In the Kremlin

Transit (20)

June 16, 2008 George Satarov

For some people, our power has much in common with God's craft (may this blasphemy will forgive me). For others - with mother nature. You ask: what is common? I answer - the inexplicability of thoughts. What do we know about the plans and intentions of the Almighty? We can only, to the best of modest human capabilities, reflect on them, as theologians do. True, there is a significant difference. Einstein said (referring to the laws of nature, actually speaking): "God is sophisticated, but not malicious." Can we say the same about our native power? I doubt. So it is with nature. We are in spashing to describe it, inventing the laws, in his pride attributing these laws to nature. We are building hypotheses and theory, we are impudently experimenting, trying to make sure of our confusion. The bustle fusses. So I am: building hypotheses about our incomprehensible power, and share my fabrications with you. And what else remains?

Consolation that of all adventures, the most intricate are the adventures of the spirit. In the field of extra -sensitive comprehension of the Russian government, this is guaranteed. Here, for example, is our president. Being a candidate, he promised to “expel it to change from the temple”, sorry - officials from state -owned bodies. And here recently I just suggested privatizing them (companies, not officials). And the Deputy Prime Minister appointed by him said that they would withdraw officials from the state-owned departments, but not all, but “almost”. Comrades are confused in the testimony. There would be surprised, or even indignant. But the sophisticated reader will immediately understand everything. “Ege! - he will say. - Everything is clear! The guys are in the search. The bargaining is on, the most effective way is to pocket everything. ” I do not want to say anything bad about the president or about our power in general. This is about the adventure of the spirit is just about checking the hypotheses.

So, I, as promised, remained for me, in confirmation of the fairness of my hypotheses to tell about possible scenario forces arising from the current situation. Given: the main intentions of the president are declared; The range of steps that must realize these intentions are clear; There are my assumptions about the motives of these intentions, and these assumptions are supported by some disparate evidence; There are no signs of readiness for any decisive steps corresponding to the scale of existing problems. In the article "Transit-18" I concluded that such a picture is most close to the inertial scenario "Sluggish Russia". Required: to understand the possibilities and conditions for the transition to other scenarios from this list.

Let's start with the simplest case - the script "Smart Russia". In the coming years, it seems to me, there are no conditions for the transition to this scenario. The most noble intentions of individual representatives of the power elite can be associated with the script "Dictatorship of Development". Public resources are extremely low (or not high enough) for any essential dimensions: the level of social protest; organization and energy of public organizations; Consolidation of business around conscious interests; influence of independent media; Demand in society for opposition and offer that can satisfy this demand. It takes at least four years of more or less favorable conditions so that there are a chance of fairly significant changes that can give rise to powerful public pressure. Other possibilities of the transition to the Smart Russia scenario are fraught with fairly serious political shakes that split the elite to smithereens and forcing it to move on to this scenario. However, both the pressure from below and the forced initiative from above, caused by shocks, are by no means guaranteed to push the Smart Russia scenario. Other options are possible in a very wide political range.

Two scenarios remain: “Development dictatorship” and “security dictatorship”. These two scenarios are distinguished by the degree of split between elites and the degree of deviation from the “Games according to the Rules” regime (regardless of the nature of the rules). In this sense, as you can see from the drawings that I bring below again, the script “Dictatorship of Development” is an intermediate between “sluggish Russia” and “security dictatorship”. The deviation from the script “Sluggish Russia” with a high probability first leads to the scenario “Dictatorship of Development”, and only then is a transition to the script “Security dictatorship”.

Figure 1. Projection on the plane of the axes “Adaptability-trigidity” and “Game according to the Rules is the Rules” of four basic political scenarios and points describing the political regime in Russia in 1991-1996. and in 2001, together with the trends of 2001-2007 and 2007-2008, as well as a predicted trend

Figure 2. Projection on the plane of the axes “Adaptability-trigidity” and “Consolidation-conflict” of four basic political scenarios and points describing the political regime in Russia in 1991-1996. and in 2001, together with the trends of 2001-2007 and 2007-2008, as well as a predicted trend

This sequence of change of scripts turns from a geometric abstraction into a real plot if we carefully analyze the situation.

The instability of the Swing Russia scenario is primarily determined, as I have already said, by the impossibility of strictly control the boundary of the application of the right in the framework necessary for the authority. The border will be blurred for various reasons. The rhetoric, already applied by the authorities in the public sphere of its “coverage operations,” is perceived by both society and lower echelons of power literally (“right, so, the fight against corruption, so the fight against corruption”). This means that both (to varying degrees, of course) begin to take various actions, which, in their opinion, are adequate to this rhetoric, this publicly voiced programs. The general denominator of such actions is attempts to use the right to practice to restore the legal order. The first traces of this are already visible. A couple of examples. First: the Constitutional Court makes an unexpected tough decision for everyone, which ceases the criminal prosecution of Manana Aslamazyan. Second: in Barnaul, the district judge recognizes the results of the choice of the mayor (the protege of the party in power) invalid. The growth of this kind of actions will be exponential: the more such decisions, the stronger the desire to take the opportunity to defend your rights. It is also important that the expansion of the law will capture different spheres of legal regulation, including politics and information space.

To stop such an avalanche, tough and extraordinary measures are needed. This is where another factor in the breakdown of the Sluggest Russia script will appear: conflict in the elites. As I mentioned in the previous article, the strategy of Putin-Medvedev (in my version) divides the top of the authorities into the “beneficiaries” and the “special-partners”. At one pole of this demarcation, power oligarchs are located, on the other there is a small group of high-ranking officials-technocrats who are not involved in enrichment on a billionth scale. Their joint normal work in the government is unrealistic. There is simply interspecific difference. As the plan to pronounce the country is clarified, the contradictions between these groups will increase. And the second group, trying to saddle and use the wave raised by Medvedev, will push the country with its actions towards the script “Development Dictatorship”.

Why this scenario? There are at least two reasons for this. First: technocratic logic: “We know what to do. The main thing is that they do not interfere with us. ” It is poorly consistent with the principles of democracy, but is perfectly mounted with hopes to extend its power. The second reason: in the anti -corruption Medvedev campaign, he will be assigned the role of those responsible for that part of the anti -corruption policy that is associated with the elimination of the causes that generate corruption, and this is tantamount to the repair and reform of the institutions destroyed for the Putin's rule. This is exactly what they can do, as they believe. But what exactly: in this area, they easily replay of opponents.

And the second question: is the transition from this trend to the path to “Smart Russia” is possible. I do not exclude such an opportunity. It can manifest itself as the conflict is tightened inside the elites if the scales of the scales begin to lean towards the power oligarchs and if it becomes clear that the defeat is not only fraught with a shameful second place, but more significant dangers. In this case, technocrats will need public support. This is where the unpredictable premature chance appears. But still-a chance.

It must be understood that a cozy consensus of “sluggish Russia” is formed around the consent to live “according to concepts”. Any split, any attempt to impose on the other other concepts in a forceful way, an attempt, even timid, move from concepts to legal rules fraught with disorganization. This is another important circumstance that must be taken into account.

It is clear that such a development of events, interception of initiative by hired technocrats, is deadly for power oligarchs. The situation, you know, is quite funny. Putin-Medvedev’s plan in my interpretation is not implemented without technocrats. The services of lawyers, economists and the like fraternity are needed. Although they do not know how to walk in construction. Without them, the plan breaks, the constant rotation of hired specialists disorganizes and delays its implementation. And after four years, a new political generation will begin to swear and go on stage. And the ongoing decline in controllability of the country? And the increase in discontent in regional elites? And the surge of social problems? And, do not bring the Lord, a fall in oil prices? And an increase in the risk of corruption revelations? Who walked along such a blade of such a long and jagged knife, like these unfortunate ones? Do you, my readers, got your eyes? And these are again insolent media? Well, full, full. Here is a napkin.

Tug the rope by security forces in their direction can acquire various forms. The choice of tools will depend significantly on how late they wake up. The institutes of legitimate violence that are under their control can be used both for the preventive rotation of the naughty specialists and for rude terror. I do not presume to predict what will really happen. But, what can be said for sure, the transition to the script “Protective dictatorship” will put a cross on Putin-Medvedev’s plan and will not only delay the moment, which is covered for power oligarchs, when they can take advantage of their property. She will just hang over the abyss. Together with them. There is nothing more dangerous for dictators than the inevitable collapse of their own dictatorship. I’m just not sure that this will console those who are under the rule of this pack.

That's all. The end of the fairy tale. You ask: what to do? I rushed to give advice on the site. The last article will be out of topic. But perhaps it will be some answer to a similar question with the impudent substitution of the topic.

The ending follows

Author President of the Innem Foundation