Transit (14)
The previous article was about an attempt to return in 2000, in the script “Dictatorship of Development” in the format of bureaucratic authoritarian modernization, accompanied by some thaw (compared to the current lawlessness). Now we must analyze: how realized is all this?First, we will consider endogenous (internal) factors, and then we will engage in exogenous (external).
Much will become clearer if you use a historical analogy, understanding all the restrictions on this technique. Recall the Gorbachev thaw. In the terms of our scenarios, we may well say that then there was a transition from the script “Sluggish USSR” to the script “Dictatorship of Development”. Then, as now (if our forecast is correct), this thaw was caused by the need to mobilize and ensure the loyalty of elite groups to get out of the system crisis. First of all, it was necessary for the services of the technical intelligentsia, which was supposed to ensure “acceleration” - it was this task in attempts to modernize the untreated system Gorbachev put forward the first. When the acceleration failed, the “perestroika” began and it was necessary to expand the circle of mobilized elites - this problem was solved by “publicity”.
And now I want to return to the topic that I developed in the article “Transit 4” , which talked about the ideology and practice of high modernism according to James Scott. They tend, remind, an unjustifiably high idea of the controllability of social processes. Like, say, to control the temperature of the iron or pressure in the gas pipeline. Using relatively simple regulatory devices, you can relatively stably maintain (within the given accuracy) the temperature of the iron or pressure in the pipe.
At the end of the eighties, it seemed to many, for example, that you can plan a stable economy with a plan and market specified in front of the percentage attitude of the plan. Moreover, they discussed about this percentage! And now some sincerely believe that a mixture of democracy and authoritarianism is also controlled, where percentage attitude can also be almost set. Thus, the analogy I proposed revealed the community of primitive ideas about the social order of the leaders of management during the time of perestroika now.
Meanwhile, starting with a certain level of complexity, including, for example, self -organizational mechanisms, many stable states of the system become discrete, moreover, often - final. In other words-in the space of all possible states of the complex system there are several points of stability, all other points of the state are unstable and form many all kinds of transition trajectories from one stable (relatively stable) state to another. For example, the activity of a person knows two stable states - wakefulness and sleep. Any intermediate states are not only unstable, but also ineffective, but often associated with pathology. Of course, these stable conditions are only relatively relatively. The system can, being in them, accumulate internal problems, which withdraws it over time from this state. The system can be subjected to external influences, which will also translate it into an unstable state.
The primitive idea of society includes the belief according to which society can be stabilized in almost any in advance in a given state. On this, Gorbachevskaya thaw was burning. An attempt to dose publicity broke, and the avalanche of a new, unusual, critical information swept the minds of citizens. An attempt to dose the freedom of choice with appointments to the people's deputies fell off after the first creation to realize it. Already the following elections have become truly free. It would seem that minor deviations from a stable state (I remind you, all these conditions are locally stable) of a sluggish Soviet stagnation brought the system out of balance. And it rushed. The GKChP in August 1991 was an insolvent attempt to go into another stable state - a “security dictatorship”. However, the energy was not enough. The impulse of the flight of society from annoying lethargy was too great.
You already realized that I am seeing an analogy between two historical episodes - the Gorbachev thaw and a possible attempt by a new thaw. Following this analogy, we can expect, firstly, that the current initiators of the “development dictatorship” will also be sure that they can regulate the doses of weakening the dictatorship. And secondly, it can be foreseen in the same way that this dosing will break. The question is where?
As follows from the previous article, the dosage strategy will apply not only to the sphere of freedom of speech. In the same way, it is planned to dose the scope of law. As I noted in the previous article, it cannot be expected that the right will act in the field of political competition, as in other areas regarding the inviolability of the “vertical”. But an attempt to “charge” the right to normal work in the field of business relations will inevitably lead to the expansion of legal relations to other areas, including political ones. There are a lot of channels for this. Here is an example. We saw how the Putin government masked its political actions to the "disputes of business entities." But the same technique can be used by a society that can move the solution to political problems in the sphere of civil relations.
So, the main endogenous factor, which will destroy the new attempt of the “dictatorship of development”, is the failure of the dosage of freedom and law. Such dosage generates instability.
What can happen, where the trajectory leading to a new stable state will turn. If this thaw had enough time, then society would have the opportunity to adapt to it, accumulate new power, believe in itself and its capabilities. A new generation would come into force, would realize its political interests the middle class. I believe that for three or four years it would be enough for the process to gain sufficient inertia of movement to a sustainable state associated with the Smart Russia script, simply put to democracy. But, most likely, this time will not be. Then there remains the fork that we have already talked about: either the “security dictatorship” or “sluggish Russia”. The choice between them is determined by external influences, exogenous factors.
Naturally, ask a question: the impact on what? In this case, it is obvious that we should talk about the impact on the source of the thaw - the new president and that part of his team that initiates and supports the chosen strategy of bureaucratic authoritarian modernization, accompanied by a thaw. Here is the time to emphasize: this effect is facilitated to the extent that this source is localized, in which it is not provided with wide public support. But real support is not a sleepy thoughtless vote, not a strained paid youth enthusiasm for artificial “movements”, but the conscious and organized protection of the civil society of their interests, which at the moment coincided with the interests of a separate part of the authorities, do not get careful dosage, half measures, imitation. Therefore, such support is difficult to expect, which will facilitate the task of those who will work to curtail the “Development Dictatorship” script.
You have already noticed that I attribute to external factors dissatisfied within Russia, moreover, dissatisfied with the bureaucracy, civil and power. I have already mentioned a society whose support or the absence of one can also be an external factor. Finally, other external factors were already mentioned in previous texts, such as hydrocarbons, etc. We will still return to them as necessary, but now we will move on to the main external factor - dissatisfied with the bureaucracy. This will be an attempt to answer the third of the questions raised in the previous article: who will be dissatisfied with the bureaucracy?
However, the answer to this question is inseparable from the answer to the following question: what will they be unhappy and what are their goals?
The answers, however, are quite obvious. There are already dissatisfied with Medvedev’s nomination even now. This was evident from the election campaign, which simply was not there, and which in the regions was sabotage by representatives of the president in the alliance with the security forces. Remember the trap No. 1-“Lack of the base of legitimacy” from the article “Transit-10” . Here it is, in all its glory. With normal political competition, everyone is interested in maximum legitimacy of elections in order to ensure the legitimacy of power. In our country, everyone worked on the delegation of the elections so that the new leader would not be legitimumen; to understand the boundaries of the possible; To see his dependence not on the right, not on citizens, but from a small Codla, who built a trap called "presidential elections". Even Putin himself is dissatisfied with this nomination, who cannot come to terms with the inevitable and systematically makes it clear who is the main in the country, now and forever.
The general part of possible discontent is also obvious: establishing the normal work of economic institutions is inseparable, as noted above, from the formation of zones of the functioning of law. The thaw, allowed in one or another volume, is inseparable from the expansion of the zone of freedom of information, and therefore, from the expansion of the zone of active public attention to the activities of the authorities. Both that and another is a possible source of direct threat to bureaucracy in general and specific bureaucrats in particular.
We are talking about threats located outside the bureaucratic vertical itself. The imperious elite will inevitably face an alternative: to show everyone that threats from the outside are fictitious, or clearly show the sequence of intentions. In the first case, it will immediately become clear: both modernization and the thaw are fictitious. So, the mobilization of elite groups breaks down. So, this top is returning not in 2000, but at best-in 2007. And then the best scenario for her (for a while) is to look for a new consensus for the transition to the script “Sluggish Russia”.
In the second case, specific victims of such a policy will inevitably appear. But then the “vertical of power” will lose what supports the shaky loyalty in it: hope from below protecting from above. This inflation of loyalty is an internal threat to the vertical. It is no less important than the external threat.
Both that, and another creates a new psychological reality for the bureaucracy, in which the main thing is a sense of instability caused by transit of power, is supplemented by a sense of insecurity. Both that and another gives rise to a new surge in fear, no less than in 2004-2005, when fear gave birth to threats of terrorist attacks and orange revolutions. In total, it should not just be about discomfort, but about the panic state.
If you have a personified source source, you have a very limited number of action options: run away, attack, agree. I believe that if the Medvedev group will try to realize their intentions to return in 2001, then we will observe all three reactions in different proportions. The first reaction, it seems to me, will be represented by a relatively small number of supporters, and the type of reaction itself does not affect those scenario alternatives that we consider. The two remaining types of reactions correspond to either an attempt to turn to the “security dictatorship”, bringing down Medvedev’s regime, or to the script “Sluggish Russia” as part of a new bureaucratic consensus.
It is natural to expect that radicals - supporters of the first option - will dominate among the "security forces". This is natural, because they already control what Weber called the institutions of legitimate violence and that Putin allowed them to turn into institutions of illegitimate violence. The temptation is extremely great. However, not all security forces will be on one side of the demarcation line. They will affect, for example, the current disagreements between the Chekists. Finally, civilian bureaucrats will also be represented among the radicals. Such subjective qualities as the degree of hazard experience will work here.
I will start the next article by discussing the resources of the parties involved in the post -crop battles.
Author - President of the Indem Foundation
To be continued