
Military officials, in the best Soviet traditions, did everything to hide the very fact of the tragedy or at least its real scale. The command did not even consider it necessary to publish the full list of the boat’s crew. Journalists had to obtain it through unofficial channels for a bribe. (Photo: AP )
There is no truer sign in Russia: if bosses, especially bosses in uniform, start trumpeting success, expect trouble. As soon as the generals once again announce the end of the military operation in Chechnya, the very next day the militants destroy our column. The current tragedy in the Barents Sea was preceded by a stream of loud statements, the leitmotif of which was the “rebirth of naval power” of Russia. This power, according to the admirals, is needed in order to resist the United States and NATO at sea. At the end of July, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, even defended his dissertation in which he argues for the need to develop a new naval strategy that takes into account the growing threat from the sea. Kuroyedov believes that it is necessary to create a kind of “Navy metasystem”, the task of which is to ensure “through demonstration, and, if necessary, the use of naval force”, the achievement of Russia’s political, economic and military goals in almost the entire World Ocean. All this, in principle, very much smacks of Soviet traditions. However, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Putin, who honored with his presence the ceremony of defending the admiral's thesis, expressed full agreement with the ideas of the multi-star applicant. A little later, during a visit to the main base of the Baltic Fleet, the head of state, not without pathos, declared: “Russia cannot exist without a navy if it claims the role that it has played so far and intends to play in the future.”
Wedge everywhere
The Kursk disaster and the entire course of the rescue operation clearly demonstrated the value of all this sovereign optimism.
In numerous interviews and articles, admirals never tire of repeating that perhaps the only thing preventing the Navy from returning to the World Ocean is the aging of the fleet. Indeed, in recent years, practically no new ships have been built. But the Kursk is one of the newest submarines - it was launched in 1994. Moreover, she was considered the best submarine in the fleet. And on this best ship, at the time of the accident, none of the rescue systems worked. Rescue buoys, which mark the site of the disaster, transmit a distress signal and through which communication with the crew is carried out, were not thrown out. The rescue capsule, specially designed to evacuate the crew, did not work. Finally, for some reason the sailors were unable to use individual wetsuits (the relatively shallow depth - about 100 meters - in principle should have allowed this to be done).
The sailors just shrug their shoulders: they say, something extremely unusual happened, which is why the standard rescue systems did not work. But the possible causes of the disaster listed by the Navy commander are quite ordinary - an explosion in the bow compartment, a collision with some kind of ship, or a collision with a mine left over from the Second World War. (Experts from the Norwegian environmental organization Belluna also point out that for an ocean-going submarine, a depth of 100 meters is small, and even a minor error in control could lead to the bow hitting the bottom). However, let's not forget - we are still talking about a warship, which must survive and carry out a combat mission in military operations, when both depth charges and torpedoes are used against it. It is known about Kursk-class submarines that they have a very high degree of survivability. They can withstand almost a direct hit from a nuclear weapon. In addition, they have a 30 percent buoyancy reserve, the largest in the world among submarines. It is difficult to imagine that those who developed the ship's rescue systems did not take into account the possibility of emergency situations listed by Kuroyedov.
“We are all talking about an ideal submarine that has on board everything that it is supposed to have,” one major military official remarked to an Itogi correspondent, not without irritation, “but who told you that this was the case in this particular case?” Indeed, we weren’t going on a multi-month ocean voyage, just outside the outskirts, for only three or four days. In this context, the message that leaked to the media that, in order to save money, a second, reserve group of batteries was not installed on the submarine, which provides the ship with energy in the event of an accident, does not seem too fantastic. Knowing Russian regulations, it cannot be ruled out that the submarine may not have had serviceable buoys or wetsuits.
The very fact that the commander of the Navy admits the possibility of a collision between a boat and another ship suggests that there is no proper order in the fleet. The disaster occurred in a pre-announced training area. “Alien” ships should not be allowed there under any circumstances.
The rescue operation itself raises no less questions. For several days, special devices, replacing each other, descended to the submarine and could not dock with it. Naval commanders explain the failure by unfavorable weather conditions (waves 2-3 points), the presence of strong bottom currents, poor visibility, and a strong roll of the boat exceeding 60 degrees.
That’s right (however, as soon as the video footage of the boat was transferred to British experts, they stated that the list did not exceed 20 degrees), but then it turns out that the Navy is only able to conduct effective rescue operations in the pool. After all, there have always been tidal currents in the Northern Fleet’s native Barents Sea, and the weather in these latitudes is not the same as on the southern coast of Crimea during the holiday season. And it’s strange to expect that a submarine that has suffered an accident will lie on the bottom in a way that is convenient for the rescuers. There can be only one conclusion: at present, the domestic fleet has neither effective rescue equipment nor experienced rescuers (the command of the Northern Fleet was forced to admit through gritted teeth that it does not have qualified divers at its disposal). So, before starting to create the “Navy metasystem”, so dearly loved by Admiral Kuroyedov, it would be good to acquire all this equipment.
If only the master wouldn't be angry
The Kursk tragedy showed what kind of people lead our fleet. The main concern of this public is how not to get a beating from the president; the fate of more than a hundred sailors worries them to a much lesser extent. "Kursk" did not make contact in the middle of the day on August 12 (according to some sources - in the evening of the 11th). However, for almost two days, until August 14, the command delayed announcing this emergency. I foresee objections: the admirals had nothing to do with it, they reported everything to the Supreme Commander, and he ordered to remain silent for the time being. But when they started talking (and there was nowhere to go, the hydrodynamic impact was recorded by an American reconnaissance ship, which was already 400 kilometers from the site of the disaster), they began with outright lies. Everything, they say, is not so scary: both reactors are shut down, stable “hydroacoustic contact” has been established with the team. Several days passed before the naval commanders admitted: there was no contact, just until Tuesday the acoustics recorded blows from the inside to the hull - apparently with a sledgehammer (wasn’t it the same one that Vladimir Putin kissed not so long ago during a visit to the North Sea people?).
Naturally, everyone was worried about the oxygen supply on the boat. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy first stated that it would only last until August 18. Later, when it became clear that it would not be possible to get people out by this date, he named a new date - August 25. As if the boat is not a technical device with precisely defined characteristics.
Not only are the admirals unwilling to share information, they do not seem to have it in full. Until August 18, the command could not even name the exact number of sailors on board the Kursk. First the number 103 appeared, then 116 and finally 118. When the “hotline” started working, those “who believe that their relatives may be on board the Kursk” were offered to call it. You might think that this is not a nuclear submarine , and a tram where you can ride a “hare”.
And it’s a complete theater of the absurd - the admirals’ reaction to proposals from the United States and Great Britain, who were the first to offer help in rescuing the submariners. The refusal followed the most decisive: they say, our rescue equipment is the best, it is more than enough and there is no need to create a crush in the disaster area. Then, apparently, they decided that it was too rude, and a day later they gave another explanation for the refusal: time is precious, and coordinating actions with foreign rescuers will take up time. A little later, a new argument was put forward - Western rescue technology does not fit in with ours. (It is interesting that in the last five years, cooperation between the Russian Navy and American and British sailors has been focused specifically on practicing joint actions during rescue at sea, and it is not clear why during this considerable period of time the problem has not been solved.)
God be with you, help
The West was at a loss as to what motivated the Russian command when refusing help: either something happened to the submarine that no prying eyes should under any circumstances see, or the Russians were having another attack of sovereign foolishness. In any case, it was impossible for the Americans and the British to understand how, while recognizing that the chances of saving the sailors were extremely slim, they could not use all means - both their own and those of others. However, like Russian citizens.
Only on August 17, after painful deliberation, senior naval officials went to Brussels for consultations. Here, finally, it dawned on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that all this was, to say the least, immoral. Putin from Sochi (the president never interrupted his vacation) gave the order to accept help. However, the lost time cannot be returned: British rescuers with their deep-sea units and Norwegian scuba divers could find themselves in the disaster area not at the end, but at the beginning of the week.
It is quite obvious that both the military and political leadership refused assistance mainly because they still consider the West to be their potential enemy.
Inferiority complex
And here is the time to think about why the Kursk multi-purpose submarine went to sea? She went out, perhaps, without proper preparation. This nuclear submarine does not carry intercontinental ballistic missiles and is not a deterrent. The two dozen Granit cruise missiles it is armed with are designed to destroy aircraft carrier groups and submarines. The heavy nuclear cruiser Pyotr Velikiy, the pride of the fleet, which took part in the ill-fated exercises during which the tragedy occurred, was intended exclusively for the destruction of large naval groupings (it is now involved in the rescue operation).
The scenario of these large-scale exercises of the Northern Fleet consisted of simulating a battle at sea between two large naval groups. Moreover, they were started in order to prepare for the cruise of a squadron of Russian ships scheduled for this fall in the Mediterranean Sea, where the US 6th Fleet is based. During the Cold War, our naval presence there made at least some sense. If not military (the United States could destroy a Soviet group separated from its bases in a few hours), then at least political. It is difficult to understand what the meaning of the current display of the flag is. Sending squadrons around the world with the sole purpose of ridding the Russian military of the inferiority complex that was tearing their souls apart after the NATO operation in Yugoslavia is an expensive pleasure.
Russia, of course, must ensure its interests at sea. But these interests have nothing in common with the chimeras into which the complexes of our admirals have been transformed. The Russian fleet should not prepare for war with NATO at sea, but solve real problems. This is primarily nuclear deterrence and protection of the economic zone. Neither "Peter the Great" nor "Kursk", for all their merits, fit into such a strategy.
The job of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is to make decisions that meet the real and not the mythical interests of the country. The president’s job is to save the lives of citizens in trouble at any cost, with or without the help of others. As the tragic events in the Barents Sea testify, Putin has not yet coped with either one or the other.

At the Yalta summit, Putin told reporters that he did not go to the disaster site for one reason: he did not want to disturb the people involved in rescue work. It is unclear, however, why the president did not immediately return from Sochi to Moscow, which is what his compatriots expected of him. (Photo: EPA )