
Laboratory of Public Sociology (PS Lab) writes about the study of the communist dictators of Martin Dimitrov “Dictatorship and Information”:
“Political scientists have long described the so -called“ dictator dilemma ”. Autocrats are based on repressions that give rise to fear of the population. As a result, people hide their real views, and that is why autocrats can rarely evaluate the level of discontent in society. Communist regimes decide this dilemma most effective and partly therefore known for their long -lived <...>. How do they manage to solve this dilemma? With the help of two tools <...>.
Firstly, they create many excess channels for obtaining information that duplicate each other. Reports of party cells, information network, surveillance, complaints and petitions, polls, media monitoring - all this information goes upstairs. Accordingly, despite the fact that bureaucrats or special services have an incentive not to convey the information that can be angry with the leadership, “bad news” can somehow reach communist autocrats.
Secondly, such modes often use such information to search for “latent” discontent that has not yet turned into open criticism, which can be opposed by the distribution of goods, “prevention” with a challenge for a conversation or point repressions. Therefore, such regimes often fall not because they are not aware of the growing crisis, but because they cannot take the right actions in connection with it. <...>
Of course, the party in power does not play in Russia a role comparable in value in the sense of collecting information, and the number of informants, at least reliable ways to evaluate it and is not, is clearly inferior to what was under communist dictatorships <...>. However, an obsession with the desire to understand what people think, Russian autocrats have. So, by order of the government, Polelsters regularly conduct open and closed polls, and Roskomnadzor relies on automatic monitoring of the media and social networks.
The problems of the interaction of the Russian regime with information are not in its shortage and not even in the absence of resources for repression, but in the personalistic nature of the regime. The latter leads to the formation of an information bubble around the leader and the main elites. Apparently, the information of the “bad news”, with which the communist regimes actively fought with the help of excess channels, is a big problem for Putin's regime. ”