In the economy

Save the speculator!

April 7, 2009 Mikhail Delyagin

The Government’s “program of anti -crisis measures” is zealously discussed not so much by the real sector and production as speculators: the bulk of the funds allocated supports the banking system, and not production, but the production does not receive support through the most effective state order system, but due to direct distribution of money (which go to pay the same speculators and partial subsidizing excessive interest on loans).

In this, the program inherits with chaotic “anti -crisis” measures of the late 2008, when the government did not save, but their obviously ineffective owners and creditors who distributed excessively risky loans.

The government continues to rave liberalism

The program is still based on a fundamental liberal myth about the need to eliminate the state from regulation of the economy. In particular, it is claimed: "The priority of the support (as in the text is M.D.) will be provided with a private initiative in crisis conditions."

This is equivalent to the recognition of the compilers of the program, not only in ideological blindness and illiteracy (since the “private initiative” in principle cannot see the strategic perspective and therefore needs the guide of the state, and in the conditions of the crisis of its possibilities, there are also much fewer opportunities of the state), but also in the obvious inefficiency of “anti -crisis measures” developed on the basis of such misconceptions.

“The government will not invest taxpayers in the preservation of ineffective production”, without distinguishing strategic and socially significant production, which should be preserved regardless of the errors made by their leaders, as well as production that became ineffective as a result of violation of their obligations (for example, the enterprises of the military -industrial complex receive funds for executed defense orders).

At the same time, the government declares the willingness to help enterprises investing in the development of production and create new products, regardless of how from the text, from the effectiveness of these investments; Do not forget that Russian businessmen often issued their losses as investments - international accounting standards allow this.

As a “key task”, the government again calls the “weakening of the dependence of economic growth on external factors”. This item, apparently, is mechanically rewritten from similar documents of past years, because in 2009, which is discussed in the program, as recorded in it, there will be an economic decline.

The task of increasing the significance of internal demand has been ritually set throughout the 2000s (and in terms of reducing dependence on the export of raw materials-since 1986), it is now very easy to fulfill, since the reduction of export raw materials will automatically reduce the significance of external factors in the development of the economy and, accordingly, will increase the importance of internal ones.

The government and the central bank (the compilers of the program do not even know that actually this body is called the Bank of Russia) declare the desire to "increase the investment attractiveness of the economy." Under the cover of this beautiful slogan throughout the 90s and 2000s, liberal fundamentalists stimulated the influx of speculative capital destroying the economy and the outflow of investment capital from it. Now, in the absence of the possibility of a significant influx of foreign (and Russian) private capital as such (due to the global financial crisis), this slogan does not make sense at all, but will be used, as before, to block development and modernization.

Similarly, the infamous slogan of the beginning and mid-90s about "privatization in the interests of an effective owner" is repeated. The question of where he will come from when the past “effective owners” plundered their enterprises and brought them to collapse, the government does not care; Apparently, it is supposed to sell the surviving assets of the USSR to the next “friends” and without a twinge of conscience to declare “effective owners” of them.

The government declares intention to concentrate on institutional reforms, "ensuring the development of human capital." Past examples of such reforms: the reform of education, which has been dilated to be destroyed even in the 90s, the reform of healthcare, which made it almost inaccessible, pension reform, which deprived the current generation of Russians even hopes for retirement, housing reform that deprived Russians of housing rights.

The government intends to continue this path by considering “investments in a person” (although in fact it is investment in a business that is created by officials, parasitizing in the social sphere) as a priority of its budget policy. It seriously states that these investments incomprehensibly “should become generators of internal demand that causes growth ... in science, research and development, industry and infrastructure”.

In fact, the opposite is true: the state investments in infrastructure launch the increase in social capital; If this scheme is turned over, development is impossible: a classic example is a modern education that prepares in a complete separation from demand (obviously insufficient, since the state does not stimulate development) of professional unemployed people who are not necessary for the economy.

It is very significant that the government promises not to solve the problem - for example, to provide the economy with credit resources - but only “all the necessary efforts for this”.

Thus, it not only relieves itself of responsibility for the state of the economy (it can always be said that everything necessary was done-and the government did not promise the results), but also clearly demonstrates that it itself considers its activities fictitious and demonstrative.

The government demonstrates illiteracy and contempt for law

The slogan “maintaining the equilibrium exchange rate of the ruble” indicates ignorance by the compilers of the program that the country's foreign exchange market (and, in particular, the level of equilibrium of demand and demand for currencies) is completely controlled and directly controlled by the Bank of Russia.

Having devalued the ruble, the government declares the need to ensure its attractiveness; It seems that it is somewhat late, because after a painful devaluation and in anticipation of its new round (due to the lack of financial control), it is simply impossible to “buy” such a promise.

The government speaks of the need to reduce interest rates - conducting their increase (while all developed countries reduce them, trying to improve the economy), and, moreover, in the same document, considering their increase as anti -crisis measure.

The measures provided for the whole of 2009 can be covered (and then with incomprehensible efficiency) only 1,226,800 people-while the number of unemployed has increased by 1.656 million people during the October-February. And it will grow further. Thus, these measures are obviously insufficient.

The government does not make the difference between stimulating the production of cars and stimulating the screwdriver assembly of cars in Russia, although the latter, contrary to its assurances, has no positive effect on the “development of related industries”.

The program repeatedly refers to "reducing budget expenditures that are optional."

This indicates the legal nihilism of the compilers of the program, since the budget, as a law, is mandatory for execution and “optional” expenses for the same reason why there are no “optional” laws.

Using such a term, the government signed the monstrously low quality of its own budget planning, because it also compiled in the fall of 2008, approved a budget containing “optional” expenses.

The absence of indications of the criteria for which budget expenditures belong to “optional”, as well as the total value of these “optional” expenses indicates an arbitrary (and therefore, ineffective and corruption) nature of the “crisis” budget for 2009.

The government ignores reality

This program includes a number of declarations that are not true.

So, an indication of a possible decline in GDP by 2.2% in 2009 is not true - the value of GDP, on the basis of which the government calculated the new budget for 2009 with a default of 10% (which seems to be the minimum possible) gives the magnitude of the economic recession of 11.5%.

It is said that “the government has done a lot in terms of development of industries”, which directly contradicts the description of the level of their development and the scale of their problems contained in the same document.

The statement “The Government intends to refrain from substantial buildings of borrowing in domestic financial markets, in order for the limited investment resources of the banking system to be fully sent to lending to citizens and domestic enterprises”, for all its justice, it completely contradicts the statement of the deputy chairman of the government, the Minister of Finance Kudrin that the pure value of borrowing in the domestic financial markets in the coming years will almost be almost Touch: from 266 billion rubles. In 2008, up to 429 billion in 2009 and 860 billion rubles. In 2010.

An indication that the anti-crisis measures taken in October-December 2008 “allowed us to prevent the growth of the crisis, its transition to forms that threaten the basics of the functioning of the economy” directly contradicts reality (in particular, the transformation of the Russian economy into unprofitable, a decline in the GDP of 7% in the first quarter of 2009, as well as eating working capital, which should renew The landslide decline in production in May 2009). This instruction is an awkward attempt to hide the amazing inefficiency of the Russian state (who managed to devalue the ruble by more than 35% with a simultaneous loss of more than a quarter of a trillion of dollars of Russian international reserves).

In the description of Russian problems, it is recognized that Russian “companies were forced to occupy abroad”, but it is not indicated that this need was artificially created by the state that bred the country's money abroad and thereby creating “monetary hunger” within it; It is not recognized that Russian business occupied, in fact, its own money (taking into account the banking multiplier), paid by it in the form of taxes and withdrawn by the state to the financial systems of developed countries.

Setting on the underdevelopment of financial infrastructure, the authors of the program tactfully silent about the fundamental reason for this - the insecurity of property, due to the desire of the ruling kleptocracy to enrich.

Finally, it is valuable that anti -crisis measures should not contradict modernization, but, on the contrary, be its locomotive. Nevertheless, in fact, a number of anti -crisis measures provided for (for example, reduction of investment) are pronounced anti -modernization in nature.

The promises to fulfill the state obligations to the population are “in full” is shameful crawling: only some of these obligations will be indexed, and then in accordance not with the real, but predicted by inflation. Thus, a significant part of these obligations will be “eaten” by rising prices.

The promise to “offer” (unknown to anyone) “a new complex of measures that allows small businesses to successfully develop in a crisis”, put forward as a priority, remained unfounded, since it is clear that the proposed sufficiently partial measures to support small businesses are not able to solve such a large -scale problem.

A significant part of anti -crisis measures is to provide state guarantees - while the state Sberbank with the lips of B. Zlataks has already announced the refusal to use this instrument, which undermines its effectiveness and indicates the inconsistency of the government program with key entities of the economy.

The government has its own "program of anti -crisis measures" as an empty chatter

Basically, the program is a description of already committed actions and implemented measures. Thus, this is not so much a work plan for the future as a report on the work done, which (along, for example, with a categorical denial of the presence of the Russian crisis and indicating only the “world crisis”) makes it a propaganda rather than a substantial document.

The measures described in the program are completely insufficient to achieve the declared priorities (for example, “instead of“ oil ”growth, we must go to innovative”), which turns the program into a set of empty declarations.

The proposed measures are poorly structured and chaotic, as, indeed, the document itself.

The sloppiness of the program, up to grammatical and stylistic errors - which is only one header “Program ... measures” - probably reflects not only the insufficient possession of its developers in the Russian language, but also their neglect of this document.

The same measures are described several times (for example, if they are simultaneously elements of industrial and regional policy). At the same time, about such crazy and frankly unscrupulous actions as the allocation of 141 billion rubles. To support the stock market (that is, to save the “hung” money there - probably high -ranking - speculators), tactfully is silent.

The table with measures of 2009 provides for a column indicating the cost of the described measures, but in some cases this cost is not indicated; The table with the measures of 2008 does not contain such a column, so the cost of the corresponding measures has to be indicated in their description.

Some phrases are frankly ambiguous: for example, it is argued that the increase in the state of the state in the property does not reflect the "strategic intentions of the government to limit the role of private property in the Russian economy."

The government admits that without “consistent demonopolization and development of competition” “all measures of stimulating demand will not be effective,” but does not provide for any significant measures in this direction.

Finally, the government declares: "Sustainable economic growth is based on inviolability and protection of private property." Either it does not know that a decline is observed in the Russian economy, and private property is not protected (classic examples-Yukos, “Russneft”, “Arbat-Plastizh”), or, recognizing “default”, the insecurity of property, tries to explain the lack of economic growth.

In general, the initiation of a public discussion around the propaganda document in essence seems to be no more than an advertising course aimed at creating the illusion of complete accounting of public opinion and criticism of specialists after insignificant corrections.

This will allow the official propagandists to “tie” the public and the “status” loyal opposition to the position of the government, limiting the future criticism of its inevitable mistakes on their part.

Author - Director of the Institute of Problems of Globalization, Doctor of Economics

Photos from the site www.government.ru