The Reformer's Collapse

The transition of the US Congress to Democratic control and the subsequent immediate resignation of the main ideologist of the Iraq War, Donald Rumsfeld, provide an opportunity to reflect on several important topics at once. For example, that in some states there is a force that can overrule even the most stubborn head of state. George Bush, as you know, stood up for his Secretary of Defense. Despite thousands of critical articles, despite several mini-revolts by senior generals and open letters from retired military leaders, he stubbornly insisted that Donald Rumsfeld was doing an excellent job. But millions of people who were not well versed in military strategy and military development voted as they saw fit, and the man who had unquestioned authority in the administration left his post. And, as is already obvious, the will of voters will force the failed strategy to change.

Or you can think about how an erroneous political course based on the absolutization of force inevitably comes into conflict with the military strategy itself. Rumsfeld had every reason to go down in history as a major military reformer with the ability to hear the call of the future. When he joined the Bush administration, he made a statement that journalists laughed at for a long time. Surely, the man who had at his disposal the most powerful military machine in the world called for its radical restructuring, demanding “to prepare for what cannot be foreseen.”

The fun ended on September 11, 2001. Suddenly it turned out that the middle-aged Minister of Defense, who was reproached for being half a century behind the times, was able to predict the emergence of what is now commonly called asymmetric threats. He saw that the danger would no longer come only from an adversary state against which traditional deterrence could be exercised, but from certain terrorist groups who were not at all afraid that unacceptable damage would be caused to the country where they were based.

Rumsfeld gave a completely adequate response to these new challenges. He set the task of achieving a new quality of armed forces, which required maximizing the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution. The reforms he launched received the loud name “revolution in military affairs.” Modern technologies, primarily information technologies, have provided the military with fundamentally new means of conducting combat operations. Thanks to satellite reconnaissance and unmanned aircraft, the strategist has the opportunity to predict any enemy maneuver even before it begins to be implemented. The “fog of war,” which, according to Clausewitz, accompanies every military operation, is dissipating. It becomes possible to create a unified communication system covering all units participating in the operation. Finally, information technology, combined with the advantages of aviation and mechanized units, allows operations to be carried out at such a pace that the rules of strategy of past centuries (outflanking the enemy, breakthroughs and encirclements) simply become meaningless.

Rumsfeld believed it was necessary to radically change the structure of the armed forces and the command system in order to make the most of the new opportunities. For this, he was ready to break the most powerful army in the world. The structure of land connections is changing right now. According to Rumsfeld, it should be as flexible as possible. An Army task force should be composed of specialized units to perform a specific mission. Navies must rely not on permanent bases around the world, but on the ability to carry out operations relying solely on aircraft carriers.

It must be said that this strategy of Rumsfeld worked well at the initial stage of hostilities in both Afghanistan and Iraq. During the air operation in Afghanistan, aviation operated not from land bases, but from aircraft carriers located at a considerable distance from the conflict zone. But due to the fact that target designation came directly from satellites to the pilot of the aircraft closest to the target, the twenty minutes that the fighter could be in Afghan airspace was enough to complete the combat mission. Iraqi troops were unable to organize counterattacks because they were discovered and destroyed before moving to the deployment lines.

And then there was a certain dizziness from success. Rumsfeld believed that this superpower was capable of solving any political problem. The troops were given a fundamentally impossible task - to introduce civilization and democracy at bayonets. From a military point of view, this meant an inevitable long-term occupation. Thus, the famous principles of Colin Powell were violated: armed forces should be used only and exclusively to achieve military victory and should be withdrawn from the conflict area immediately after victory is achieved.

But it turned out that the army that Rumsfeld created is effective only in the so-called remote control of the conflict, when, as a result of military defeat, the losing side fulfills all the demands of the winner. Just like it was during the first Gulf War. But it is ineffective as soon as it is given political tasks such as overthrowing an undesirable regime. By the will of Rumsfeld, the “army of the future” was thrown into the vulgar colonial war of the past.

What followed is well known: the inability to ensure occupation with the available forces (and there was simply nowhere to get additional troops), vulnerability to terrorist attacks, losses that many times exceeded those that the troops suffered during the fighting. And Rumsfeld, from a tough but rational reformer, increasingly turned into a stubborn militarist.

Now no one, including Robert Gates, whom the US President nominated to be Secretary of Defense, knows how to get out of the bloody mess brewed by Rumsfeld. There is no doubt that leaving Iraq will leave a memory no less painful than the Vietnam disaster. The lesson is absolutely obvious - even the most advanced army can only win on the battlefield. Demanding more from her means dooming her to failure.