Around Russia

Without a road

June 23, 2009 Arkady Moshes

A month after a month in Russian relations with the outside world, a general conflict is growing. Moreover, this conflict, as a rule, does not give anything to Moscow. Despite the beautifully sounding references to the aphorisms of Chancellor Gorchakov, according to which, Russia, they say, ended the period of “concentration”, in fact, a special effect is not achieved. To understand this, it is enough to look at the key points of the foreign policy agenda, without trying to determine the case of the parties in each case, but only comparing the goals and results.

Relations of Russia with the European Union are stagnating. Everyone has long been accustomed to this, so the lack of results of the next-by the way, the twenty-third-the Russia-Es Summite in Khabarovsk is no longer worried about anyone, including the diplomats themselves, who habitually console themselves with the fact that they managed to “repulse”, in truth, not very persistent European counterparts.

Meanwhile, the facts do not create a blessed, for struggling for the influence of the regional power, paintings. The energy has ceased to be the main link and turned into a constant source of disagreement. The EU sharply reduced the purchases of Russian gas (the crisis has nothing to do with it, because the import of Norwegian gas is increasing) and seriously set himself the task of diversification of energy supply sources. The outcome of the war of competing gas pipelines is still unknown, but according to the difficulties the process of coordinating the Northern Stream route is faced, it can be judged that it will only be more difficult to lobby. The EU strengthens its presence in the region of the common neighborhood. In May, an initiative in eastern partnership was launched, which all six invited post -Soviet states joined with pleasure. There is a general crisis of trust.

Russian-NATO relations most clearly characterize the mutual expulsion of diplomats. It will be at least unjustified in such an atmosphere of the Western country to a serious discussion of Russian security initiatives.

The Russian-Ukrainian confrontation also has long turned into a chronic one. But here, in recent months, visible shifts have occurred in the alignment of forces. During the winter gas war, Ukraine has proved that its system is much easier to endure Russian pressure than it was assumed, and that thanks to the volume of transit, Russia and Ukraine are in relations between interdependence. After all physical and reputation losses, Russia did not come a single step closer to control over Ukrainian gas transmission infrastructure. The March Declaration on the participation of the EU in the modernization of this infrastructure, signed despite the demarche of the Russian delegation, may be the first step towards the reorganization of the entire Russian gas trading system when Europe will acquire it on the Russian border. Finally, none other than Viktor Yanukovych, abandoning the backstage deal with Yulia Tymoshenko, demonstrated that he believes in the choice of the Ukrainian people - and not external recognition - as in the only source of legitimacy of power in the country, which once again emphasized that Moscow will never “put kings” in Kyiv.

Relations with Belarus reached the stage of a complete scandal. The refusal of Minsk to take over the chairmanship of the CSTO is simply unprecedented, and the demonstrative actions of the formally nearest partner in terms of borderline fencing from Russia have an image effect that goes beyond Belarus.

Uzbekistan refuses to join decisions on the creation of collective forces of operational response of the same CSTO. Kyrgyzstan either closes, or does not cover the American Manas base. The contradictions in gas with the same Turkmenia reached a dangerous degree of severity. Without exception, all the energy -reproducing countries of the Caspian region, not satisfied with the Russia's monopoly for transit, are striving to diversify their export.

The unwillingness of the world states to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a whole symptomatic in terms of assessing its real influence in the world and even in the post -Soviet space. But China deserves special attention in this context, relations with which, although they are trying to hide it, after last year’s war with Georgia, objectively complicated.

Indeed, there is a positive dynamics in relations with the United States, but it is too early to say how durable it will be. This is not the first attempt to “reboot” over the past decade, and it is possible that it will end as the previous, Bushevskaya, inability to agree.

The meaning of diplomacy at all times was the ability to increase the number of friends and allies, sometimes sincere, sometimes forced and temporary. If this does not happen, either the goals of politics, or the means, or both are inadequate.

One of the main, if not the main goal of the Russian foreign policy throughout the post -Soviet period, and especially actively since 2004, was the launch of reintegration processes in the USSR, the reconstruction of the Russian -Scentric system, the “zones of privileged interests” or, in other words, the sphere of influence. Moreover, this goal had both self -sufficient and external aspect. It is believed, and it is not unreasonable that the recognition of the other world players of the “High League” comes only when the ability to project their influence outside their own boundaries is proved.

You can understand this logic, but such a goal -setting will inevitably come across strict resistance. In the second half of the twentieth century, there were no cases in Europe when the decaying countries were reunited. This is because local leaders who have received recognition as the ruling elites of independent states will never give this status without struggle. (This applies not only to Russia: for example, Romania is spitting, but cannot become a new older brother for Moldova.) The European Union took place precisely because, unlike all previous supranational formations with their instinctive craving for centralization, only those functions that cannot be effectively carried out below.

It is possible to weaken the resistance of national elites both at the national and at an individual level, but this requires huge economic injections, from subsidies to whole industries to bribes to individual politicians, and the effect will be temporary. If we talk about the means, then Russia is trying to pursue the usual policy of the whip and the carrot. The problem is that in the 21st century a combination of promises and threats, even fulfilled, is not enough. It is necessary what is called “soft force” - the general attractiveness of the model of the state and economic structure. Today, Russia is clearly lacking in Russia, and in Europe - rich, less corrupt, internally adjusted - there are just a lot of it, and millions of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldavians were convinced of this in their own practice.

The basis of everything is highly self -esteem. Russian foreign policy thinking is too condescending to itself and arrogant in relation to others. With the economy that is 2-3 percent of the global GDP? It is difficult to drop a challenge to the West. There are no energy superpower; In this case, the world would become different after the Arab oil embargo of the 70s. The ideas that Russia always has a super resource in resources that can be “fucking” are incorrect because none of the potential “addressees” of such a policy deals with Russia alone, but has long built its own system of foreign policy relations.

Most likely, most of these arguments the Russian foreign policy community perfectly understands. And he tries to compensate for the feeling of losing with rigid rhetoric, negotiating intransigence, professionalism of diplomats and the worst thing - the lives of soldiers. But this is unlikely to be enough for a long time.

Theoretically, Russia has two roads for leaving today's situation. One - to confrontation with the West. Objectively, Russia cannot afford such an outcome due to economic weakness, calls of various kinds in the east and south, as well as the same absence of allies. Subjectively, Russian elites do not want this, because they are in no hurry to be in personal quality behind the new “iron curtain”.

Another road leads to a deep audit of current policy. To the rejection of the requirements to consolidate the exclusive rights in the near abroad for Russia. To the combination of market foundations in relations with neighbors with respect for their sovereignty, something like "money apart, but friendship friendship." To the understanding that in partnership with today's political Europe, Russia will be easier to develop in the modern world than in rivalry with it. But it seems that the Russian elites are not yet ready for the adoption of such an approach.

However, Russia is not for the first time to move on the road.

The author is the director of the Russian program of the Finnish Institute of International Relations, in 1988 - 2006. Employee of the Institute of European RAS

Photos of RIA Novosti