What to do. Part 5

I am afraid that what I wrote in the four previous articles might seem unexpected to many. Firstly, because the answer to the question “What to do?” was not reduced to the traditional explanation of why one should vote “for such and such.” Secondly, because my answer focuses on the own activity of those who are already asking this question or are close to it. Thirdly, I suspect, because my answer does not contain any exciting, mind-blowing ideas like storming the Kremlin. Everything looks quite banal and therefore can be perceived with distrust. Well, I’m not a politician, and therefore I can afford to say what I think, and not what is expected of me.

However, one complaint about my texts may sound quite justified: “You, Satarov, write how to do it, but don’t write what and why.” Agree. And therefore I will try to further fill these gaps.

But, first of all, I think it is important to return to the traditional question “Whom to support?” The fact is that sooner or later this question will arise before everyone who decides to come to the polling stations. There is no escape: we are forced to realize our political preferences in elections by choosing specific persons or parties from the ballot offered to us.

I will answer the formulated question twice. My first answer again may not satisfy many readers, but I ask you not to immediately stand on your hind legs, but to delve into the rationale for my thesis, which I consider extremely important. Here it is:

Today in Russia it is important not who comes to power, but as a result of what procedure.

Don't take my word for it. When I say “no matter who,” I of course mean some reasonable range of choices. But regarding the procedure, everything is much more complicated and important. The procedure by which a politician comes to power determines his future dependence and loyalty. If someone becomes, say, president as a result of a fair election in which there was equal competition with equal access of candidates to legal resources, then victory is determined solely by the number of votes received. This is what determines the winner’s dependence on these votes and, therefore, on the voters. This means that he must demonstrate loyalty to voters both symbolically and in reality - through actions. Of course, the politician’s dependence does not end there. He is dependent on his team, which helped him win, on his sponsors, who formed his election fund. And he will demonstrate his loyalty to them by appointing supporters to posts and pursuing policies that coincide with the expectations of the interest groups that supported him. But in conditions of transparency of power, this is not a tragedy: he cannot (or is very difficult) to do this in forms that are clearly against public interests.

Now there is another option: someone became president as a result of a behind-the-scenes conspiracy of a certain “elite” group, which monopolized the resources necessary to bring its protege to power. At the same time, any opportunities for other candidates to become real competitors for votes were suppressed. An empty question: on whom will such a winner depend and to whom will he be loyal? You know the answer yourself. Voters have nothing to do with it. They are just a screen covering the imitation of elective procedures.

No matter how much we like such a winner with his bearing or the persuasiveness of his voice, this is not important here. Moreover, even if he really wants to do something useful for society, this is also insignificant. He is unable to do this, because he is not dependent on citizens, but on a narrow group with which he has a behind-the-scenes agreement. He is dependent on their monopoly resources. It's in their hands. And he will always work for them, not for us. And they will sell us stories about how good their protege is and how he cares about the people. No matter how attractive the program of the “successor” may be, no matter what milk rivers and jelly banks it promises, it is all meaningless and insignificant. Those who shadowed him to power will not allow him to do anything.

I will try to express everything that has been said in the following almost equivalent formulation:

An angel who came to power as a result of the special operation “Successor” is much more dangerous than a devil who won a fair election.

Now is the time to move from somewhat theoretical-sounding statements to examples and explanations. It seems to me that the fall from grace of Russian democracy (more precisely, the democrats) began under Yeltsin before the December 1993 elections to the State Duma. Then the transition to a mixed electoral system was dictated not only by the misconception that it contributed to the formation of strong parties (not confirmed), but also by pragmatic calculations. It was assumed that the winners, by controlling federal television channels, could facilitate their party victory (this was also not confirmed, however, due to extremely low professionalism). This was an example of how electoral legislation changes to suit the needs of one political force.

The depth of the decline increased with the presidential elections in 1996. Then control over information resources was used much more professionally. And these resources worked mainly for Yeltsin.

The final fall from grace occurred under Putin. But the successors did not come up with anything new. They simply took to the extreme, absurdity and indecency what had appeared during the previous presidency.

It should be noted that the sins of the Yeltsin period described (as well as those not mentioned) above were not necessarily committed for selfish reasons. There were many who sincerely believed that the preservation and development of democracy in Russia was possible only if specific politicians or parties won elections. It was then that many of us began to confuse the victory of democracy with the victory of “democrats” (I used quotation marks only because certain political forces and persons were then classified as democrats, often simply by their self-name). I write about this with bitterness, because I myself was committed to this heresy (I apologize for the clerical wording). And getting rid of it was quite painful. And we all haven’t thought much about it – from politicians to voters. We flouted the principles of equal competition in elections, convincing ourselves that if we don’t do this now, then there won’t be elections later.

And here’s what’s interesting: elections have practically disappeared after all (you wouldn’t call this word what the Putin regime is offering us). This means that the following reasoning has the right to exist. If we had agreed, say, in 1993 or 1996, with political opponents to unshakably observe the principles of fair political competition and be the first to set an example, then we would have a chance to take root in democracy. Of course, you can say: “They should have thrown it!” Isn’t it clear!?” Maybe. Or perhaps not. How to conduct business. But, and this is the main thing, there would still be a chance. And when we ourselves sinned against democracy, maybe not even very much, we took the path of curtailing it. Sami. And then they inevitably lost themselves, losing democracy.

I talk about this in such detail for two reasons. I pointed out the first one and am not afraid to repeat it:

Today in Russia it is important not who comes to power, but as a result of what procedure.

The second is no less interesting: today we have a chance to correct the mistake that we all made a decade earlier (I emphasize - all of them; some sinned, others condoned). More on this in the next publication.