The fate of the architectural party

Disputes about how many chairmen “Right Cause” should have – three or one – do not answer the main question: how can a party of an architectural type, that is, constructed from above, and not organically developed from below, count on any decent electoral result in conditions when this is already the third similar project of the Russian government. Moreover, the first (“United Russia”) is the main one for the Kremlin, and the second (“Socialist Revolutionaries”) is secondary. In this situation, there are no resources left for the “third stage” project.

The right's modern problems stem in large part from the history of its creation. In 2007, it seemed to Kremlin technologists that liberals were not needed at all in the Russian political system as an independent party. For supporters of this ideology, the liberal-conservative club “November 4th” was previously created, and all those liberals who did not fit into it could be free. The Union of Right Forces was doomed to death, having become the main target during the Duma election campaign, which was conducted in a pronounced anti-liberal spirit. The fate of Yabloko looked a little less sad - it was assigned the role of a dying party, gradually transforming into a public organization, active only at the municipal level and protecting green spaces from petty officials.

The situation was somewhat changed by the election of Dmitry Medvedev as president, who showed interest in liberal party building. The result of this was the creation of “Right Cause,” but in the most distilled version, completely safe for the Kremlin. To do this, two pro-Kremlin spoiler parties – “Civil Force” and the Democratic Party of Russia – were added to the “disloyal” (albeit very conditionally) SPS. At the same time, the SPS functionaries managed to insist only that leading positions in the new party should not go to the leaders of the spoilers - Barshchevsky and Bogdanov. However, this victory turned out to be incomplete - Bogdanov’s brother entered the political council of the “Right Cause”, and the Moscow organization of the “rightists” was formed by Bogdanov’s comrades-in-arms (which is not surprising - the authorities especially needed a guarantee of the reliability of the capital’s “rightists” so that they would I had no intention of agreeing on joint street actions with “non-systemic” liberals). And during the election campaign in Sochi, it turned out that Bogdanov himself joined the new party - formally as an ordinary member. But SPS activists, who did not want to participate in the architectural project, did not join the new party. And the former members of the Union of Right Forces who remained in the party received only a third of the seats on the political council - now they are forced to sit side by side with figures who have never had anything to do with the liberal political movement, but are now in the majority.

The triumvirate of co-chairs, selected on the principle of a balance of interests, also has an architectural character. It is clear that Gozman, as in the Union of Right Forces, represents the interests of Chubais. Titov, even when creating “Business Russia” (as an alternative to the RSPP), was closely associated with the Kremlin - according to his views, he could well find a place for himself in “United Russia”. Bovt, in principle, initially suited both the Kremlin and Chubais. The rules of architectural party building also provided for the “uncharismatic” nature of the new leaders, who should not take away votes from United Russia.

It is with this factor that the background of the ideological discussion is connected - what kind of party to be, liberal or conservative. In fact, the “conservatives” (Titov) are focused on the functioning of “Right Cause” as a small “niche” party, trying to gain the support of electoral groups that do not vote for United Russia in federal elections, but are not in real opposition to the Kremlin. These are entrepreneurs and managers grumbling at the government, dissatisfied with specific decisions in the economic sphere (for example, the refusal to reduce VAT), but at the same time not advocating the resignation of the cabinet and highly valuing political stability. There are at least two systemic problems with this scenario. The first is that the size of this electorate and its eternal tendency towards absenteeism do not allow the party not only to overcome the 7% barrier, but also to receive 3-5% of the votes. The second is the lack of incentives to vote for such a party at the federal level; even if a miracle happens and it forms a small faction in parliament, this will not affect the fate of the VAT in any way. This point of view also has a plus - in regional elections, representatives of the local elite who, for one or another non-political reason, did not join United Russia, can speak under the relatively safe flag of a party loyal to the Kremlin. And at the expense of their own resources (fame, money) they get a chance to get into legislative assemblies in order, however, to solve their own problems (increase their status, improve the system of their intra-elite connections). But converting such regional successes to the federal level is extremely difficult. In addition, it is well known that at the very first problems on the horizon, such pragmatists strive to minimize risks for themselves personally and cannot be a reliable support for the party.

“Liberals,” in turn, strive to appeal to a broader electorate, both those who vote for “United Russia” and those who are critical of the government, in order to break out of a narrow political niche. They believe that in a crisis, a liberal political-economic alternative may be in demand again. However, the implementation of this scenario also looks doubtful. It is extremely difficult for the Architectural Party to gain the support of real oppositionists - they are unlikely to be attracted to calls from the right that have little to do with modern political problems to ban the propaganda of Stalinism or to establish a new holiday in memory of the liberation of peasants in 1861 (with the help of these calls the party seriously intends to emphasize its liberal identity , but in reality they only cause bewilderment). And in the struggle for “loyalist” votes, the party may find itself in the position of the former Union of Right Forces. Let us recall that his conflict with the Kremlin began precisely with the fact that the right began to pose a threat to the federal electorate of United Russia, seriously laying claim to part of its rather large periphery (the other part was claimed by the “Socialist Revolutionaries”, who also felt serious problems in connection with this in the early stages of the 2007 campaign).

It seems that competition within the “Right Cause” will continue and even intensify, without fundamentally changing the essence of the party. It is unlikely that any of the points of view listed above will completely win - most likely, everything will end in compromises that cause irritation on both sides. And the question of sole leadership will apparently be postponed until the Duma election campaign, although by then it will be very difficult to find a “star” who can give hope for electoral success and at the same time act within the framework of strict rules determined by the architectural character of the party.

The author is first vice-president of the Center for Political Technologies