
The highest, as it were, voting government officials, led by the unchanged Boris Gryzlov, hastened to declare that with their vote, they, of course, would support President Medvedev’s initiative to change the procedure for appointing the chairman of the Constitutional Court. Actually, they are going to change not the “appointment procedure,” since the chairman of the Constitutional Court has always been elected by secret vote of judges as “first among equals,” but the constitutional system itself, or, in any case, one of its most important foundations. The appointment of the chairman of the Constitutional Court by the Federation Council, obedient to the president, reduces the political weight of the Constitutional Court in the current configuration of power to zero, although this is rather a theory, and in reality it is now not much higher.
All the lawyers in positions (nobles lick, it’s impossible to leave such a project without comment) rushed to look for some higher logic in the proposal of lawyer Medvedev that fell out of the blue. Thus, the moderately oppositional Elena Mizulina expressed the idea that the proposed procedure would be “more transparent,” but she did not dare discuss the appropriateness of transparency in this particular issue. In fact, there is no point in even discussing the democratic optimality of the previous procedure, but of all the lawyers in office, only Judge Gadis Gadzhiev spoke directly about this - from the composition of the Constitutional Court, which has faded in recent years, he alone retained the courage required by a judge.
Both political scientists and analysts did not remain silent with a smart look. Of all the tortured versions, the most plausible one seems to be the one according to which the place of the head of the Constitutional Court is reserved for the head of the SSPU, assistant to the president Larisa Brycheva. But this is contradicted by two important circumstances. Firstly, no one asked Brycheva whether she would like to become chairwoman of the Constitutional Court. Brycheva, who replaced Ruslan Orekhov as head of the Main State Legal Directorate in 1999 (who, according to our information, is now well employed), and before that was his permanent deputy, is one of the oldest and most powerful shadow figures in the Presidential Administration. If someone liked this place, then Brycheva would understand it “in a hardware way” and could ask for compensation, for example, the position of an ordinary judge of the Constitutional Court, which gives honor and guarantees without depriving her of maneuver. As for the chairman of the Constitutional Court, he is protected by the FSO, he cannot talk to anyone without it being reported to everyone at once, and such a position for Brycheva, who is accustomed not to empty discussions, but to real “resolution of issues,” would become offensive and undeserved reference.
Secondly, different groups in the Kremlin probably reacted differently to the judges’ decision to elect Zorkin as chairman of the Constitutional Court in February. It is unlikely that he retained the measure of independence and idealism that was characteristic of him in 1993, when in the conflict with Yeltsin he sided with the Supreme Council. But still, Zorkin is a figure, and those supporters of the “vertical of power” who build it without regard to the Constitution would prefer any other member of the Constitutional Court (except Gadzhiev) for this post. But there, behind the Kremlin wall, there are also lawyers, for whom the professor behind the pawn formation is just useful - like a rook in reserve. And Medvedev, by the way, never spoke about plans to overthrow (and how?) Valery Zorkin before his legal three-year term.
What, then, is the solution to this latest (not the first of its kind) presidential proposal, which too clearly falls out of the context of public speeches and even some of Medvedev’s actions? (For example, the initiative to abolish the 3-year “probationary period” for judges, announced in the same package, has the exact opposite reformist vector.) In addition to deputies who are obliged to babble something due to their position, and intellectual “political scientists,” there are also real elites, including those abroad, who again wonder in different languages: “Why would this happen all of a sudden?” In their eyes, Medvedev cannot be seen as unpredictable; this is not the image he is shaping for himself, and strong motives are needed for his next (there’s no other way to say it than in Yeltsin’s way) “squiggle.”
The last time everyone was similarly dumbfounded was in November, when for no apparent reason the presidential term of office was proposed to be increased from 4 years to 6. And all the jurists in office, of course, enthusiastically supporting this and even somehow justifying it, began to think to themselves with fear: what will happen tomorrow? And “tomorrow” nothing has happened yet. Meanwhile, Valery Zorkin’s term of office as chairman of the Constitutional Court will expire in February 2012. Then, if “tomorrow” there really are no disturbances, this is the picture that will emerge: a newly elected Duma (for a term of 5 years and, probably, with a different party breakdown), a certain (there is, however, little choice here) undoubted presidential candidate , and the position of the chairman of the Constitutional Court will just be vacant.
That is, Medvedev’s different initiatives “in the field of judicial reform” actually relate to different “sports.” If our logic is correct, we should expect another project, which has arisen more than once, but has so far been “published”, to unite under one roof (possibly in St. Petersburg) all three higher courts: the Constitutional, the Supreme and the Supreme Arbitration. However, this, too, due to the lack of transparency mentioned by lawyer Mizulina, is just a version. There is no point in pampering deputies with explanations, not to mention voters.
The author is a columnist for Novaya Gazeta
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