In society

Agony

February 5, 2013 Lilia Shevtsova

To insist that the Putin regime has exhausted itself is trite. Today it is more important to reflect whether the agony of Putinism will lead to the end of the autocracy, whether the elites can hope for the split and how other countries came out of authoritarianism.

Part 1. Putin - Antican Tomb

The history of the democratic revolutions of modern times shows that authoritarian leaders (and dictators too), having begun to lose power, usually tried to survive in three ways. Some began the game in democratization, which only strengthened in a society that began to feel a sign of weakness in this game, the desire for real freedom. Others began to carefully open the window, hoping to get a new legitimacy from society through the elections. But in vain - no authoritarian leader never managed to force society to believe in his unexpected liberal aspirations. Starting to open the window, authoritarian regimes usually collapsed (this is a reminder to those who all hope that Putin will return to moderate liberalization, especially with the new prime minister!). Still others did not waste time on “tricks” and immediately moved to repressions. In this case, authoritarianism and dictatorship could extend its time, but only under certain conditions: or if a new leader came, which allowed authoritarianism to get some legitimation through a change in the coercion of coercion; Or if the leader began an external conflict or a war that was forced to unite the population (but for a while). The change of leader and permutation within the ruling team when addressing the regime to cruel repressions helped maintain power and system in China in 1989. The Greek regime in 1974, having made a coup in Cyprus, and the Argentinean regime, having made an invasion of the Volclands in 1982, delayed (but not for long) their political death. By the way, the Russian conflict with Georgia in August 2008 was neither the regime nor the system of Russian autocracy, which still retained stability. Now this conflict Putin would come in handy.

There is no doubt that the Putin regime has entered the last stage of its existence. There are classic criteria for the decline in power, and its key features in Russia are evident: the Kremlin’s inability to keep the status quo or start changes; transition to repressions in order to maintain power; misunderstanding of modern challenges and attempts to answer them, turning into the past (militarism, Orthodox fundamentalism); The desire to transfer control of power and inheritance. For those who doubt that the last countdown of time began for the Putin regime, I can advise to look through Toynbi, Huntington or Fukuyama, who carefully studied the process of degradation and death of various modes. Can Putin maintain power by moving from imitational democracy to a repressive regime? If you believe in world experience, then just starting an armed conflict with the outside world.

If Putin is not ready for this, then his preservation in the Kremlin begins to contradict the interests of the autocratic system, i.e. The totality of mechanisms, traditions and interests of layers interested in personalist power. I emphasize: the political and social base of the system is much wider than the base of Putin's rule, which is uncontrollable. Today, the reproduction of the system requires to close the Putin chapter. The formation of a new status quo complicates the preservation of a leader and teams in the Kremlin, which in the public consciousness are associated with failures. Putin cannot guarantee corporate interests either for a power bureaucracy, for which he is not cruel enough, nor for the “Sislibs” and the bourgeoisie standing behind them, who are not satisfied with his new rules of the game, giving them to eat a power bureaucracy. Putin has long been rejected by a dynamic city minority. But the archaic part of society looks at him without adoration. Theoretically, Putin could try to deceive fate through a return to the water formula. This means an appeal to society through the head of bureaucracy and Praetorians. But in order to get water legitimacy, you need to be prepared not only to shed blood of the population, but also to repress the leading representatives of the ruling class. And the most entrusted! “Kazus Serdyukov”, who is either accused, or saved from the prosecution, showed that Putin is unlikely to be able to become a new Stalin or Mao. And only the Stalinist-Maoist model of the anti-Bunocratic and at the same time anti-oligarchic “revolution from above” can give Ohruskoye Putin the support of the part of the population to which he appeals. However, a leader who has lost charisma and sacredness is unlikely to have a chance to become a leader, even if he desperately wants it and decides to indicative bloodletting.

So far, the Putin Kremlin has not yet decided to what extent he was ready to use a repressive resource. It is unclear (and most likely, the Kremlin too) how power structures are ready to protect power when the moment of serious tests comes. Meanwhile, the political regime cannot be in a situation for a long time where it is not clear to the leader whether he can turn to violence. The unclear limits of the repressiveness of the Putin regime and the obvious fear of power before the consequences of its violence erodes the supports of the rule and the system itself. Moreover, this ambiguity not only scares society, but also allows some social layers to gain courage and overcome the fear of confrontation with the authorities.

In a word, one cannot but see the contradictory role of Putin. On the one hand, he is the father of postputinism and the initiator of the transition to power rule. He promoted the repressive flywheel: and now the Duma, the Investigative Committee, and the courts with zeal pushes him further ... But, on the other hand, Putin’s current presidency begins to undermine the system. The ruling class cannot not understand this. The price of Putin’s preservation in the Kremlin for the ruling class is already higher than the price that this class can pay for his departure. How to ensure his departure - this is what the thought should occupy the minds of not only the distant, but also Putin's near environment. At least his far -sighted representatives.

And here is our paradox. The real transformation of Russia requires Putin to leave the Kremlin. But his departure until the moment when an influential system alternative appears, can facilitate the preservation of autocracy through the arrival of a fresh “iron hand”. Obviously, we will soon see attempts to privatize the slogan "Down with Putin!" Those who try to free the Kremlin for the new king. Therefore, this slogan can work on society only in a link with the slogan "Down with autocracy!". The latter means the rejection of the principle of monopoly enshrined in the Constitution, which is the rod of the Russian system.