of the Orthodox Church, which can become a serious ally in the struggle for the throne), this is what the president most likely had in mind when he told reporters in Shanghai that the successor may not be too noticeable today, but not far from power man. As for Yakunin’s professional qualities, they are, as they say, irrelevant: Russian Railways has been a business for a long time, there are enough professionals there, Yakunin’s task is to ensure that financial flows go where they should go.

Position

also seems quite stable: loyal - a native of the KGB, as for professionalism, then in such a system that is not amenable to reform, which is our police, competence is not essential.

But

- dark horse. On the one hand, he, like Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov, is a protege of Boris Yeltsin. On the other hand, the president clearly needs his knowledge of the colossus that the Ministry of Emergency Situations has become in recent years, especially since it was Shoigu who was involved in the construction of the ministry and built it for himself. Thirdly, Shoigu has his own electoral resource: he constantly appears in ratings with positive popularity, while the vast majority of other high officials (with the exception of D. Medvedev and S. Ivanov, whose ratings are now being pumped up by federal channels) are consistently in the negative zone.

Apparently, Shoigu began to promote one of the Kremlin clans as another potential successor - either as a distracting figure, or to spur others on. Shoigu's potential disloyalty is balanced by recent massive corruption scandals in his own department: it is clear that the president has no doubts about his controllability. Moreover, in a country with a worn-out housing and communal system, antediluvian communications, transport arteries, and so on, emergency situations are such a populist delicate matter that the president most likely will not dare to replace Shoigu with another, more loyal one.

The situation around is much more interesting

. Whatever the gray eminence of the Kremlin does, his track record, which includes work for M. Khodorkovsky, M. Friedman, and A. Voloshin, turns him into a clearly disloyal travel companion of the president. Of course, Surkov proved that he has no equal in manipulating public opinion: the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2003-2004. evidence of this. Although, it should be noted, the failures of the country’s main PR technologist were not spared: just remember the United Russia party or the Nashi youth movement. But the main thing is that “the Moor has done his job”: television channels everywhere stand in the pose of “what do you want?”, most newspapers do the same, governors are in handcuffs, and besides, security officers are keeping an eye on them. In addition, Surkov's opportunism makes him an unattractive ally for any of the Kremlin clans. And then there are leaks about his own presidential ambitions, plus the new head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Sobyanin, who sooner or later will begin to feel burdened by an overly active deputy (it is too early to say anything about the prospects of Sobyanin himself)... In short, Vladislav Surkov seems to be an obvious candidate for honorable resignation.

Finally, the most interesting person involved in our analysis is

, who supervises all law enforcement agencies and, moreover, has an external resource comparable to that of the president himself - he controls Rosneft, and, as some media claim, has a multibillion-dollar personal fortune. Igor Sechin is called a long-time business partner of Vladimir Putin, who has extensive information about that side of the president’s life that is little known to us. In this sense, their relationship is not that of autocrat and vassal, but rather of two interdependent players.

In addition, Sechin showed that he is quite capable of playing his own part. It follows that he poses a serious threat to Putin as president. However, his removal would mean a real palace coup with unclear consequences: Sechin managed to place too many of his people in various ministries and departments. The risks are similar to those that Nikita Khrushchev faced when he arrested Beria. Khrushchev then relied on Marshal Zhukov, whom, however, he immediately exiled as soon as the deed was done. Vladimir Putin has no one in mind for the role of Zhukov - except perhaps the head of the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, who is absolutely loyal to the president, although after Nord-Ost, Beslan and the murder of the former president of Ichkeria Yandarbiev, he cannot be considered a competent bureaucrat. And that is why he is also valuable in the post of chief security officer. In short, the fate of Igor Sechin is a mystery.

It will be interesting to see what solution the president finds for himself.

So what can we expect if we proceed from the proposed hypothesis that for Putin, as an autocrat, the loyalty of high officials is more important than their professionalism? In the near future - perhaps the resignation (in one form or another) of German Gref,

which, from all points of view, is alien to this festival of Kremlin life (on it and the stigma of the family protege, and the monetization of benefits that turned out to be a scandal), and some secondary ministers like

In a more distant perspective, the resignation of Vladislav Surkov and, possibly, Alexei Kudrin (it is possible that together with Dmitry Medvedev). In 2007, many prophesy and resign

He just has the qualities that autocrats are obviously afraid: by definition - that is, according to his political biography, it is not loyal (as the head of the presidential administration, he refused V. Putin, despite all the curtsy that he knows how to do; Well, besides, as the last cold winter showed, a super professional. So - all the more dangerous. In addition, he is able to unite around himself the leaders of a big business, which is unlikely to keep neutrality on the issue of choosing Putin's successor.

It is worth it

. The country's foreign policy is a continuation of the internal policy, Putin himself is engaged in it, Lavrov under him is nothing more than a technical performer. He does not solve anything, does not determine anything, does not have any resource and is not dangerous to anyone: this place will be needed by someone from the president’s close circle-they will be removed, no-it will remain to occupy the office on Smolenskaya Square.

And, of course, the most intriguing: will the palace coup happen? The coups are a generic line of authoritarian regimes built on the alliance of bureaucrats with the military, regardless of whether they wear a military uniform or prefer to walk in civilian clothes. One thing is important here: to be as far as possible from the arena of "military" actions. Moreover, the nature of the actions may not have quotes.