Sufi elections

The Chechen parliamentary elections cannot be viewed from the standpoint of classical democracy. It was not in the republic, it is not and will not be. But elections provide an opportunity to discuss the inviolability of local customs, regardless of the century or social system.

Any self-respecting expert who writes about Chechnya knows the word “teip”. However, teip (clan) identity has been significantly blurred in recent years; representatives of the same teip have turned out to be irreconcilable competitors. Let us remember, for example, how Malik Saidulaev, who was trying to compete with Akhmat Kadyrov, was removed from the election campaign in 2003. Moreover, both of them belong to the largest benoi teip in the republic. Let us add that the notorious “terrorist number one” Shamil Basayev is also a Benoite.

However, against the backdrop of the erosion of teip identity, the religious self-identification of Chechens, which is also relevant for the elections that took place, is becoming increasingly important - belonging to one of the trends in Sufi Islam traditional for the North Caucasus or to the so-called Wahhabism, which appeared in Chechnya only in the 90s. e years together with the Arabs who came to the first Chechen war. The position of the “traditionalists” is weakened by the fact that they are split into two powerful camps corresponding to the famous Sufi orders (tarikat) - Naqshbandiya and Qadiriya, which operate throughout the Islamic world. For example, in Afghanistan, the leaders of these orders played a significant role in the fight against the pro-Soviet regime of Babrak Karmal and Najibullah. There are no doctrinal differences between them, but rituals differ. Thus, the Qadiris in Chechnya practice “loud dhikr” (that is, ritual zeal, which Russians had the opportunity to see on television during reports from the Grozny rallies in the early 90s). Naqshbandis are adherents of “silent dhikr,” which is performed without demonstrative actions reminiscent of dance, and comes down to the mental mention of Allah.

At one time, the Naqshbandis were part of Shamil’s inner circle, then swore allegiance to the tsarist regime (some naibs, Shamil’s closest associates, received Russian officer’s shoulder straps), then occupied key positions in Soviet bodies. In general, they have always been in power. The Kadiris under Shamil called for a compromise with Russia, but after the fall of Shamil’s imamate they did not win anything: in the eyes of the tsarist administrators they were dangerous rebels. Many adherents of the order, including its main spiritual authority in Chechnya in the mid-19th century, Kunta-haji, were persecuted. In Soviet times, they also played a secondary role.

The situation changed in 1991, when the Kadiris (among them then was the little-known Kadyrov Sr.) actually came to power, removing their rivals (of course, this process was presented to the external audience first as a fight against the partyocrats, and then as the construction of an independent Ichkeria). Accordingly, Qadiriya was on the side of Dudayev and Maskhadov, but only until the latter became dependent on Arab influence and his supporters, primarily Basayev. After this, a number of influential representatives of the order supported the federals, and the political positions of the orders became somewhat closer.

The Kadyrov regime, naturally, relies on the Kadiri tradition. Therefore, the guaranteed victory of United Russia, demonstrating the federal center’s stake in Ramzan, is beneficial to the Qadiris. In addition, the success of the Union of Right Forces was fundamentally important for the Kadyrov clan, which gave the elections the necessary “civility.” Plus, parliamentary elections have become the optimal way to include the former Ichkerian Minister of Defense Magomed Khanbiev into the establishment of the Chechen Republic. Indeed, it was difficult for him to find a place in the security forces of the republic that corresponded to his ambitions, and entry into the civil service was complicated by his lack of higher education. Let us remember that Khanbiev was one of the key figures in the struggle of the Qadiris against the “Wahhabis” in the 90s (of course, on the side of the former). Khanbiev’s participation in the elections is also acceptable to the West, which has long insisted on the inclusion of separatist leaders in the political process. And here it’s not just an ordinary Ichkerian, but a division general, a holder of all possible Maskhadov awards.

Naqshbandiya also received its quota, although not without problems. At first, Rodina was considered the main “Naqshbandi” party, which attracted Bislan Gantamirov to its ranks. In 1991, he was, however, on Dudayev’s side, but quickly “came to his senses.” However, Gantamirov’s candidacy was actually vetoed by Ramzan, after which it was pointless to talk about any serious chances for Rodina. In addition, another critic of the Kadyrov clan, the former head of the Shali district administration Sherip Alikhadzhiev, who also ran for Rodina, withdrew from the elections in the single-mandate district.

But Naqshbandia was not left completely without representation in parliament. The old, proven resource of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation helped, not only was it habitually nostalgic for Soviet times (when, let us remember, the positions of the Naqshbandis were much stronger), but also put at the head of the list a young representative of the well-known Naqshbandi clan of the Arsanovs in the republic. This name alone can attract a significant number of supporters to the side of any electoral list, no matter what it is called. Therefore, the rather high result of the communists, whom Ramzan did not interfere with (they were not dangerous competitors for him, unlike Gantamirov, who has good connections in Moscow), looks quite natural.

So the elections in Chechnya once again showed that the balance of power between the Sufi tariqas has remained unchanged over the past ten, or even fifteen years (the last time the Naqshbandis were briefly in power was in 1995-1996, when the republic was ruled by the will of Moscow Doku Zavgaev). However, Chechen history shows that the tariqas can still change places more than once.