The beginning of the disaster

Six months ago, it was about the foreboding of the disaster. A month and a half ago - about the gate of the disaster. Today - about its beginning. Six months ago, the word "catastrophe" in relation to the nearest future of the country could seem an exaggeration. However, the events currently taking place, unfortunately, confirm that the term is used correctly.

One of the key events that launch the catastrophe is what is sometimes called "December 2 elections." The currently so -called “pre -election campaign”, in its style, resembles two other election campaigns - the one that took place in the USSR before the election to the Supreme Council on December 12, 1937, and the one that took place in Germany before the elections in the Reichstag on March 5, 1933. All three campaigns - two past and current - unite the general features of the behavior of power: massive violations the number of laws adopted by the authorities itself; Theatrical shows with elements of psychosis; The prevention of political opponents to participate in the elections, intimidation, violence, terror - up to the imprisonment of opponents in prison and camps. So far, the degree of rigidity and the scale of illegal actions of the authorities are inferior to the events in the USSR and Germany seventy years ago, but the direction of evolution of the regime leaves no doubt.

Based on what is happening in recent months, the event of December 2 is not parliamentary elections in the classical sense of the word. This is not the identification of the will of citizens. And this is not even a referendum on trust Vladimir Putin. December 2 is a special operation.

This is a special operation in which the main participants in this action on the part of the authorities - “USRO”, “PUBINTS”, “NAMES” - are not independent participants in the process. All of them are statists, and low -level statists who do not know and poorly understand for what purposes they are used today, and how they will be used tomorrow.

The degree of non -informationalness and misunderstanding of what is happening, demonstrated not only by the propagandists close to power, but also high -ranking representatives of the regime itself, including the leaders of both chambers of the parliament, both premieres - recently set aside and recently appointed, both “successors” shows that they are the statists in the conducted specializedramed.

For citizens of Russia, it is important to understand what the main goals, inevitable results and the likely consequences of the current operation currently carried out.

The main task of the special operation of December 2 is the legitimation of the regime. Not only and not so much that has already been formed to date, but also of the one that will form in the coming months. The dynamics of events does not exclude the fact that the current political regime is in a state of transition from evolutionary to revolutionary changes. It should be seriously treated by V. Putin’s words about the upcoming “radical renewal of power”.

The legitimation of the regime and the “radical renewal of power” create the conditions for the completion of the process of deinstivatualization of the Russian state. The process of destroying the institutions of the modern state and society - relatively independent parliament, independent judiciary, most of the free media, autonomous governors, professional government and even the presidential administration, once began, cannot be immediately stopped. Moreover, it will inevitably continue.

In line are the power structures of the state, the decomposition process of which has been unusually accelerated recently. Their transformation from extremely ineffective, but still former state structures in criminal structures are in full swing. State and criminal structures of a power nature are related to each other by the use of violence in relation to citizens. The nature of the use of violence distinguishes them from each other - in accordance with the law or regardless of it. Failure to comply with the laws, their ignoring and violation turns state law enforcement agencies into organized criminal groups.

The consequence of the destruction of the institutions of the modern state and society is the concentration of power in the hands of a very narrow circle of people, up to one person, the absolutization of power; relativization of institutions of inviolability of the personality, home, property, turning property into possession, due to certain, constantly changing and constantly multiplying conditions; deformation of the rules acting in the state and society; The destruction of even informal, but established and well -known procedures.

The inevitable result of the deinthivate is the reduction in the planning horizon, the elimination of independence, responsibility of authorized persons, the spread of suspicion, instability, uncontrollability and unpredictability of decisions and to refuse to make them. The unpredictability of decisions, actions and actions refers not only to mass representatives of the state bureaucracy, not to mention the general public, but also to the members of the power group themselves.

Not only behavior, not only comments, but also expressions of the persons of the ministers of the Russian government, the so-called “heirs”, after taking the second person in the Russian power hierarchy-the prime minister-and the appointment of a new prime minister, indicate the transition of the process of deinthitivatualization to the next phase-to the narrowing of the circle of persons who make decisions to the absolute minimum and the elimination of even informal decision-making procedures, to the decision-making, to the decision. The transition from institutions (both formal and informal) to their complete absence. Not only millions of Russian citizens, not only semi -professional political consultants who are working on the sacred business to decipher the “signs of the sky”, but even a very narrow circle of people who have recently been making decisions, cannot predict the subsequent actions of the authorities, not only. The radical reduction in the number of participants in the political process, which have at least minimal independence, incredibly increases the risks for the country.

One of the examples of deinthivate is the liquidation of the institution of the transfer of power before our eyes. The democratic procedure that existed in the country in the 1990s is actually abolished. However, its place was not taken by any new procedure for transferring power-neither party, nor group, nor dynastic nature. There was no procedure characteristic even for authoritarian regimes.

For example, in the USSR, which in no way was a democratic country, nevertheless over the years that passed after the death of Stalin, a certain procedure for inheritance of power has been developed, which was consistently and actually without failures in 1982, 1983 and 1985. The election process included both education among members of the Central Committee and the Politburo of Groups and Alliances, as well as the real process of choosing a general secretary who had a very significant, although not absolute power. Members of the Politburo had great independence, discussions occurred at the meetings. Moreover, the mismatch of the position of a member of the Politburo and the Secretary General did not lead to repression.

The liquidation of the institution of the transfer of power that occurs over the past months significantly increases the risks of the forceful solution of the issue of inheritance, the risks of violent coups, as well as the risks of repression against their real and/or potential participants.

The elimination of traditional institutions of the organization of the state and society causes the demand for their substitutes, the role of which is played by threats of terror, the seriousness of which can be confirmed only by real repression - mass or electoral. The logic of the evolution of a deinthiulized regime inevitably requires the search and finding of enemies - the people, the party, the ruler. The campaign unfolding in the country against the "enemies" of the current president, following the logic of the political process, will inevitably require the transition from the irregular use of violence against persons "causing the regime" to the systematic use of repression.

Candidates for “enemies” and, therefore, the sacrifices of this kind of repression have already been determined: the so -called “West”, political and ideological opponents, part of the state bureaucracy. As for the West, he should hardly expect anything fundamentally new, except for an aggressive propaganda campaign, diplomatic confrontation, and next outbreaks of energy and cyber wars. In contrast to the “West”, two other groups of “enemies” are directly “at hand” of the regime and have the right to claim to be quickly obtaining blows.

As for the opposition, the campaign of repressions against its representatives quickly gains momentum, both in terms of the latitude of coverage and the scale and rigidity of the measures used. As for the bureaucracy, she, too, apparently, will not have to wait long for her turn. Due to access to the levers of power, it is the bureaucracy, including its power part, poses a real threat to the current political regime. The logic of the process will require its elimination. Following the election campaign of 1933 in Germany, the “Night of Long Knives” came in 1934 against the leaders of the SA, headed by Ernst Ram, and after the 1937 election campaign in the USSR - the repression of 1938 against the organizers and performers of the Greater Terror, headed by the head of the NKVD Nikolai Ezhov.

The fact that the regime is already ready for the systematic use of repressive measures against both the opposition and against the bureaucracy was demonstrated not only by the fact that Harry Kasparov and hundreds of participants in political actions, but also the deputy minister of finance, Sergei Storchak and the deputy head of the drug, Alexander Bulbov, were behind bars.

The main thing that the advancing disaster carries is its consequences not for members of the dominant regime, not for representatives of the current bureaucracy, or even for participants in the political opposition. The main thing is that it carries for ordinary citizens.

Moreover, these possible consequences are less related to their well -being. Historically, repressions are not necessarily accompanied by immediately advancing economic crises, and sometimes carried out during and against the background of noticeable economic growth. For 2000-2007, during which the liquidation of the institutions of the modern state in Russia took place, the growth of Russian GDP amounted to 69.5%. During the formation and legitimization of the Stalinist state in the USSR and the Nazi state in Germany from 1932 to 1939, GDP in the USSR grew by 69.1%, in Germany - by 69.6%. The rate of economic growth in Germany and the USSR in the 1930s exceeded the growth rate of the world economy by 2.4 times. The growth rate of Russian GDP in the 2000s exceeds the growth rate of the global economy by 2.38 times.

The main thing that the advancing disaster carries is the consequences for the safety and life of ordinary citizens. The price that people pay and pays a country, for the unfolding institutional catastrophe, even such events that are far from policy, for example, storm on November 11 in the Kerch Strait, can indicate even such, which seemed like the consequences of natural disasters. Although the storm equally hit both the Russian and Ukrainian shore, the Russian port of the Caucasus and the Ukrainian port of Kerch, the damage caused to the Russian side turned out to be much harder than the Ukrainian side. All the sailors who died during the storm were on ships in the Russian port of the Caucasus, all 5 vessels of shipwreck, all 8 vessels thrown out of agriculture did not receive permission to leave the dangerous zone from the part of the Russian port leadership. In other cases of spontaneous disasters, the difference among the dead (for example, from floods in the summer of 2003 in Europe and the North Caucasus: Germany - 1, Czech Republic - 7, Russia - 132) and on the scale of damage could still be explained in the levels of economic development of affected countries. In the case of the Kerch storm, this explanation no longer works - today's Ukraine is still poorer than today's Russia. But the fact that in different situations is called sloppiness, irresponsibility, human factor, is institutions for protecting people's lives and preserving property. And in a poorer, more poor, but democratic Ukraine today they work better today than in a richer, but authoritarian Russia. Sacrifications of human lives in today's Russia are caused not by the element - but by destruction by the regime of institutions of modern civilization.

The prospects of the new political regime, whose legitimization is expected on December 2, do not raise doubts - it is archaic and historically doom. Political regimes with the vertical organization of society, with the dominance of violence and terror, lose to political regimes with its horizontal organization, tolerance, competition in the economic and political spheres. The greatest civilizations of the East, the most powerful states with the vertical organization of society - from Egypt to Assyria, from Mesopotamia to Parthia, which surpassed the level of wealth, economic, scientific and cultural development of the then western states, were swept by history. Only the ruins of their capitals - Thebes, Babylon, Nineveh, Petra, Palmyra, Merva remained to the descendants from them. More poor, but differently-horizontally-organized societies of the West not only survived, but also won a historical victory-not over the East-over an ineffective system by the organization of society, state power and economics. The post -war climb of the eastern countries - Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and in recent decades - India and mainland China - occurs in many respects imported from the West with an institutional foundation of horizontal competition.

Unlike the clarity of the final prospects of the current Russian regime, there are no answers to the three most important questions yet:

1) how long this mode will last;

2) what price Russia will pay for its existence;

3) How many victims of Russian citizens will cost its liquidation.

The analysis of the nature of the current regime is prompted by difficulties associated with both its sufficiently fast evolution and with the absence of obvious historical analogues and the limited application of the standard analytical apparatus. Despite the fact that many similar features can be found in various authoritarian dictatorships of the past, the current Russian regime has its exceptional features. The presence of a strange organization entitled "Party" United Russia "does not make either its ruling party or regime - party dictatorship, as it was in the communist USSR and Nazi Germany. The exceptional position of quasi-state corporations intended for redistribution in favor of their owners and their consumption of national economic resources does not make this regime corporate, as it was in Italy, Spain, Portugal of the middle of the last century. The dominant position of the representatives of the Order of the Kryukonosians and the Right Rights in power does not make this state order - as it was with the Order of the Templars, the Teutonic Order, with the Order state of Prussia.

The search for the current Russian political regime of the social model inevitably leads the researcher to the shores of Sicily and the Appeninsky Peninsula. Social organizations professionally specializing in the use of violence are not limited only to states, armies, secret services and private security enterprises. Among them there are organized criminal groups. It is naturally not about the desire to insult or humiliate anyone, but about the use of these terms exclusively in the analytical plan-as a description of certain, clearly fixed models of social behavior. The difference between the latter and the first is that the use of violence by the latter is not limited to law, even if extremely imperfect. At one time, Blessed Augustine accurately noticed the kinship of such power structures: "A state, devoid of justice, is nothing more than a gang of robbers."

However, a certain disappointment lies in wait for the researcher here. In the presence of even larger quantitative and qualitative analogies of the current Russian regime with the most famous criminal communities - the Italian “Goat NOSTRAL”, “CAMORRRA”, “NREGETTA”, Chinese “Triads”, Russian “thieves in law” - it should still be recognized that significant differences are also preserved. The mafia has its own principles, rules, codes of behavior, cruel, monstrous, unacceptable for civilized citizens. But these rules exist, both the leadership and members of the criminal communities in most cases still follow them. What is happening in today's Russia is poorly monitored by following the rules and codes of behavior, no matter how disgusting they may be. Нынешняя российская ситуация кажется более похожей на нестабильные группировки городской шпаны, отличающиеся неустойчивостью настроений и непредсказуемостью поведения – от отношений, кажущихся весьма доброжелательными, до внезапного удара финкой.

Независимо от уровня понимания природы нынешнего режима на повестке дня стоит вопрос о том, что делать в этой ситуации гражданам России.

Следует вспомнить правила поведения, которых приходится придерживаться при вынужденном общении нормальных людей со шпаной. Одно из них заключается в том, чтобы минимизировать риски встреч, контактов, общения с ее представителями. Другое сводится к неучастию в делах шпаны. Третье сводится к базовым правилам выживания в новых, мягко говоря, не самых приятных условиях. По словам Варлама Шаламова, их суть наилучшим образом была сформулирована зэками ГУЛАГа более полувека назад: «Не верь. Don't be afraid. Не проси».