Be real

To understand the prospects of the protest movement, the next achievement of which was the thousands of a rally on Sakharov Avenue, it makes sense to analyze its structure. And see what poles it (movement) gravitates to. Since all living things, say, any family gravitates to the poles, and sometimes bursts off by these very poles in two, as the Taganka Theater, the group The Beatles, the French parliament of the Great French Revolution, etc.
In the most general form, we can say that in the protest movement there are their own conservatives and radicals, right and left, maximalists and minimalists, idealists and pragmatists, Slavophiles and Westerners, revolutionaries and evolutionists, conformists and non -conformers, populists and realists, sovereigns, monarchists and republicans - the overshadow of couples can be multiplied. Although any of the pairs is worthy of interest, we can afford an analysis only in the most general form, such as more than more, radical-pushing.
At first glance, the situation seems extremely simple. First, radicals, maximalists, revolutionaries from Strategy-31 for several years held their noisy but small actions, shocking the authorities and inhabitants with radical slogans such as “Russia without Putin”. For which the authorities defended them with batons, dragged them into a kutuzka and sentenced to various administrative terms. And then, after frank falsifications in the elections, they were joined by intelligent representatives of the middle class, who were not only not ready to recognize the original “professional politicians”, but also fundamentally changed the intonation of protest, stating that they against the revolution, against radical movements, with an exclusively peaceful protest. Including - without leaders and parties, which, I must say, was much more arranged by the authorities, which considered that new protesters, office hamsters, angry townspeople would be more careful than these lemon, Nemtsov and Kasparovs. That is, those who almost the entire Putin era mercilessly criticized the “bloody Putin regime”, choosing a strategy of hard opponulation of the authorities. And a kind of intermediate results of distance from “professional politicians and radicals” was a vote on the Internet for the right to speak at a rally on December 24, when softly liberal TV presenters, actors and writers unequivocally pushed into the background of those who did not allow the all gloomy Putin years to fade off the fire of protests. That is, they made a bet on those who, like them, adhered to cautious conformist tactics and, only when the protests became permitted and massive, joined them.
I must say right away that I'm not trying to arrange any grades; Mass heroism, when opposing power in Russia (in Russia?) It is impossible and traditionally interpreted as marginal, deviant, suicidal behavior. It is enough to recall the public assessment of Soviet dissidents, who, even in the most free 90s of the last century, did not receive a respect such as their colleagues like Gavel in Europe. But my task is not to blame, but to analyze in an attempt to show how the level and quality of claims to power is correlated with such characteristics as maximalism or realism, idealism or pragmatism.
Consider a completely representative characteristic of protest sentiments, expressed - and very accurately - in the article of the smart and insightful linguist Irina Levontina, who, analyzing slogans and calls at the rally, concludes that "it is evident: the rally is peaceful, no one wants any revolutions." And then it formulates the level of claims from the audience: “Many people, especially young people, do not want to fall in love with some charismatic leaders at all, become fans of parties and ideologies. They just want to be able to choose parties and candidates, how they choose a mobile operator. Yes, maybe not one is perfect, perhaps there is no particular difference, but the choice should be. That's just it should be. I choose them, and let them compete for me and from this will become better. This one will not like this - next time I choose another. He wants to keep me - let him work, try. There is no other. "
In the framework of our topic, it would seem, this is an example of distinct pragmatics, minimalism, caution, realism. Very simple requirements articulating the concept of choice. Which could be easier for the authorities than such claims. But is it so? Is there really the right to choose a solution to those problems that have come to a standstill of Russian society and caused a crisis of the legitimacy of the gangster power? With a more careful consideration of a set of claims articulated by Levontina, it is easy to make sure that the choice of the best in any situation is possible only in a well -established society, such as Western European or American, although there is a political choice understood in economic categories (better, more comfortable), it works relatively. But these are societies with established constitutions, traditions of regular change of power, normal judicial and legal systems, diverse and outwardly free media. In our case, the requirement of the right to choose involves the preliminary implementation of all of the above circumstances (the new republican, and not the monarchical constitution, the independent court and the media, etc.), which is actually an example of extreme and completely utopian maximalism. That is, putting forward the requirements of obviously unrealistic or useless ones.
In this sense, externally much more radical requirements of the “political opposition” such as “Churov on Nara, Putin in Chechnya” are much more easily feasible-with all the serious power of the Putin regime, its fall is still an easier task than the sudden transition of the authoritarian culture and habits of Russia, with practically absent democratic institutions, to the situation when political requirements can be evaluated as economic (that is, more or less or less profitable). Another thing is whether the implementation of these requirements will be the change of the entire political elite and the replacement of its new one - fundamental for Russian conditions. What is primary here: Putin or sociocultural circumstances that caused his appearance? Rather, the second. Replacing Putin with anonymous, in principle, is represented, after this, everywhere respected democratic institutions is problematic. If only because this is the current Russian Constitution, which provides the first person with obviously non -impraters, which - such, in general, human nature - is unlikely to refuse the same Navalny, bring his fate to the chair of the President of Russia.
But the requirement of the immediate creation of democratic institutions is equally utopian and idealistic. Who will create them, how, from whom to form a new judicial corps and a new independent public television? As a single example, this is possible as a system - almost unrealistic. Because conformism or total dishonesty in the big and small is not the work of Putin, Surkov and the company, they only pedalized the situation for their own purposes. Rather, Putin, Surkov (as a symbol of hypocrisy and manipulation), total corruption is a reflection of the state of Russian society, and to demand from society to change in itself if he has never managed to maintain a democratic trend for a long time, equally utopically and idealistic.
In this sense, the example of the early 1990s with their multi-million protests is characteristic. While the protesting democrats in a fierce symbolic struggle fought with the communist conservatives, the Chekist and Komsomol bastard sawed the Giri behind the stage. By the way, this is a realistic warning today's reasons for the shares of peaceful protest: while the protesters fight for symbolic values, real values ​​and their belonging are discussed in completely different places and other people. And the more serious the protests become, the more real that they will be used as an instrument of obtaining power and property committed by others and so far unknown figures.
I am to the fact that very often maximalism and idealism are completely optional with radicalism. And bearing in mind that, perhaps, the main problem of Russian society remains infantile moraa and social irresponsibility, it makes sense to repeat the slogan of the 1968 revolution in Europe: be realistic - demand the impossible.