It seems to me that a return to the election of governors in one form or another is inevitable, and this will happen sooner rather than later. Perhaps the position that United Russia has now taken is not so much its choice as the Kremlin’s understanding that the party in a crisis situation will share responsibility with it and all the negativity associated with the crisis will affect it in one way or another, and in In this situation, it is better to keep governors as people who occupy a position above the fray, and not directly head the party list of United Russia. I would like to hope that this also reflected realism related to the fact that the popularity of United Russia will inevitably fall, and it would be wrong to strictly tie the governor to it now. In Medvedev’s words that the party that won the elections, should propose candidates for the post of governors to the president, one can see the official transfer to Putin as the leader of United Russia of the unofficial control that he already retained over the determination of candidates for governors, and on the other hand, since nothing more specific than “the party that won the elections,” it was not said, then when elections are held under a mixed system, as is now happening in most regions, it is not entirely clear how to determine the winning party. Until this good wish takes the form of a specific legislative initiative, it can be interpreted very differently and not necessarily in favor of United Russia in the future. It is quite possible that after some time we will see that the United Russia brand will be abandoned and another will be offered, but this will not fundamentally change anything. There is no system of strict party control. One could have expected that at the last congress of United Russia, Putin would try to make the party his powerful political instrument, transfer there some real levers, decision-making centers. That did not happen. And if so, then “United Russia” remains just a party screen, and this is clearly illustrated by the insignificance of party functionaries at the federal and even more so at the regional level. “United Russia” is not the CPSU, their party apparatus does not control the administrative system. Now the administrative system is almost completely included there, but tomorrow, suddenly, if Putin wants, it will be called something else, and he himself will not lose control over it. Some party functionaries who will not be needed in the new party project will simply remain left behind. So far there are no visible attempts to strengthen the party component in control over the administrative system. Candidates for governor are a rather complex system of compromises, and it is not at all necessary for a person associated with United Russia to become a candidate. If the Kremlin is satisfied with him, the relevant party organization will propose his candidacy. It must be borne in mind that the procedure for identifying candidates and nominating them by the president, which was established by Putin’s decree, was not observed. In a number of cases, the plenipotentiary representatives were removed from this, and the fact that it was they who should formally conduct consultations, draw up a list and transfer it to the Kremlin, in many cases was simply not followed, and the plenipotentiary representatives learned about who the Kremlin proposed as governor together with ordinary citizens. Obviously, in the conditions of party participation in the nomination, the situation will be even more controlled by the Kremlin. However, Medvedev’s proposals seem to me completely inadequate. This is not part of the solution to the problem, but something that once seemed interesting to someone in an almost decorative sense, and now, suddenly pulled out in the midst of a crisis, it looks ridiculous and funny. The transition to popular election of governors, in my opinion, is functionally necessary. In order to really control the situation in the regions in conditions of deep crisis, the possibility of social protest, and so on, the system, the ineffectiveness of which was perhaps not obvious to the Kremlin in conditions of stagnation, cannot work in any way. What we have seen now in Ingushetia is an attempt, using the wrong methods, to at least somehow improve the situation. Today it is just Ingushetia or a couple of other regions where the Kremlin has urgently replaced recently appointed governors, and tomorrow it will become quite obvious that part of the powers and part of the resources for their implementation must be transferred to the regions, otherwise it will be impossible to cope with the crisis. Strong figures will be needed, supported by regional elites, and not just appointees who may have nothing to do with the region and therefore do not control the situation in the region. Now the Kremlin can negotiate with regional elites, or, if it considers it necessary, ignore them. But in a crisis situation, when it will be impossible to experiment and there will be no time and resources to simply change managers from Moscow or somewhere else, a much larger role for local elites in determining the figure of the governor is inevitable. By 2004, gubernatorial elections were very well controlled , and if this system is restored, then control can be carried out in the same way as before. Firstly, it can be stated that only a party that has deputies in the local parliament has the right to nominate candidates, and remove a huge number of candidates, perhaps popular, but not based on administrative resources. Secondly, even if someone unacceptable to the Kremlin passes, he can always be removed by checking financial contributions to his campaign or convicting him of other violations. This kind of influence on elections, when only candidates who suit the Kremlin remain, has been and, obviously, will return with the return of elections.