Reform Yanychar

President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, a tough critic of the Jewish Financial International, reported the imminent resignation of the Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, who, apparently, along with the Jewish international-and ruins the army.

Geo-Policy General Ivashov is the same reliable source of information about Serdyukov as Igor Giorgadze-about President Saakashvili.

Our army has been ruined since 1991. As you ask some Ivashov, an amateur to talk about Russian spirituality-you will hear that they are ruining the army. Moreover, the generals who trade soldiers and fuel are not ruined (this, apparently, is a sign of special spirituality). The army is destroyed by someone from the outside.

Well, it is worth admitting that the Russian army hates the Minister of Defense of Serdyukov just like the archers - Peter I. This does not poorly testify to Serdyukov. This testifies terribly for the army.

Under Stalin, the Soviet Army was, according to Victor Astafyev, the “most mediocre army in the world”, an army of slaves intended to hack the enemy’s fortifications with their own bodies. The army, in which the best executioners like Field Marshal Zhukov were considered the best commanders. The country called Russia was destroyed, turned into an appendage of this gun of conquering the world and produced either tanks or the steel from which the tanks made.

In the 70s, in the era of local wars, this mass army, the last mass army of the Second World War, no longer played the role for which Stalin was preparing it. It existed because the social organism created once dies slowly. And whole giant projects, for example, the air defense ring around Moscow, had not a military meaning, but gluttonous: the air defense ring was created to have more lands around the army around Moscow in the most trumped places and that more generals could serve in the Arbat Military District.

In the 90s, the army remained the only unreformed institute, and this led to a disaster. If you are planting a structure inside the market economy that has uncontrolled budget money and an unlimited human resource, then you get a slave-owning economy in which officers sitting on the “land” are trading people, and the suppliers sitting on the “farm” turn into the owners of the cement-intonest-building empires.

As among the Ottoman Janissaries or Russian archers of the 18th -century model there were brave people, and brave officers remained inside the Russian army; But together this is no more an army than AvtoVAZ is a plant.

The reform, started by Serdyukov, is generally reduced to the sale of economic assets and in the transition to the army capable of fighting in local conflicts. That is, more simply, to the realization that generals should not trade cement, and officers - soldiers.

As a result, the hatred of the workers and cement owners to Serdyukov grew to some incredible size. Moreover, in full accordance with the psychology of the above persons, it is not manifested in a military coup (for this you must be military), not in attempts, not even in open criticism, but in market gossip.

“You understand,” General Vlasov, the acting head of the Department of Arrangement and Mounting of the Russian Ministry of Defense, told me after the suicide of the Russian Federation, “Serdyukov called him and asked him to transfer the building next to the General Staff to the fund of his wife. Patriot Vlasov could not stand it and shot himself. ”

The heartbreaking story, only the problem is the supplier of Vlasov, the successor of the legendary Grebenyuk and Kosovan, the managers of the construction empire is even larger than “Donstroy” or “Inteko”, is not very similar to a person who can shoot up due to a piece of state property.

It is very possible that the minister put the ultimatum to General Vlasov: you will either sit or surrender those who stole. It is very possible that Vlasov found the courage in this situation to act as an officer, and not as a supplier. But because of state property ... Come on, our rowing people were just happy to find a compromise with Serdyukov on such a basis.

Another story: Minister Serdyukov fired the head of the Moscow Military District. “You imagine,” they tell me, “they had to build new barracks in Bakovka, and Serdyukov says:“ This is that such a St. Petersburg company should build it. ” And the commander replies to him: “And what should I do with the military builders? They are sitting without work! " And he was fired.

I don’t know if it is true about the St. Petersburg company. But military builders are the same guys who receive 40 thousand rubles. The salary, when the whole army stands at the “teeth on the shelf” rack, and build (or rather, do not build) at home for 20 thousand dollars. for sq. m. Of course, Serdyukov was wrong, having dismissed the district commander. Because for such remarks in normal democracy, they are planted, and in normal dictatorship they are shot.

The third bike. A general from Transbaikalia comes to Moscow to receive a new post. And he says with indignation: “I went into the reception room, and they tell me that, they say, you will go to the minister, and he will ask you:“ Who is better, civil defense minister or military? ” You must answer: "Civil." He will ask you: "Which is better - a division or a brigade?" You must answer: "Brigade." Otherwise, you will go back to your Transbaikalia. Imagine, I was forced to answer, as ordered. "

You listen and do not believe your ears. The general, who does not like Serdyukov’s reform, came to his office and licked Serdyukov boots. So you are either not licking, or then be silent about your shame. And this one boasts!

Serdyukov reforms have flaws. These are innate shortcomings of any reform under Putin.

Firstly, Serdyukov cannot shoot anyone. Putin's regime does not like public processes over thieves. Moreover, if public processes began, the question would immediately arise: after all, Serdyukov is not the first Minister of Defense under Putin. What did Sergey Borisovich Ivanov do to him?

Secondly, all reforms under Putin are carried out as special operations-quickly and without explanation. This provides immense opportunities for lies and sabotage from the generals. A simple example: the story with the Berdsk brigade of the GRU special forces. It was decided that one military district was relied on by one GRU brigade. There was a brigade in Berdsk and there was a brigade in Ulan-Ude. Both were in half a composition. It was decided to unite them. They didn’t explain anything to anyone, and the brigade left the barracks with the words: “We are all thrown out into the street.” Nobody was thrown out into the street, and the thesis that it was difficult for an oath to the officer from Berdsk to go to Ulan-Ude is unlikely to be recognized as wealthy. The officer is still not an investmentBank, and they go where the company will send.

The third drawback of Serdyukov’s reform lies in the fact that, being one of the most capable administrators of Putin, Anatoly Serdyukov, like Aleksashka Menshikov, is flesh from the flesh of his era. Every reformer in Russia complains of his pocket: this is such an eternal problem of our reforms, starting with Peter the Great and ending with collateral auctions. So to speak, the historical originality of reforms in Russia. Sorry, we have no other reformers for you.

Well, it is very possible that the Air Force Academy could be left in the Petrovsky Palace. And something was not so sold to someone. These are details.

Not details - that the army should not trade cement, but officers - soldiers. If they do this, they are not officers. Like the Janissaries or Sagittarius, they do not pose a danger to the enemy, but represent it for the Fatherland.

The Janissaries cannot be reformed from the inside. This is the first problem of any total rotten structure - it cannot be reformed from the inside. Whether Serdyukov will be able to reform it from the outside is also a question so far.

But the most amazing thing is that with regard to the reform of the army, our most reactionary layers, discussing the greatness of Russia in the intervals between trade in soldiers, found hot support among many liberals who do not care much to delve into the process, but terribly satisfied, which can be referred to with a colonel Ivashov, the admirer of Russian spirituality and Iranian Akhmadinezha, and the Putinski a protege.